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This paper discusses the impact and the appropriateness of tax incentives for small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the European Union. First, we provide a survey of 
implemented tax incentives specifically targeted at SMEs in the 28 EU Member States. 
Building hereon, we measure the impact of these regimes on the effective tax burdens of 
targeted companies. We find that SME tax incentives are a commonly used measure among 
European policy makers. The vast majority of regimes, however, only marginally reduce the 
tax liability of SMEs. If major reliefs are available, they mostly stem from special tax rates 
whereas tax credits and special allowance play a minor role. In the second main part of the 
analysis, we examine the arguments potentially justifying the usage of SME tax incentives. 
As a main result, small firms per se do not create more jobs and innovations nor do they face 
insurmountable financing constraints. The existence of market failures commonly associated 
with SMEs – and possibly warranting the use of SME tax incentives – can therefore not be 
confirmed. Instead, disproportionate tax compliance costs for small entities constitute the 
most compelling argument for a special tax treatment. These compliance costs can most 
appropriately be addressed by administrative reliefs. Special tax rates, tax credits and 
allowances, in contrast, are not only inefficient but also ineffective in this regard. Instead of 
improving the neutrality of the overall tax system, the latter are likely to add further 
distortions and unnecessary complexity. Altogether, the focus of policy-makers should thus 
shift from providing discriminatory incentives to the design of a generally neutral and simple 
tax system, which would benefit small as well as large enterprises. 
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1. Introduction 
Recently, public discussions on tax policy have mainly centered around profit 
shifting activities by large, multinational firms.
1
 The majority of businesses, however, is made 
up of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In the European Union, they account for 
99.8% of all businesses and 67% of total employment.
2
 Moreover, SMEs are widely 
perceived to be the engine of growth and innovation for the economy.
3
 Accordingly, the 
European Commission (EC) regards the “capacity to build on the growth and innovation 
potential of small and medium-sized enterprises” to be incremental for the future prosperity of 
the European Union (EU).
4 
The creation of a “world-class environment for SMEs” has thus 
become a major goal of the European Commission.
5
 
While the need of an attractive business environment for SMEs is widely agreed 
upon, it is less apparent how to create it. SMEs face disadvantages with regard to financing, 
competition failures and disproportionate regulatory burdens compared to large enterprises. 
An attractive business environment minimizes the impact of these obstacles and aims at 
providing a level playing field for firms of all sizes, industries and legal forms.
6 
Naturally, 
taxation is an important component of the regulatory framework in which businesses operate. 
It constitutes a major, inevitable cost factor for all businesses. For policy-makers, taxation is a 
particularly interesting feature of the business environment as it can be directly influenced 
and controlled through legislation.
7
 Occasionally, however, tax legislation is excessively and 
inappropriately utilized to compensate for problems not related to taxation and the creation of 
a neutral and efficient tax system takes a back seat.
8
 
The use of tax incentives specifically targeted at SMEs may be one of these 
occasions. Preferential treatment for certain groups of taxpayers generally interferes with the 
neutrality and the efficiency of the tax system and the social benefits of any tax incentive have 
                                                 
1
 See Fuest/Spengel/Finke/Heckemeyer/Nusser (2013) pp. 307 ff.; OECD (2013a) pp. 9 ff. 
2
 See European Commission (2015a) p. 7. 
3
 See Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (2014) p. 2; European Commission (2013) pp. 3 f.; OECD 
(2009a) p. 22. 
4
 See European Commission (2008) p. 2.  
5
 See European Commission (2008) p. 2. SMEs were again prominently featured in the Commission’s 2020 
Strategy as a key driver of smart, sustainable and inclusive economic growth. The special focus of some of the 
EC’s flagship initiatives on SMEs as well the Annual Reports on the Performance of SMEs constitute further 
indicators for SMEs’ perceived significance in the European Union. See European Commission (2010a) pp. 10 
ff.; European Commission (2015a) pp. 7 ff.  
6
 See European Commission (2013) pp. 8 ff.; Lee (2014) pp. 183 ff.; BIS (2015) pp. 74 ff. 
7
 See OECD (2009a) pp. 31 ff.; European Commission (2015b) pp. 75 ff.  
8
 See OECD (2001a) pp. 87 ff. 
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to be carefully weighed against the related costs.
9
 The adequacy of SME tax incentives thus 
hinges on the desirable traits of small and medium-sized enterprises and incentives’ 
effectiveness in fostering these traits to the benefit of society as a whole.
 
Policy-makers across 
Europe apparently consider these two prerequisites to be given as SME tax incentives have 
become a commonly used policy instrument in Europe as well as the rest of the world. 
This study analyzes and evaluates the current use of SME tax incentives in the 
European Union. In this endeavor, we first examine which SME tax incentives are currently 
offered and how they affect effective tax burdens. The latter is done with the help of the 
European Tax Analyzer, a proven simulation program for the calculation of effective tax 
burdens that allows the implementation of a variety of incentive types. In the second step, we 
analyze in how far tax incentives – especially in their current forms – are an appropriate tool 
to achieve the abovementioned policy goals associated with the SME sector. We thereby aim 
at providing policy-makers with clear-cut advice on the usage of special tax treatments for 
micro, small and medium-sized enterprises.  
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Chapter 2 gives an overview of 
the currently available tax incentives in the EU before Chapter 3 quantitatively analyzes their 
impact on effective tax burdens. Building hereon, Section 4 discusses and evaluates the 
underlying policy rationale for the provision of SME tax incentives before Chapter 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Overview of SME Tax Incentives in the EU 
2.1 Definition of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
Analyzing SME tax incentives, of course, first requires a definition of the term SME. 
While a multitude of quantitative as well as qualitative approaches can be found in the 
academic literature, the most prominent and widely used definition, especially in the EU, has 
been established by the European Commission.
10
 As the analysis at hand deals with tax 
                                                 
9
 See Klemm (2010) p. 324.  
10
 The European Commission first published a Commission recommendation on the definition of small and 
medium-sized enterprises in 1996. Since then the recommendation has been followed by several updates. The 
following discussion is based on the most recent definition provided by the Commission recommendation of 
May 6, 2003. Furthermore, the Commission has issued an updated user guide to the SME definition in 2015 that 
is also drawn upon. See European Commission (1996) pp. 4 ff.; European Commission (2003) pp. 36 ff.; 
European Commission (2015c) pp. 1 f. 
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incentives in the European Union and legislators who are impacted by the European 
Commission, we will also refer to this  standard in the following.  
Table 1: SME definition  by the European Commission 
Category Number of employees Turnover Balance sheet total 
Micro < 10 ≤ € 2 million ≤ € 2 million 
Small < 50 ≤ € 10 million ≤ € 10 million 
Medium < 250 ≤ € 50 million ≤ € 43 million 
 
The SME definition by the European Commission employs three quantitative criteria 
to distinguish four different size classes. Enterprises are classified as either micro, small, 
medium-sized or large according to their number of employees, annual turnover and balance 
sheet totals (see Table 1). Specifically, enterprises need to meet the given employment 
threshold and either the turnover threshold or the maximum balance sheet total to be assigned 
to the respective size category.
11
 Besides these quantitative criteria, the SME definition by the 
European Commission also includes provisions on related parties. An enterprise must not own 
25% or more of the capital or the voting rights of potentially related parties to be considered 
independent. Furthermore, no external party must hold 25% or more of the capital or the 
voting rights of the enterprise.
12
 If these requirements are not met, the thresholds for 
employment, turnover and balance sheet total apply for the whole group of enterprises instead 
of the stand-alone entity.
13
  
2.2 Typology of SME Tax Incentives 
Tax incentives are special provisions of the tax code granting preferential treatment 
to certain activities, investments or taxpayers.
14
 With regard to SME tax incentives, the 
preferential treatment takes many forms and available options for policy-makers can be 
broadly categorized along the lines of three key dimensions: 
1) Level of taxation: Does the incentive apply on the level of the enterprise or does it 
benefit the business owner upon extracting income from the business? This 
distinction primarily applies to businesses that are not taxed transparently (i.e., 
corporations, limited liability companies and – in some countries – certain forms of 
                                                 
11
 See European Commission (2003) p. 39. 
12
 Exceptions apply to certain kinds of investors such as venture capital investors, business angels, institutional 
investors or public bodies. 
13
 See European Commission (2015c) pp. 16 f. 
14
 See Zee/Stotsky/Ley (2002) p. 1498; Klemm (2010) pp. 315 f.  
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partnerships). In the case of transparently taxed entities (i.e., sole proprietors and 
partnerships), the two levels cannot be distinguished. 
2) Tax liability vs. compliance costs: Does the incentive address the actual tax liability 
or does it address the compliance costs that are related to the process of determining 
and settling the tax liability?  
3) Input vs. output-based incentives: Does the size of the relief depend on the amount 
and/or the kind of inputs invested within the enterprise or does it depend on the 
outcome the investment generates (i.e., taxable income)? Input-based tax incentives 
include special depreciation schemes, investment allowances and tax credits while 
special tax rates, exemptions and tax holidays constitute the most common output-
based measures. 
In addition to the abovementioned three dimensions, further options arise in the 
design of SME tax incentives, in particular with regard to additional eligibility restrictions not 
relating to firm size. Such restrictions may refer to firm age (i.e., only new or young firms), 
location (i.e., only enterprises in certain regions), time (i.e., incentives only available for a 
certain period) and the sort of activity performed by the taxpayer (i.e., only businesses in a 
certain industry). Moreover, incentives differ with regard to their way of targeting SMEs. 
They can either explicitly or implicitly target firms of a certain size. Explicit SME incentives 
use clear-cut thresholds on quantitative size criteria (e.g., turnover) whereas implicit measures 
achieve a preferential treatment of SMEs in other ways. For example, limiting the absolute 
amount of available reliefs can induce disproportional advantages for SMEs without explicitly 
excluding large entities. If the caps are chosen appropriately, the relief only makes up a small 
amount of large businesses’ overall tax liability whereas small enterprises benefit more in 
relative terms.  
For the purpose of this analysis, the term SME tax incentive is defined very broadly 
as any kind of special tax treatment that is particularly beneficial for enterprises within the 
SME spectrum given by the European Commission.
15
 This includes all benefits either 
emanating from schemes that are exclusively applicable to SMEs (explicit incentives) as well 
as those provisions that are especially advantageous for SMEs despite being generally 
applicable to all enterprises (implicit incentives). Given the abundance of regimes and the 
model restrictions of the quantitative analysis, the following analysis will, however, primarily 
focus on those incentives being applicable to corporate entities and those addressing the size 
                                                 
15
 See European Commission (2003) pp. 36 ff. 
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of the actual tax liability (i.e., no purely administrative reliefs).
16
 Moreover, taxes not relating 
to income are neglected. 
2.3 Available SME Tax Incentives in the EU 
Currently, a broad spectrum of tax incentives is offered to SMEs in the EU. 
Disregarding administrative reliefs and provisions for venture capital funds, 18 of 28 EU 
Member states target tax benefits specifically at SMEs (see Figure 1).
17
 In total, more than 60 
regimes exist. Geographically, Scandinavian and Eastern European countries mostly refrain 
from supporting SMEs through the tax code while Southern and Western Europe seem more 
convinced of the usefulness of such measures. Countries such as Belgium, France and Spain, 
for example, have implemented a multitude of incentives for micro, small and medium-sized 
enterprises.  
Among the different incentive types, preferential tax rates are the most common 
instrument to support SMEs. 10 of the 28 EU Member States feature CIT rate schedules 
favoring small businesses over large ones. Importantly, special tax rates usually apply to a 
wide range of micro and small enterprises as they are rarely connected to eligibility criteria 
not related to firm size. Input-based incentives for SMEs are commonly used as well. 
Specifically, investment allowances, tax credits and accelerated depreciation schemes can 
each be found in about a quarter of the EU Member States. The input-based regimes often 
come along with extensive eligibility criteria, though. These criteria restrict the benefits to 
certain kinds of companies and investments, e.g., only new companies, only R&D-related 
investments or only companies in certain regions. In other instances, the incentives are 
granted under certain conditions such as the creation of additional jobs or the reinvestment of 
preferentially treated income. As a consequence, the number of affected SMEs as well as the 
size of average effective reliefs can be expected to be much lower for tax allowances, tax 
credits and depreciation schemes than for output-based measures. Overall, it appears that 
preferential tax rates are the primary instrument to support the small business sector as a 
whole whereas input-based and shareholder-level incentives are mostly designed to serve very 
specific purposes for which SMEs are considered key contributors. These purposes include 
the creation of jobs as well as the development of new products and technologies. The 
widespread reliefs provided by output-based measures, on the other hand, could represent an 
                                                 
16
 Many regimes apply to corporate as well as non-corporate entities, though, and the trends and patterns in the 
provisions of SME tax incentives are similar for both sectors. The same is true with regard to the arguments 
possibly supporting tax benefits for corporate and non-corporate SMEs. 
17
 Detailed descriptions of all available regimes can be found in the country reports in Annex 1. 
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intended compensation for perceived size-related disadvantages of micro and small 
businesses, e.g., the disproportionate tax compliance burden.  
A closer look at the currently available SME incentives also shows that policy-
makers differentiate between micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. The latter are 
eligible for not even a third of all SME incentives explicitly referring to size criteria whereas 
small entities are only excluded from a few regimes. Apparently, the need for tax incentives is 
perceived to be much stronger for micro and small businesses than for medium-sized 
enterprises. The size criteria used in tax codes mostly correspond to the criteria from the SME 
definition of the European Commission (i.e., the number of employees, sales and total assets). 
The exact thresholds differ regularly, though. As an exception, eligibility for special tax rates 
mostly depends on income. Interestingly, only few countries abstain from explicit size criteria 
and favor SMEs implicitly by establishing absolute maximum reliefs. In the Netherlands, for 
example, the investment allowance as well as the progressive tax rate schedule are open to all 
companies but the effect relative to the overall tax burden is likely to be negligible for 
medium-sized and large enterprises due to the small absolute amounts of eligible expenditures 
and income. Such implicit measures offer the advantage that exceeding the respective 
thresholds does not vacate the whole relief. Instead, it only changes the marginal treatment for 
excess investments or profits, which is more conducive to the equity and the neutrality of the 
tax system.  
The denial of refunds is also characteristic of most current SME tax incentives in the 
EU, i.e., if tax allowances and tax credits exceed the tax base (or the tax liability, respectively) 
only few countries grant a refund on the excess amount. More commonly, carry forwards or 
carry backs are granted. In several countries, however, even carry forwards are declined (or 
severely limited) so that low-profit and loss-making taxpayers forfeit the benefits. Given that 
low-profit firms in particular have problems to obtain enough capital for their investment 
projects, the respective incentives could exclude a large share of those taxpayers who are 
actually intended to be supported.  
8 
 
Figure 1: Major income tax incentives for small and medium-sized companies in the EU (2015) 
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Lastly, the availability of multiple SME tax incentives in some countries is 
noteworthy. When offered simultaneously, the incentives naturally impact on each other’s 
effectiveness in lowering tax burdens as the effect of a diminished tax base depends on the 
applicable tax rate and vice versa. An investment allowance for R&D investments, for 
example, could lose much of its appeal if the income is subject to a CIT rate of 15% instead of 
33.33% as in France. Hence, the co-existence of multiple input and output-based regimes adds 
a significant amount of complexity to the tax system. Given the prominent role of compliance 
costs for SMEs,
18
 legislators would probably be well-advised to provide the intended reliefs 
by means of a minimal number of regimes. With regard to the compliance burden, four 
countries in the EU (Hungary, Latvia, Portugal, Romania also provide the very smallest 
companies with access to significantly simplified regimes. These regimes build on turnover 
instead of taxable income and regularly replace several levies at once (e.g., the CIT, the PIT 
and social security contributions).
19
 The simplifications, of course, also serve the purpose of 
optimizing net tax revenues, i.e., not incurring overly high administrative costs for the 
collection of small amounts of taxes from thousands or millions of very small businesses. 
 
3. Impact of SME Tax Incentives on Effective Tax Levels in the EU 
The qualitative overview of available regimes in Section 2 and Annex 1 shows that 
SME tax incentives are common practice in the EU. The incentives, however, differ 
significantly in their design and in their scope of application. The actual impact of available 
incentives on the majority of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises may therefore be 
limited for many regimes. If, however, the effects on effective tax burdens were negligible, it 
would be hard to make a case for tax incentives given the additional compliance and 
administrative costs. The following quantitative analysis therefore measures the actual effects 
of SME tax incentives. The calculations also allow conclusions about the proper targeting of 
SME tax incentives as they help to unveil the relationship between the size of reliefs and firm 
characteristics such as profitability, capital intensity and capital structure. Lastly, the effective 
reduction of tax burdens hints at potential distortions of investment and financing decisions 
introduced by size-dependent tax treatment (large firms versus SMEs but also micro versus 
small and medium-sized companies). In particular, businesses could be incentivized to not 
                                                 
18
 See Sandford/Godwin/Hardwick (1989) pp. 191 ff.; DeLuca/Stilmar/Guyton/Lee/O’Hare (2007) pp. 170 ff.; 
Eichfelder (2011) pp. 63 ff. 
19
 Further simplifications (not covered in Figure 1) include simplified accounting regimes, simplified collection 
procedures and even the exemption from certain levies such as the VAT and some local business taxes. 
Oftentimes, these simplifications are only available for non-corporate entities, though. 
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outgrow their current size class, which would, of course, be the opposite of the intended effect 
of SME tax incentives.  
3.1 European Tax Analyzer 
The quantitative analysis is performed with the help of the European Tax Analyzer, a 
simulation program to calculate effective average tax burdens for model enterprises in 
different jurisdictions. For this study, four different model enterprises are considered: a large, 
a medium-sized, a small and a micro company. In order to sample the model firms, each 
company in the 28 Member States of the European Union as reported by the AMADEUS 
database by Bureau von Dijk (see Figure 2) is assigned to one of the four size classes.
20
 
Building on this classification, averages of all relevant financial indicators are taken over the 
companies in each category. Finally, the averages define the respective model enterprises and 
their characteristics. Put differently, the model companies represent the average European 
companies in the four size classes. 
The basic idea of the European Tax Analyzer is to simulate the development of the 
model companies twice: one time in a world without taxes and one time in a world with taxes. 
The difference in firm values between both scenarios ultimately represents the tax burden. 
The development of balance sheet positions, sales, costs and other financial indicators 
therefore needs to be simulated over a period of ten years in the next step. The estimates also 
include macroeconomic data such as interest rates (short- and long-term rates for debtor and 
creditor) and price increases (primary products, general inflation, wages, real estate and 
investment goods)
21
 as well as data on the structure and the costs for employees and R&D. 
For depreciable assets, it is generally assumed that they are disposed of at the end of their 
useful lives and replaced by an identical asset. The replacement costs are adjusted for 
inflation. The initial financial endowments consist of debt and equity. Dividends are 
distributed annually to shareholders whereas undistributed after-tax profits become retained 
earnings and can also serve as a further source for acquiring new assets or financing the 
corporation in general. Due to deriving average European model enterprises from the 
AMADEUS database, companies have identical pre-tax figures (balance sheet, profit- & loss-
                                                 
20
 A two-step approach is used to generate the model companies: First, each EU company in the AMADEUS 
database is classified as either micro, small, medium-sized or large according to the definition by the European 
Commission. In a second step, average financial indicators (i.e., balance sheet, profit and loss statement, etc.) are 
determined for each category and form the financial framework of the respective model enterprises. 
21
 Interest rates are determined by the average of the monthly short-term and long-term interest rates as provided 
by the European Central Bank (MFI interest rate statistics). Assumed price increases are determined by the 
average of monthly or quarterly price indices provided by Eurostat and the Statistical Office of Germany for 
2012. 
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statement and liquidity) and are subject to equal macroeconomic parameters in all countries. 
As a consequence, differences at the end of the simulation period are exclusively induced by 
differences in tax codes.  
Figure 2: Model companies (European Tax Analyzer) 
Balance Sheet ('000 €) Micro Small Medium Large 
Total assets 1,074 4,442 15,857 171,949 
  Fixed assets 340 1,385 5,215 58,759 
    Intangible fixed assets 21 88 340 5,199 
    Tangible fixed assets 284 1,139 4,111 41,151 
    Other fixed assets 36 158 764 12,408 
  Current assets 734 3,057 10,642 113,190 
    Stock 175 816 2,978 27,362 
    Debtors 154 993 2,911 41,938 
    Other current assets 405 1,248 4,753 43,891 
Equity & liabilities 1,074 4,442 15,857 171,949 
  Equity 509 2,268 7,035 73,194 
    Common stock 151 659 1,694 21,306 
    Other equity 358 1,609 5,341 51,888 
  Non-current liabilities 156 601 2,558 28,000 
    Long-term debt 127 416 1,796 19,937 
    Other non-current liabilities 28 185 762 8,063 
  Current liabilities 410 1,572 6,264 70,755 
    Loans 77 344 1,920 22,661 
    Creditors 246 963 3,265 32,385 
    Other current liabilities 87 265 1,079 15,709 
     Profit & Loss Statement ('000 €) 
    Sales 659 4,764 19,404 209,689 
Operating profit (loss) 72 381 1,348 14,278 
Profit (loss) before tax 62 342 1,237 13,369 
Profit (loss) after tax 48 264 957 10,384 
     Employment 
    Employees 3 21 90 628 
Costs of employees ('000 €) 84 634 2,703 21,939 
     Financial Ratios 
    Return on equity 10.45% 13.15% 15.74% 16.53% 
Profit to turnover ratio after tax 7.30% 5.30% 4.93% 4.95% 
Equity ratio 47.35% 51.06% 44.37% 42.57% 
Personnel intensity 14.18% 14.80% 14.97% 11.42% 
Intensity of machinery 26.43% 25.64% 23.63% 23.93% 
Stock intensity 16.29% 18.38% 18.78% 15.91% 
 
Each model enterprise is a corporate entity. Hence, the relevant tax codes applied in 
the taxation of the model company throughout the calculation period are those applying to 
corporations in the EU Member States in 2015. Importantly, the multi-period approach 
12 
 
combined with the modelling of an actual company allows the consideration of a multitude of 
tax rules that would not be possible otherwise. Above all, tax bases and tax codes’ impact 
thereon can be accounted for.
22
 This is of particular importance for examining SME-specific 
tax incentives that often modify tax bases and restrict eligibility by thresholds referring to 
balance sheet totals, turnover or the number of employees. 
Figure 3: Calculation of effective tax burden (European Tax Analyzer) 
 
The actual tax burden on the corporate level is calculated by subtracting the post-tax 
value of the company at the end of the simulation period from the pre-tax value (see Figure 
3). The former equals the sum of the pre-tax cash flows and the value of the net assets of the 
company at the end of the simulation period. The post-tax value of the enterprise is based on 
the pre-tax cash flow less the tax liabilities from each period. Moreover, the value of the net 
assets at the end of the simulation period reduced by potential tax liabilities on hidden 
reserves needs to be added to arrive at the post-tax value of the company. The effective tax 
burden is given as an absolute number. 
                                                 
22
 The following provisions relating to the tax base are considered: depreciation schemes (pool vs. individual 
depreciation schemes; depreciation periods), inventory valuation (LIFO, FIFO or weighted average cost 
method), capitalization of R&D costs, employee pension schemes (i.e., deductibility of pension costs, 
contributions to pension funds), thin capitalization rules, earnings stripping rules, notional interest deductions, 
provisions for bad debt and guarantee accruals, avoidance mechanisms for double taxation on foreign-source 
income (i.e., exemption method, tax credit, deduction of foreign taxes), non-deductible items and loss relief rules 
(carry-back, carry-forward). Additionally, non-profit taxes with special bases can be included (e.g., real estate 
tax, payroll tax). 
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3.2 Implementation of SME Tax Incentives 
Table 2 displays the currently available SME tax incentives that are included in the 
determination of effective tax burdens with the European Tax Analyzer. Calculations are 
made for all 28 Member States of the European Union. Due to the model assumptions and the 
characteristics of the model companies, not all regimes can be modelled. Since effective tax 
burdens are given as absolute numbers, the values calculated for the four model enterprises 
(micro, small medium-sized and large) cannot directly be compared with each other. Instead, 
the effective tax burden is calculated twice for each SME category: once according to the 
provisions applying to large enterprises and once allowing for SME tax incentives. The 
difference between both values represents the reduction induced by SME tax incentives. 
Comparing the relative reliefs for different size classes then enables a comparison of effect 
sizes.  
Further SME incentives such as preferential loss offset rules and special provisions 
on carry forwards and refunds of excess reliefs provided by tax incentives usually do not 
show in the effective tax burdens due to the underlying assumptions about the model 
companies’ economic development. Moreover, purely administrative reliefs cannot be 
captured and shareholder-level incentives are neglected.
23
 SME incentives limited to overly 
specific assets, activities or regions (e.g., for energy rationalization, education and training 
expenses or investments in special economic zones) are not considered either because they do 
not apply to the majority of SMEs or their implementation would require a more detailed 
specification of the model company that is not feasible with the AMADEUS data at hand. 
                                                 
23
 Shareholder taxation and the effect of incentives on this level of taxation are generally difficult to capture 
adequately because of the heterogeneity of shareholders. While investment funds and corporate investors are 
oftentimes exempt from the taxation of their proceeds, individuals are mostly not. However, even among them, 
taxation may vary significantly depending on the classification of proceeds as either capital income or business 
income. In addition, the vast majority of incentives are provided on the corporate level and previous analyses 
have found only small effects of incentives on the shareholder level. See European Commission (2015b) pp. 84 
ff. 
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Table 2: Implementation of available SME tax incentives (European Tax Analyzer) 
Country Incentive 
Implementation 
Yes/no Notes 
Austria - - - 
Belgium progressive CIT rate yes applies to each model SME 
  exemption from fairness tax no does not apply to model companies (only corporate level considered) 
  exemption from capital gains tax no does not apply to model companies (no capital gains) 
  increased notional interest deduction yes applies to micro and small model companies 
  investment allowance (10.5%) no does not apply to model companies (only for non-corporate entities) 
  investment allowance (4%) no not applicable in combination with notional interest deduction 
  investment allowance for safety measures no not implemented due to limited application (only safety measures) 
  accelerated depreciation no not implemented due to model restrictions and immateriality 
Bulgaria - - - 
Croatia reduced CIT rate for new investments no not implemented due to limited application (only new ventures and major 
business extensions; similar regime for all companies in place) 
  investment allowance for costs of education and training no not implemented due to model restrictions and immateriality 
Cyprus - - - 
Czech Republic - - - 
Denmark - - - 
Estonia - - - 
Finland - - - 
France reduced CIT rate yes applies to micro and small model companies 
  exemption from surcharge on income tax liability (3.3%) yes applies to micro and small model companies 
  exemption from surcharge on income tax liability (10.7%) yes applies to each model SME 
  progressive local business tax yes effect not displayed because scheme is part of the general tax code 
  exemption from local business tax no does not apply to model companies (exceed eligibility threshold) 
  progressive minimum taxation no does not apply to model companies (exceed eligibility threshold) 
  tax credit for newly acquired assets (based on depreciation) yes applies to each model SME 
  tax credit for newly acquired assets (based on acquisition costs) no not implemented due to limited application (regional) 
  tax credit for newly hired employees no not implemented due to model restrictions 
Germany accelerated depreciation yes applies to micro model company 
  investment allowance no not implemented due to model restrictions 
  exemption from local business tax (€ 24,500) no does not apply to model companies 
Greece - - - 
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Country Incentive 
Implementation 
Yes/no Notes 
Hungary progressive CIT rate yes effect not displayed because scheme is part of the general tax code 
  exemption from local business tax yes applies to micro and small model companies (municipalities determine 
eligibility) 
  exemption from innovation tax yes applies to micro and small model companies 
  tax credit for interest payments yes applies to each model SME 
  investment allowances for new employees and disabled employees no not implemented due to model restrictions 
  investment allowance for certain business assets no not implemented due to model restrictions 
  accelerated depreciation no not implemented due to limited application (regional) 
  alternative regimes (simplified entrepreneurial tax, small business 
tax, itemized tax on small businesses) 
no not implemented due to model restrictions 
Ireland reduced CIT rate for new companies no not implemented due to limited application (only new companies) 
Italy - - - 
Latvia progressive CIT rate no does not apply to model companies (exceed eligibility threshold) 
  tax credit no not implemented due to limited application (regional) 
 micro enterprise tax no does not apply to model companies (exceed eligibility threshold) 
Lithuania reduced CIT rate yes applies to micro model company 
  free depreciation yes applies to micro model company 
  unrestricted loss carry forward no does not apply to model companies (no losses) 
Luxembourg reduced CIT rate no does not apply to model companies (exceed eligibility threshold) 
  exemption from local business tax (€ 17,500) yes effect not displayed because scheme is part of the general tax code 
Malta tax credit (general) yes applies to micro and small model companies 
  tax credit for R&D no not implemented due to limited application (only R&D) 
  tax credit for new ventures and major business extensions no not implemented due to limited application (only new ventures and major 
business extensions and only certain activities) 
Netherlands progressive CIT rate yes effect not displayed because scheme is part of the general tax code 
  investment allowance yes effect not displayed because scheme is part of the general tax code 
 lump-sum deduction for R&D no does not apply to model companies (only for individual entrepreneurs) 
Poland immediate depreciation yes applies to micro model company 
  tax credit for innovative technology no not implemented due to model restrictions 
  investment allowance for new assets / new employees no not implemented due to limited application (regional) 
Portugal  reduced CIT rate yes applies to each model SME 
  progressive surcharge yes effect not displayed because scheme is part of the general tax code 
  exemption from corporate income tax for new companies no does not apply to model companies (only if simplified regime applied) 
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Country Incentive 
Implementation 
Yes/no Notes 
 Portugal (ctd.) tax credit for R&D no not implemented due to limited application (only R&D) 
 tax credit for reinvested retained earnings no not implemented due to model restrictions 
 notional interest deduction yes applies to all model SMEs but only to initial deposits and capital increases 
Romania turnover tax no does not apply to model companies (exceed eligibility threshold) 
Slovakia - - - 
Slovenia - - - 
Spain reduced CIT rates yes applies to each model SME (more generous for micro and small companies) 
  reduced CIT rate (Basque regions) no not implemented due to limited application (regional) 
  exemption from local business tax yes applies to micro model company 
  tax credit for newly hired employees (€ 3,000 per employee) yes applies to micro and small model companies; only applies for new employees 
(model assumes employees to be eligible in first year) 
  tax credit for newly hired employees (50% of outstanding 
unemployment payments) 
no not implemented due to model restrictions 
  accelerated depreciation yes applies to micro and small model companies 
Sweden - - - 
United Kingdom progressive CIT rate no not implemented due to limited application (only oil and gas companies) 
  investment allowance for R&D no not implemented due to limited application (only R&D) 
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3.3 Effective Tax Burdens by Size Class 
Table 3 shows the effective tax burdens for micro, small, medium-sized and large 
companies as well as the reduction of the tax burden induced by SME tax incentives. First, the 
lack of significant reliefs for medium-sized entities in all but three countries (France, 
Hungary, and Portugal) is noticeable. The reduction of their tax burden does not exceed 2% 
anywhere. The average relief amounts to 0.1% (0.86% if only considering the countries 
providing incentives for medium-sized entities). Whatever arguments justify the use of SME 
tax incentives for policy-makers, they do not seem to apply to medium-sized enterprises, i.e., 
firms with 50 to 250 employees and an annual turnover between € 10 million and € 50 
million.
24
 As there are no significant reliefs for medium-sized companies, the ranking of the 
respective tax burdens is also a good estimate of the general levels of company taxation in the 
sample countries (see Figure 4). Clearly, substantial differences occur. France, for example, 
features a tax burden that is more than four times as high as the burden imposed on Bulgarian 
firms. In general, enterprises in Eastern European countries are subject to relatively low levels 
of taxation whereas the Western and the Southern European countries can mostly be found at 
the other end of the spectrum. 
Figure 4: Effective tax burden of medium-sized companies (European Tax Analyzer) 
 
                                                 
24
 The definition of medium-sized enterprises given by the European Commission also demands a balance sheet 
total between € 10 million and € 43 million. The balance sheet total is rarely used as an eligibility criterion for 
SME tax incentives, though. See European Commission (2015c) pp. 10 f. 
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For small enterprises, the number of countries providing reliefs increases to eight 
(only taking into account those considered in the European Tax Analyzer). While half of them 
provide substantial reliefs (France, Hungary, Spain), incentives in the other half feature very 
modest effects (Belgium, Malta, Portugal). The average relief amounts to 3.50% of the tax 
liability as determined for the rules applying for large taxpayers (15.17% if only considering 
countries effectively providing incentives for small companies). 
By far the most generous regime exists in Hungary where the tax burden is reduced 
by more than 60% compared to large enterprise rules. The reduction is mainly driven by 
exemptions from the local business tax and the so-called innovation tax which are only 
available for small and micro companies.
25
 Municipalities, however, can decide against 
granting the exemption. Hence, businesses do not benefit everywhere in Hungary. In addition 
to the exemptions, small and micro companies may also be eligible for three alternative 
regimes that completely replace ordinary income taxation based on accrual accounts (the 
simplified entrepreneurial tax, the small business tax and the itemized tax on small 
businesses). These regimes may induce even larger reliefs. The case of Hungary exemplifies 
two major concerns with SME tax incentives. Firstly, if companies are not eligible for 
lucrative incentives as soon as they outgrow the small business category, generous reliefs 
provide a huge discouragement from growth or a huge encouragement of misreporting taxable 
income and business size. Total exemptions from certain taxes are especially prone to this 
problem. They create notches at which not only the marginal but also the average tax rate 
jumps. This creates stronger distortions of economic decision-making than so-called kinks 
where only the marginal tax treatment changes.
26
 The availability of a multitude of regimes 
and incentives
27
 is the second concern with Hungary. In the face of several options, 
entrepreneurs may experience difficulties in predicting the overall available relief and 
choosing the regime actually minimizing the tax burden. A substantial part of the tax savings 
may thus be offset by the additional costs of tax planning and tax compliance. As mentioned 
above, the imbalance of the relief and the costs of planning and complying becomes even 
more of a concern for less generous regimes, e.g., in Belgium.  
                                                 
25
 Both taxes are levied on the difference of sales and certain costs directly attributable to sales. 
26
 See Slemrod (2013) pp. 259 ff., for a detailed differentiation of kinks and notches in the tax system. Section 
5.1 also includes a detailed discussion of problems emanating from jumps in the tax system.  
27
 Besides the alternative regimes, Hungary also offers several tax credits, allowances and depreciation schemes. 
See the country report in Annex 1. 
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Table 3: Effective tax burden by size class in the EU in thsd. € (European Tax Analyzer) 
Country 
Large  
enterprise 
Medium-sized enterprise Small enterprise Micro enterprise 
No incentive Incentives Reduction No incentive Incentives Reduction No incentive Incentives Reduction 
AUT 51,091.3 5,519.0 5,519.0 0.00% 1,506.9 1,506.9 0.00% 275.9 275.9 0.00% 
BEL 54,151.9 5,451.7 5,451.7 0.00% 1,533.6 1,497.3 -2.37% 298.8 262.5 -12.15% 
BLG 16,996.3 1,693.0 1,693.0 0.00% 485.4 485.4 0.00% 94.2 94.2 0.00% 
HRV 32,459.7 3,240.3 3,240.3 0.00% 933.7 933.7 0.00% 178.6 178.6 0.00% 
CYP 24,595.5 2,554.2 2,554.2 0.00% 697.2 697.2 0.00% 127.5 127.5 0.00% 
CZR 31,522.9 3,145.3 3,145.3 0.00% 900.3 900.3 0.00% 174.1 174.1 0.00% 
DEN 41,355.1 4,149.9 4,149.9 0.00% 1,185.9 1,185.9 0.00% 234.0 234.0 0.00% 
EST 32,964.6 3,281.5 3,281.5 0.00% 936.3 936.3 0.00% 182.4 182.4 0.00% 
FIN 34,494.8 3,455.9 3,455.9 0.00% 988.4 988.4 0.00% 192.9 192.9 0.00% 
FRA 75,909.9 6,935.9 6,828.8 -1.54% 1,736.9 1,641.4 -5.50% 310.4 228.7 -26.31% 
GER 53,577.4 5,291.7 5,291.7 0.00% 1,489.3 1,489.3 0.00% 288.7 287.6 -0.40% 
GRE 49,627.8 5,023.7 5,023.7 0.00% 1,463.0 1,463.0 0.00% 288.8 288.8 0.00% 
HUN 63,671.4 5,322.4 5,301.1 -0.40% 1,335.6 517.0 -61.29% 170.9 105.7 -38.17% 
IRE 21,005.3 2,095.3 2,095.3 0.00% 600.2 600.2 0.00% 116.9 116.9 0.00% 
ITA 52,459.4 5,261.3 5,261.3 0.00% 1,489.0 1,489.0 0.00% 289.5 289.5 0.00% 
LTV 27,372.4 2,755.5 2,755.5 0.00% 786.6 786.6 0.00% 156.3 156.3 0.00% 
LIT 28,234.5 2,851.2 2,851.2 0.00% 813.3 813.3 0.00% 163.3 105.4 -35.42% 
LUX 50,949.7 5,081.8 5,081.8 0.00% 1,459.5 1,459.5 0.00% 275.1 275.1 0.00% 
MAL 57,446.5 5,721.9 5,721.9 0.00% 1,637.6 1,605.7 -1.95% 316.2 284.5 -10.04% 
NED 41,482.8 4,046.4 4,046.4 0.00% 1,088.0 1,088.0 0.00% 186.1 186.1 0.00% 
POL 32,904.4 3,293.0 3,293.0 0.00% 941.8 941.8 0.00% 185.0 184.6 -0.20% 
POR 43,562.7 3,796.6 3,767.1 -0.78% 1,071.6 1,057.4 -1.33% 208.2 200.1 -3.87% 
ROM 27,385.8 2,742.0 2,742.0 0.00% 784.9 784.9 0.00% 153.9 153.9 0.00% 
SVK 37,577.1 3,758.1 3,758.1 0.00% 1,075.1 1,075.1 0.00% 210.3 210.3 0.00% 
SLV 27,954.0 2,782.2 2,782.2 0.00% 797.2 797.2 0.00% 154.2 154.2 0.00% 
ESP 55,230.1 5,494.4 5,494.4 0.00% 1,572.0 1,170.5 -25.54% 305.0 166.0 -45.56% 
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Country 
Large  
enterprise 
Medium-sized enterprise Small enterprise Micro enterprise 
No incentive Incentives Reduction No incentive Incentives Reduction No incentive Incentives Reduction 
SWE 36,867.0 3,681.7 3,681.7 0.00% 1,054.1 1,054.1 0.00% 204.9 204.9 0.00% 
UKD 36,942.8 3,720.9 3,720.9 0.00% 1,062.1 1,062.1 0.00% 212.5 212.5 0.00% 
Mean 42,137.4 4.005.2 3.999.6 -0.10% 1.122.339 1.072.404 -3,50% 212.665 197.616 -6,15% 
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For micro companies, available SME tax incentives are even more numerous and 
more generous than for small entities. 10 out of 28 countries provide measures that are 
implemented in the calculations and the average relief per country increases from 3.50% to 
6.15% of the effective tax burden. Except for Hungary, all countries with SME tax incentives 
in place offer more generous reliefs to micro than to small enterprises (see Figure 5). 
Apparently, policy-makers perceive the need for tax incentives to decrease in firm size across 
all three subcategories of the SME sector. Countries providing especially generous regimes 
for micro companies include Spain, Hungary, Lithuania, Belgium, France and Malta. Except 
for Lithuania, each of these countries features a comparatively high tax burden for large 
corporations. It seems, the higher the general tax burden, the more likely a country is to 
provide relief for small and micro businesses. Interestingly, this may evoke the problem of 
severely disadvantaging the enterprises which are just too big to be eligible for SME 
incentives but not big enough to lower the overall tax burden by engaging in international tax 
planning. 
Figure 5: Effect of SME tax incentives (European Tax Analyzer) 
 
 
3.4 Comparison of Incentive Types  
Table 4 displays the reduction in tax burdens induced by three different types of 
SME tax incentives – incentives relating to the tax base (i.e., special depreciation schemes 
and investment allowances), tax credits and special tax rates. The comparison shows special 
tax rates to be the most common as well as the most generous type of tax incentive. The 
average relief provided by reduced tax rates amounts to 15.17% and 16.60% of the effective 
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tax burden for small and micro companies, respectively. This is three times as high as the 
average reduction induced by tax credits (for small entities even five times as high). The relief 
of measures relating to the tax base appears negligible at less than 1% on average. Altogether, 
only one input-based tax incentive reduces the tax burden of an average micro company by 
more than 10% (Malta) whereas special tax rates regularly induce double-digit reliefs.  
There are several explanations for these findings. First of all, a number of input-
based incentives cannot be implemented into the European Tax Analyzer because they relate 
to very specific circumstances that are not met by the model companies under consideration. 
While the omissions may amplify the gap between the effects of the different forms of relief, 
they are not the main driver as is evidenced by the lower average effect per incentive (4.11% 
vs. 13.06% for small companies and 5.55% vs. 20% for micro companies, respectively). 
Instead the basic design and the intentions behind the incentives appear to be crucial. By 
design, special depreciation schemes such as in Germany and Lithuania do not change the 
overall tax liability but only the timing of tax payments. The reduction of the tax burden can 
thus be traced back to a mere interest advantage emanating from deferred tax payments.
28
 Tax 
allowances and tax credits theoretically allow for more generous reliefs as they reduce the 
overall sum of tax payments, either directly (tax credits) or indirectly (investment 
allowances). The reliefs, however, are modest as well. Partly, this is caused by the high 
profitability that is assumed for the model companies. For low-profit enterprises, the actual 
impact of input-based incentives may be larger than indicated by the European Tax Analyzer 
because the reduction of taxable income (of the tax liability if tax credits are considered) 
accounts for a larger share of the overall tax base (tax liability) for them. The modest relief, 
however, could also indicate other purposes than a mere reduction of the tax burden. The two 
allowances in Belgium and Portugal, for example, support equity financing. It seems their 
primary purpose is securing improved financing neutrality. The tax credits in Malta and Spain 
both relate to job creation and take employment or personnel costs as calculation bases. So the 
reduction of wage costs apparently is the aim of these regimes. Lastly, the abovementioned 
depreciation schemes may not substantially reduce the sum of tax payments but they do 
                                                 
28
 The interest advantage naturally increases in the applicable interest rate. The calculations at hand assume an 
interest rate of 1.1%, which is evidence of the low-interest period financial markets have experienced in the past 
few years. In times of higher interest rates, special depreciation schemes may thus provide more generous reliefs. 
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facilitate the financing of new investments, thereby addressing SMEs’ problems in obtaining 
capital in early investment stages.
29
  
Table 4: Effect of SME tax incentives by incentive type (European Tax Analyzer) 
Country 
Small enterprise Micro enterprise 
Tax base Tax credit Tax rate Total Tax base Tax credit Tax rate Total 
BEL -1.85% 0.00% -0.47% -2.37% -2.03% 0.00% -10.10% -12.15% 
FRA 0.00% -0.61% -4.89% -5.50% 0.00% -0.51% -25.81% -26.31% 
GER 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.40% 0.00% 0.00% -0.40% 
HUN 0.00% -1.48% -59.70% -61.29% 0.00% 0.00% -38.17% -38.17% 
LIT 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -1.95% 0.00% -53.05% -35.42% 
LUX 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
MAL 0.00% -1.95% 0.00% -1.95% 0.00% -10.04% 0.00% -10.04% 
POL 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.20% 0.00% 0.00% -0.20% 
POR -0.75% 0.00% -0.58% -1.33% -0.88% 0.00% -2.99% -3.87% 
ESP -0.24% -8.28% -17.56% -25.54% -0.38% -6.10% -39.15% -45.56% 
Mean -0,94% -4,11% -13,06% -15,17% -0,97% -5,55% -20,00% -16,60% 
Notes: Table 14 only covers countries providing SME tax incentives that can be implemented with the European 
Tax Analyzer. The average reduction for each type of incentive is calculated on a per-incentive basis, i.e., it only 
includes those countries providing the respective type of incentive. 
Altogether, it seems that input-based tax incentives address very specific issues and 
that they focus on SMEs because SMEs are considered to be especially affected by the 
respective issues (e.g., financing constraints
30
) or because they are perceived to be crucial in 
solving the issues (e.g., unemployment, insufficient R&D activity
31
). Additionally, EU 
legislation may force Member States to limit tax incentives to small and medium-sized 
enterprises.
32
 Targeting specific issues, however, oftentimes requires additional eligibility 
criteria so that a multitude of firms and investments are excluded (e.g., an increase in 
employment, a restriction to R&D-specific investments or a restriction to newly founded 
companies). This shows in comparatively small average reliefs in the calculations. Eligibility 
criteria for preferential SME tax rates, in contrast, usually only include firm size. They appear 
to be the instrument of choice if SMEs as a whole are intended to be relieved – whatever the 
motivation behind this kind of incentive may be. 
                                                 
29
 For a scheme allowing immediate depreciation, the share of acquisition costs being contributed in the form of 
reduced tax payments in the acquisition year is (almost) equal to the statutory tax rate. In Spain, for example, 
immediate depreciation would thus reduce the capital requirements for the acquisition of a new machine by 25%. 
30
 See Section 4.1.4 for a comprehensive discussion of SMEs’ financing constraints. 
31
 See Section 4.1.2 for a comprehensive discussion of SMEs’ role in job creation. 
32
 The European Commission restricts the provision of direct and indirect state aid to selected (groups of) 
enterprises in order to prevent the distortion of competition. SMEs are subject to less restrictive regulation. See 
European Commission (2009) pp. 9 ff.  
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The interplay of input-based incentives and special tax rates is another aspect worth 
examining. Four of the 10 countries with SME tax incentives provide several measures at the 
same time (only counting the incentives being implemented in the European Tax Analyzer). 
An especially interesting constellation occurs in Lithuania where the overall reduction of the 
tax burden for a micro company amounts to 35.42%. If the model company only took 
advantage of the special tax rate and deferred the option to immediately depreciate newly 
acquired fixed assets, the tax savings would be much higher (53.05% of the tax burden). The 
counterintuitive result occurs because immediate expensing of acquisition costs creates 
hidden reserves that are realized at the end of the sample period of 10 years. As a 
consequence, the income in the last period exceeds the eligibility threshold for the preferential 
tax rate and the model company incurs a higher tax burden than a similarly successful 
company with more consistent taxable earnings. This phenomenon, of course, is at least partly 
the result of the model assumptions, i.e., the final liquidation. However, it also shows that one 
incentive can impede the effectiveness of other incentives if the measures are not well-
aligned. Moreover, the example highlights the increase in complexity for taxpayers if they are 
confronted with a multitude of tax incentives. Similar effects may occur when preferential tax 
rates and investment allowances are provided simultaneously as the value of an allowance 
increases in the marginal tax rate. Preferential tax rates could thus, for example, impede 
incentives to invest in R&D activities. 
3.5 Sensitivity Checks 
Besides the size of a company, other characteristics may impact the way companies 
are affected by SME tax incentives. The following sensitivity checks therefore examine the 
effects of changes in profitability, financial leverage, employment and the amount of 
machinery used by the model companies. The results not only show which kinds of 
enterprises benefit the most but also provide valuable insight into the mechanics of the 
incentives. 
The results of the sensitivity check on profitability are displayed in Table 5. The 
relative size of the reliefs (the share of the overall tax burden that is avoided due to SME-
specific provisions) is compared for the base case (micro company) as well as a high-profit 
and a low-profit scenario. For the high-profit case, the profitability of the model company is 
raised by 30% with everything else equal (assets, liabilities, number of employees). 
Accordingly, profitability drops by 30% in the low-profit scenario. The case of a firm with 
negative pre-tax profitability ratios is not considered. It is obvious, though, that loss-making 
25 
 
firms would only pay non-profit taxes and could not benefit from the implemented tax 
incentives unless refunds are granted on input-based measures (which is usually not the case). 
First of all, the relative size of the reliefs mostly decreases slightly as profitability is 
raised. This pattern occurs because the size of most reliefs is not affected by a 30%-increase 
in profitability
33
 while the overall tax liability grows in taxable income. Hence, the relief 
makes up a smaller share of the overall tax burden for more profitable businesses. Especially 
big differences between the three scenarios occur in France where the additional income 
induced by the increase in profitability is not subject to preferential tax rates whereas the 
income in the low-profit scenario is fully eligible. Consequently, the average corporate 
income tax rate is significantly lower for the low-profit than for the high-profit firm. With 
regard to input-based incentives, it needs to be highlighted that the absolute size of the relief 
only stays the same if marginal tax rates are strictly proportional in the considered interval of 
profitability. If rates are progressive – usually for non-corporate entities – the 
advantageousness of allowances and depreciation schemes increases in profitability. With 
progressive tax rates in place, such incentives would thus provide the smallest reliefs to the 
neediest businesses with the lowest profits (at least in absolute terms). 
The example of France also discloses the redundancy of eligibility criteria explicitly 
relating to size. If companies beyond a certain size ought not to benefit from an incentive, it is 
usually enough to set the amount of eligible income, assets or expenses (depending on the 
type of incentive) sufficiently low. Even if large enterprises are eligible, the relief will then 
make up such a small share of their overall tax liability that it is negligible for them. They 
benefit much less than small entities while the incentive to remain small in order not to 
exceed a certain size threshold is eliminated. Additionally, the administrative effort for 
taxpayers as well as tax administrations is reduced as firm size does not need to be 
documented. Moreover, the amount of lost tax revenues should be limited given the small 
number of large enterprises (and even medium-sized ones).
34
 A reverse trend, i.e., a regime 
being increasingly beneficial as profitability is raised, can be found in Lithuania. Lithuanian 
micro companies are subject to preferential tax rates which apply up to an income threshold 
so high that even in the high-profit scenario the model company’s income is fully eligible. As 
                                                 
33
 The increase in profitability is induced by an increase in sales. Hence, the calculation basis (acquisition cost of 
fixed assets, amount of equity, number of employees) of input-based incentives stays the same. As CIT rates are 
mostly proportional, this results in constant absolute reliefs. The relief provided by preferential tax rates also 
remains unchanged as long as the amount of preferentially treated income remains constant. The income of the 
micro model company mostly exceeds the eligible amount of income substantially so that the size of the relief is 
unaffected for these regimes as well. 
34
 The percentage of large enterprises in the population of European businesses is 0.2%. See Section 4.1.1.  
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the share of profit taxes relative to non-profit taxes increases in income, the relative size of the 
relief also grows.
35
  
Table 6 shows the results of the sensitivity check on the equity ratio. A direct impact 
of the amount of equity on the size of the relief can only be noticed in Belgium and Portugal. 
In these two countries, companies are allowed to deduct a notional interest on equity. 
Naturally, the interest deduction increases as more equity is obtained and the incentive 
regimes become more beneficial. Nevertheless, the average relief of all incentives considered 
decreases as the equity ratio is raised. This trend is not caused by changes in the actual size of 
the reliefs (measured in total €) but by changes in the income against which the reliefs are 
measured. As more equity is used, the amount of debt decreases so that interest payments and 
taxable income become smaller. The change in the equity ratio thus triggers a change in the 
profitability and results in the same effects already observed in the sensitivity check on 
profitability.
36
 The trend of higher average reliefs for companies that are more levered 
therefore does not indicate the incentives to be discriminatory against equity financing but 
rather reflects the debt bias of the overall tax system.
37
  
Tables 7 and 8 display further sensitivity checks on the amounts of machinery and 
employment used by the model company. The schemes of accelerated depreciation in 
Germany and Lithuania expectedly yield larger reliefs if more machinery is used. Apart from 
that, the results reinforce the above findings: As machinery and employment are raised, the 
related expenses, i.e., depreciation and personnel costs, increase and lower the income of the 
enterprise. In most countries, the absolute size of the relief remains unaffected so that the 
share of the overall tax liability that is avoided due to SME tax incentives increases. The 
reverse effect occurs when the amounts of machinery and employment decrease. The 
mechanism is the same as for the sensitivity check for profitability.
38
 
 
                                                 
35
 In Lithuania, the change in profitability also affects the taxation of the hidden reserves at the end of the sample 
period. As a consequence, opposing effects occur as profitability is changed. This also explains the increase of 
the overall relief in the high-profit as well as the low-profit scenario. 
36
 The changes in Lithuania deviate from the rest of the sample, i.e., the relative size of the relief increases in the 
equity ratio. This is due to the high amount of income being eligible to the preferential CIT rates.  
37
 For a comprehensive discussion of the debt bias featured in most tax systems, see Section 4.2.2. 
38
 Lithuania displays different patterns due to the abovementioned properties of the respective SME incentives. 
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Table 5: Effect of SME tax incentives by profitability (European Tax Analyzer) 
  
Profitability -30% Base case Profitability +30% 
Tax  
base 
Tax  
credit 
Tax  
rate 
Total 
∆ base 
case 
(% points) 
Tax 
base 
Tax  
credit 
Tax  
rate 
Total 
Tax  
base 
Tax  
credit 
Tax  
rate 
Total 
∆ base 
case 
(% points) 
BEL -2.17% 0.00% -11.56% -13.60% 1.45 -2.03% 0.00% -10.10% -12.15% -1.95% 0.00% -8.65% -10.61% -1.54 
FRA 0.00% -0.68% -34.48% -35.16% 8.85 0.00% -0.51% -25.81% -26.31% 0.00% -0.40% -20.48% -20.89% -5.43 
GER -0.57% 0.00% 0.00% -0.57% 0.18 -0.40% 0.00% 0.00% -0.40% -0.32% 0.00% 0.00% -0.32% -0.08 
HUN 0.00% 0.00% -42.33% -42.33% 4.16 0.00% 0.00% -38.17% -38.17% 0.00% -0.47% -34.89% -35.69% -2.48 
LIT -3.04% 0.00% -49.43% -52.24% 16.81 -1.95% 0.00% -53.05% -35.42% -1.65% 0.00% -55.40% -39.69% 4.27 
MAL 0.00% -13.49% 0.00% -13.49% 3.45 0.00% -10.04% 0.00% -10.04% 0.00% -8.02% 0.00% -8.02% -2.03 
POL -0.26% 0.00% 0.00% -0.26% 0.06 -0.20% 0.00% -0.20% -0.20% -0.16% 0.00% 0.00% -0.16% -0.04 
POR -1.17% 0.00% -3.98% -5.15% 1.28 -0.88% 0.00% -2.99% -3.87% -0.70% 0.00% -2.40% -3.10% -0.77 
ESP -0.44% -8.13% -38.96% -47.50% 1.94 -0.38% -6.10% -39.15% -45.56% -0.30% -4.88% -39.27% -44.40% -1.17 
Mean -0,85% -2,48% -20,08% -23,37% 4,24 -0,65% -1,85% -18,83% -19,13% -0,56% -1,53% -17,90% -18,10% -1,03 
Table 6: Effect of SME tax incentives by equity ratio (European Tax Analyzer) 
  
Equity -30% Base case Equity +30% 
Tax  
base 
Tax  
credit 
Tax  
rate 
Total 
∆ base 
case 
(% points) 
Tax  
base 
Tax  
credit 
Tax  
rate 
Total 
Tax  
base 
Tax  
credit 
Tax  
rate 
Total 
∆ base 
case 
(% points) 
BEL -1.10% 0.00% -10.23% -11.38% -0.77 -2.03% 0.00% -10.10% -12.15% -2.88% 0.00% -9.94% -12.81% 0.66 
FRA 0.00% -0.54% -27.63% -28.17% 1.85 0.00% -0.51% -25.81% -26.31% 0.00% -0.47% -24.21% -24.69% -1.62 
GER -0.42% 0.00% 0.00% -0.42% 0.03 -0.40% 0.00% 0.00% -0.40% -0.37% 0.00% 0.00% -0.37% -0.02 
HUN 0.00% 0.00% -39.18% -39.18% 1.01 0.00% 0.00% -38.17% -38.17% 0.00% 0.00% -36.72% -36.85% -1.33 
LIT -2.05% 0.00% -52.28% -34.03% -1.39 -1.95% 0.00% -53.05% -35.42% -1.87% 0.00% -53.73% -36.67% 1.25 
MAL 0.00% -10.75% 0.00% -10.75% 0.71 0.00% -10.04% 0.00% -10.04% 0.00% -9.44% 0.00% -9.44% -0.60 
POL -0.21% 0.00% 0.00% -0.21% 0.01 -0.20% 0.00% -0.20% -0.20% -0.18% 0.00% 0.00% -0.18% -0.01 
POR -0.14% 0.00% -3.20% -3.34% -0.53 -0.88% 0.00% -2.99% -3.87% -1.52% 0.00% -2.82% -4.34% 0.46 
ESP -0.40% -6.51% -39.11% -45.96% 0.39 -0.38% -6.10% -39.15% -45.56% -0.35% -5.73% -39.18% -45.21% -0.35 
Mean -0,46% -2,47% -19,11% -19,13% 0,03 -0,54% -2,31% -19,08% -19,10% -0,61% -2,17% -18,92% -19,01% -0,09 
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Table 7: Effect of SME tax incentives by amount of machinery (European Tax Analyzer) 
  
Machinery -15% Base case Machinery +15% 
Tax  
base 
Tax  
credit 
Tax  
rate 
Total 
∆ base 
case 
(% points) 
Tax  
base 
Tax  
credit 
Tax  
rate 
Total 
Tax  
base 
Tax  
credit 
Tax  
rate 
Total 
∆ base 
case 
(% points) 
BEL -1.76% 0.00% -9.56% -11.35% -0.80 -2.03% 0.00% -10.10% -12.15% -2.34% 0.00% -10.56% -12.78% 0.63 
FRA 0.00% -0.46% -23.33% -23.79% -2.52 0.00% -0.51% -25.81% -26.31% 0.00% -0.56% -28.66% -29.22% 2.91 
GER -0.31% 0.00% 0.00% -0.31% -0.09 -0.40% 0.00% 0.00% -0.40% -0.51% 0.00% 0.00% -0.51% 0.11 
HUN 0.00% -1.05% -36.27% -37.61% -0.57 0.00% 0.00% -38.17% -38.17% 0.00% 0.00% -39.89% -39.89% 1.71 
LIT -1.79% 0.00% -55.82% -57.36% 21.94 -1.95% 0.00% -53.05% -35.42% -2.67% 0.00% -49.94% -30.05% -5.38 
MAL 0.00% -9.03% 0.00% -9.03% -1.01 0.00% -10.04% 0.00% -10.04% 0.00% -11.25% 0.00% -11.25% 1.21 
POL -0.15% 0.00% 0.00% -0.15% -0.04 -0.20% 0.00% -0.20% -0.20% -0.25% 0.00% 0.00% -0.25% 0.05 
POR -0.55% 0.00% -2.70% -3.25% -0.62 -0.88% 0.00% -2.99% -3.87% -1.26% 0.00% -3.34% -4.60% 0.72 
ESP -0.29% -5.49% -39.30% -45.04% -0.52 -0.38% -6.10% -39.15% -45.56% -0.41% -6.81% -38.96% -46.17% 0.60 
Mean -0,44% -2,22% -19,16% -21,82% 2,73 -0,54% -2,31% -19,08% -19,10% -0,73% -2,58% -18,88% -18,96% -0,14 
Table 8: Effect of SME tax incentives by employment intensity (European Tax Analyzer) 
  
Employment -30% Base case Employment +30% 
Tax  
base 
Tax  
credit 
Tax  
rate 
Total 
∆ base 
case 
(% points) 
Tax  
base 
Tax  
credit 
Tax  
rate 
Total 
Tax  
base 
Tax  
credit 
Tax  
rate 
Total 
∆ base 
case 
(% points) 
BEL -1.98% 0.00% -9.56% -11.56% -0.59 -2.03% 0.00% -10.10% -12.15% -2.09% 0.00% -10.70% -12.81% 0.66 
FRA 0.00% -0.46% -22.74% -23.21% -3.11 0.00% -0.51% -25.81% -26.31% 0.00% -0.56% -29.48% -30.04% 3.72 
GER -0.38% 0.00% 0.00% -0.38% -0.02 -0.40% 0.00% 0.00% -0.40% -1.02% 0.00% 0.00% -1.02% 0.62 
HUN 0.00% 0.00% -36.98% -36.98% -1.19 0.00% 0.00% -38.17% -38.17% 0.00% 0.00% -39.36% -39.36% 1.19 
LIT -1.87% 0.00% -53.66% -35.55% 0.12 -1.95% 0.00% -53.05% -35.42% -2.04% 0.00% -52.37% -54.12% 18.69 
MAL 0.00% -9.50% 0.00% -9.50% -0.54 0.00% -10.04% 0.00% -10.04% 0.00% -10.66% 0.00% -10.66% 0.62 
POL -0.19% 0.00% 0.00% -0.19% -0.01 -0.20% 0.00% -0.20% -0.20% -0.21% 0.00% 0.00% -0.21% 0.01 
POR -0.83% 0.00% -2.84% -3.67% -0.20 -0.88% 0.00% -2.99% -3.87% -0.93% 0.00% -3.17% -4.10% 0.23 
ESP -0.36% -5.77% -39.19% -45.26% -0.30 -0.38% -6.10% -39.15% -45.56% -0.40% -6.46% -39.11% -45.90% 0.34 
Mean -0,52% -2,18% -18,95% -18,79% -0,31 -0,54% -2,31% -19,08% -19,10% -0,66% -2,45% -19,14% -22,20% 3,10 
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4. Policy Rationale for SME Tax Incentives 
The analysis in Sections 2 and 3 illustrates the common use of tax incentives for 
SMEs in general and for micro enterprises in particular in the European Union. The multitude 
of available incentives naturally raises the question of the rationale behind these regimes that 
come along with significant costs. Besides substantial losses in tax revenues, the partitioning 
of taxpayers compromises the neutrality and the equity of the tax system and enhanced 
complexity raises compliance as well as collection costs. Well-grounded SME tax incentives 
must thus provide substantial benefits in order to yield a net gain and increase the overall 
social welfare.
39
 And while it seems that supporting small businesses has become a generally 
accepted mantra among policy-makers and lobbyists,
40
 existing evidence on the benefits of 
SME tax incentives is mixed – at best. An adequate evaluation of the effectiveness and the 
efficiency of SME tax incentives thus requires a thorough examination of the arguments 
brought forward.  
4.1 Non-Tax Arguments  
4.1.1 Size of the SME Sector 
The mere size of the SME sector and its importance for the economy as a whole are 
frequently cited in public discussions as a reason for special support schemes. SMEs are 
commonly labeled the “backbone”41 or the “engine”42 of the economy. A look at the statistics 
confirms this role. SMEs account for 99.8% of all enterprises in the non-financial business 
sector in the European Union and for 67% of employment and 58% of the value added (see 
Figure 6
43
). Among the three subcategories, micro enterprises make up the largest share as 
92.7% of all businesses fall in this category. They alone provide almost 30% of all jobs in the 
EU.
44
 In the United States, where 99.7% of all businesses have less than 500 employees in 
2012 (i.e., possess the status of an SME according to U.S. standards), the numbers are similar. 
SMEs also provide 48.4% of total employment in the U.S and account for about 50% of the 
                                                 
39
 See Zee/Stotsky/Ley (2002) pp. 1501 f.; Klemm (2010) p. 323; Arginelli (2015) pp. 17 f. 
40
 See de Rugy (2005) p. 5. 
41
 See White House (2010): https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/08/17/small-businesses-are-backbone-our-
economy-and-cornerstones-our-communities (retrieved on August 15, 2016); The Guardian (2014): http://www. 
theguardian.com/small-business-network/2014/dec/06/small-businesses-backbone-communities-john-longworth 
(retrieved on August 15, 2016). 
42
 See Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (2014): 
http://www.midasgruppe.de/uploads/media/German_Mittelstand_Motor_der_deutschen_Wirtschaft_-
_BMWI.pdf (retrieved on October 25, 2016). 
43
 Figure 6 is based on data provided by the European Commission. See European Commission (2015a) pp. 3 ff. 
44
 See European Commission (2015a) p. 7. 
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GDP.
45
 Altogether, SMEs indeed make up a large part or even the majority of employment 
and economic output in most countries. Their importance for the economy and the job market 
is indisputable. 
Figure 6: Contribution of SMEs to the economy in the EU (2014) 
 
 
The question at hand, however, is not whether SMEs produce more output and 
employment then large businesses in absolute terms but rather if incremental investments in 
promoted SMEs create more output and jobs than comparable investments in large companies 
that would have been undertaken in the absence of SME tax incentives.
46
 In a market 
economy, investors take their decisions with the intention of profit maximization. They invest 
in the undertakings promising the highest returns, which are usually the most efficient and 
productive ones. Hence, there should not be a need for reallocating capital – unless market 
failure occurs. In general, the open market should lead to an efficient allocation optimizing 
social welfare whereas government intervention mostly causes economically suboptimal 
results.
47
 The mere size of the SME sector and its absolute contribution to the economy 
therefore do not constitute valid arguments for the provision of special tax incentives based on 
firm size. However, the size of the SME sector may hint at the amount of political influence 
of small businesses and their lobbyists, thus providing an explanation rather than a 
justification for politicians’ proneness to implement and preserve such measures.48 
                                                 
45
 See Caruso (2015) p. 7. 
46
 See Guenther (2004) p. 22; OECD (2009a) pp. 84 ff. 
47
 See Winston (2006) pp. 73 ff. 
48
 See Crawford/Freedman (2010) p. 1086; OECD (2010a) pp. 57 ff.; Qureshi (2013) pp. 19 ff. 
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4.1.2 Job Creation 
While the mere size of the SME sector does not suffice as a reason for special tax 
reliefs or other regulatory advantages, there may be other arguments. SMEs’ role for 
employment is probably the most prominent one in public discussions. Employment, of 
course, is a major policy goal in the European Union.
49
 It is desirable from a social point of 
view and it plays a key role for the national budget.
50
 More employment means less spending 
for social benefits and increased tax revenues and social security contributions. SME tax 
incentives would thus make sense, if they led to additional SME activity that comes along 
with additional employment. Obviously, this rationale assumes SMEs to be more dynamic, to 
grow faster and to generate more jobs than large enterprises. A dollar invested in the SME 
sector must have more desirable employment implications than a dollar invested in large 
businesses, which should show in higher rates of job creation.
51
 
In public perception, the leading role of SMEs in job creation seems to be 
undoubted.
52
 The academic discussion whether small businesses contribute more to job 
creation than large enterprises has been fierce, though. The debate was kicked-off by French 
economist Robert Gibrat. His rule of proportionate growth, also called Gibrat’s Law, claims 
firm growth to be independent of absolute firm size.
53
 Hence, SMEs should have the same 
expected growth rates as large entities and create new jobs at the same rates. In the 1950s and 
60s, however, empirical evidence casted major doubts on Gibrat’s Law and the assumption of 
proportionate growth became subject to some qualifications. Most notably, Hart and Prais 
(1956) contended that it only holds for surviving firms while Simon and Bonini (1958) 
observed Gibrat’s Law to apply only if firms reach a so-called minimum efficient scale level 
of output. Businesses, in other words, need to reach a minimum size in order to generate 
sufficient economies of scale. Enterprises not reaching the minimum exit the market, which 
would explain the necessity for SMEs to grow faster.
54
  
Due to data limitations, empirical evidence was scarce until the 1980s when a couple 
of studies by Birch reignited the discussion on the dynamics of firm and employment 
growth.
55
 Using data from the U.S. manufacturing industry, Birch (1981) finds establishments 
                                                 
49
 See European Commission (2010a) pp. 3 ff.; European Commission (2010b) pp. 3 ff. 
50
 See European Commission (2014) pp. 11 ff. 
51
 See Bolnick (2004) pp. 4–10 f. 
52
 See Davis/Haltiwanger/Schuh (1996a) p. 298; de Rugy (2005) p. 5. 
53
 See Simon/Bonini (1958) pp. 608 f. 
54
 See Hart/Prais (1956) pp. 161 ff.; Simon/Bonini (1958) pp. 608 ff.  
55
 See Birch (1981) pp. 3 ff.; Birch (1987) pp. 7 ff. 
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with less than 20 employees to be responsible for about two thirds of all new jobs in the U.S. 
in the period from 1969 to 1976. Establishments with more than 100 employees, in contrast, 
only provided 20% of newly created employment despite employing 65% of the total 
workforce.
56
 For the period from 1981 to 1985, Birch (1987) reports similar results and barely 
finds any net job creation among large enterprises.
57
 The findings strongly support the image 
of the SME sector to be the engine of growth and employment. In fact, the results indicate the 
small business sector (firms with less than 100 employees according to Birch’s definition) to 
create jobs at a net rate that is at least eight times as high as the large business rate.
58
  
Birch’s findings shaped the academic view as well as the perception of politicians 
and the public that small businesses are the major source of employment and growth.
59
 His 
data and his analysis, however, were questioned by several authors. Numerous studies on the 
dynamics of firm growth and job creation followed his work. Interestingly, the results 
obtained are quite diverse. While some studies confirm Birch’s findings, others report no or 
only a weak link between employment growth and absolute firm size.
60
 The diversity of 
results has also been accompanied by a discussion of several methodological questions that 
may – at least partly – have driven Birch’s results. As his findings would indeed provide a 
strong argument in favor of an advantageous tax treatment for SMEs, it is essential to gain an 
understanding of the underlying methodological issues and resolve the question if the SME 
sector as a whole really create more jobs. 
1) Data quality 
In his seminal paper Birch uses longitudinal data on a large sample of U.S. 
establishments in the period from 1969 to 1976.
61
 The data was collected by Dun and 
Bradstreet (D&B), a private-sector firm providing customers with commercial 
information such as credit records and ratings.
62
 Being designed for other purposes 
than research on job creation, the dataset by D&B suffers several shortcomings. First 
of all, the correctness of the employment numbers is doubtful. The sum of all jobs 
registered in the D&B files, for example, exceeds the employment totals given by the 
                                                 
56
 See Birch (1981) pp. 7 ff. 
57
 See Birch (1987) pp. 12 ff. 
58
 See Birch (1981) pp. 7 ff.; Birch (1987) pp. 12 ff. 
59
 See Davis/Haltiwanger/Schuh (1996a) pp. 297 f. 
60
 See Table A1 in Annex 2 for an overview of empirical studies on the relation of firm size and job creation. 
61
 The sample used by Birch contains about 80% of all recognized establishments during the sample period. See 
Birch (1981) p. 4. 
62
 See Dun & Bradsheet: http://www.dnb.com/company.html (retrieved on April 1, 2016). 
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U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics by 8 million jobs in 1986.
63
 Research has shown the 
data to be particularly error-prone for small and young businesses.
64
 With regard to 
Birch’s object of investigation, i.e., the role of the small business sector in job 
creation, this is worrisome. The recording of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as 
well as changes in the organizational form of businesses are further concerns with the 
D&B data. These events are often not properly accounted for and numbers on job 
creation and destruction could be biased in favor of the small business sector.
65
  
These shortcomings of Birch’s data indeed cast some doubts on the reliability of his 
results and those of several other studies using similar data. A negative correlation of 
absolute firm size and employment growth, however, is also confirmed by numerous 
other studies, albeit at a smaller magnitude. Mostly, these studies employ datasets 
with better coverage (including micro enterprises) and a more accurate recording of 
firm births and changes in ownership structures.
66
 The basic finding of small firms 
growing faster than large enterprises should therefore not solely be attributed to poor 
data quality. The magnitude of the difference in growth rates as reported by Birch 
should be considered with caution, though. 
2) Manufacturing vs. services 
Most studies finding comparatively high growth rates for the small business sector 
(including Birch’s work) only cover manufacturing enterprises.67 Manufacturing, 
however, may be subject to different growth dynamics than other sectors. Firstly, 
growth patterns could be impacted by a general decline of the secondary sector 
relative to the service sector in industrialized countries. Production activities have 
                                                 
63
 See Davis/Haltiwanger/Schuh (1996a) p. 307. 
64
 The D&B data does, for example, not include over 90% of newly founded businesses that appear in alternative 
sources. See Birley (1984) pp. 66 ff.  
65
 For many M&A transactions, firms and establishments are reported to be closed (and the jobs to be lost) by the 
S&B data although they were only acquired by new owners. The acquirer, on the other hand, would seem to 
create lots of jobs even though the increase in employment is attributable to the acquisition. As the target 
company should usually be smaller than the acquirer, this shortcoming in the data would lead to an 
underestimation of small businesses’ growth rates if the firm level was considered. Birch, however, examines job 
creation at the establishment level. Hence, the data shows the establishment to close down and reopen. The 
direction of the bias thus depends on the post-acquisition development of the respective establishment and the 
exact recording of the transaction. See Davis/Haltiwanger/Schuh (1996a) p. 307; Haltiwanger/Jarmin/Miranda 
(2013) p. 348 f. 
66
 See Dunne/Roberts/Samuelson (1989) pp. 671 ff.; Mata/Portugal (1994) pp. 227 ff.; 
Davidsson/Lindmark/Olofsson (1998) pp. 87 ff.; Barnes/Haskel (2002) pp. 1 ff.; Lotti/Santarelli/Vivarelli (2003) 
pp. 213 ff.; Voulgaris/Papadogonas/Agiomirgianakis (2005) pp. 289 ff.; Lotti (2007) pp. 347 ff.; 
Headd/Kirchhoff (2009) pp. 531 ff.  
67
 See Davis/Haltiwanger/Schuh (1996a) pp. 308 f. Table A1 in Annex 2 also gives a comprehensive overview of 
the existing empirical literature on the subject.  
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been increasingly outsourced by multinational enterprises to other countries with 
lower wage costs. As a consequence, the growth rates of large companies may be 
extraordinarily low when only considering the manufacturing sector.
68
 Secondly, 
small manufacturers could be particularly hard-pressed to reach a minimum scale of 
operations as economies of scale are more distinct in manufacturing than in the 
service sector.
69
 
The issue of a manufacturing bias has been addressed by several studies. Audretsch 
et al. (2004) examine the Dutch hospitality sector while several other works use 
samples covering most or all sectors of the respective economies. The vast majority 
of them find a correlation of absolute firm size and growth rates.
70
 The studies, 
however, generally report the magnitude of the discrepancy between large and small 
businesses to be much smaller than estimated by Birch. Armington and Odle (1982) 
as well as Davidsson et al. (1998), for example, only observe a weak negative 
relation when considering all sectors.
71
 Dunne and Hughes (1994) and Lotti (2007) 
confirm this and observe the differences to become even smaller (if not negligible) 
when businesses with less than 20 employees are excluded.
72
 It is, in other words, 
primarily micro enterprises driving growth rates.  
3) Firm-level data vs. establishment-level data 
Most studies on growth dynamics and job creation aim at explaining the connection 
between firm size and firm growth. Still, Birch (1981) as well as numerous other 
works measure employment at the establishment or even the plant level.
73
 Basing 
policy advice on results from establishment-level data is problematic, though. A 
                                                 
68
 See Davis/Haltiwanger/Schuh (1996a) pp. 308 f.; Lotti (2007) pp. 349 f. 
69
 In the European Union, the average size of businesses (measured in turnover) in the manufacturing sector 
substantially exceeds the average size in the service sector, which suggests firm size and economies of scale to 
play a bigger role in manufacturing. On the other hand, economies of scale may also drive results in the opposite 
direction if the advantage of being large does not even allow small businesses to compete and develop. See 
European Commission (2004) p. 12; Hurst/Pugsley (2015) pp. 1 ff. 
70
 See Kirchhoff/Phillips (1988) pp. 261 ff.; Gallagher/Daly/Thomason (1991) pp. 269 ff.; Amirkhalkhali/ 
Mukhopadhyay (1993) pp. 223 ff.; Dunne/Hughes (1994) pp. 115 ff.; Harhoff/Stahl/Woywode (1998) pp. 453 
ff.; Heshmati (2001) pp. 213 ff.; Lotti (2007) pp. 347 ff.; Headd/Kirchhoff (2009) pp. 531 ff.; Headd (2010) pp. 
1 ff.; de Kok/Vroonhof/Verhoeven/Timmermans/Kwaak/Snijders/Westhof (2011) pp. 27 ff.; 
Nassar/Almasafir/Al-Mahrouq (2013) pp. 266 ff.; de Wit/de Kok (2014) pp. 283 ff. The only study using a 
sample of non-manufacturing firms and not observing a clear correlation between firm size and growth rates 
comes from Audretsch et al. (2004). Their results may be caused by the peculiarities of the hospitality sector that 
they focus on, though. See Audretsch/ Klomp/Santarelli/Thurik (2004) pp. 301 ff. 
71
 See Armington/Odle (1982) pp. 14 ff.; Davidsson/Lindmark/Olofsson (1997) pp. 87 ff. 
72
 See Dunne/Hughes (1994) pp. 115 ff.; Lotti (2007) pp. 347 ff. 
73
 See Table A1 in Annex 2 for an overview of the data used by empirical studies on firm growth and job 
creation.  
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small establishment can still be part of a large firm. Hence, small establishments 
growing faster than large establishments does not necessarily prove small firms to 
grow faster than large firms.
74
 With regard to justifying SME tax incentives, this is 
problematic because tax incentives target firms, not establishments. There are even 
anti-misuse provisions coming along with several of the currently available regimes 
that ought to prevent small branches of large businesses from gaining admission.
75
 
Hence, the question to be posed for the currently available regimes is not whether 
small establishments (or plants) generate more jobs but whether small firms do so.
76
  
In addition, there is a methodological problem related to establishment-level data. 
Unless sufficient ownership information is provided, such data automatically drives 
the results towards a negative relation of firm size and job creation because any job 
creation by a small establishment being part of a large company is mistakenly 
attributed to the SME sector. As a consequence, SMEs’ role in job creation is 
overestimated while the contribution of large businesses is undervalued. The extent 
of this bias is demonstrated by Armington and Odle (1982) who report the small 
business share of net job creation to be cut in half from 78% to 39% in Birch’s data 
when correctly accounting for firm size (instead of establishment size).
77
 There are, 
however, numerous other studies working with firm-level data which also find a 
robust negative correlation of firm size and firm growth.
78
 Even Odle and Armington 
(1982) observe small entities to create a disproportionally high number of jobs. The 
general finding of small businesses growing faster and creating more jobs on average 
than large entities should thus hold for the firm level as well. Again, the difference in 
job creation rates found by firm-level studies is smaller than reported by Birch 
(1981), though. 
4) Netting out reality and regression to the mean 
                                                 
74
 See Armington/Odle (1982) pp. 14 f.; Davis/Haltiwanger/Schuh (1996a) pp. 300 f.; 
Haltiwanger/Jarmin/Miranda (2013) p. 349. 
75
 A more detailed description of these rules, e.g., in France or Lithuania, is given in the country reports in 
Annex 1. 
76
 The same applies to other elements of the regulatory environment, e.g., financial reporting duties. See Busch-
hüter/Striegel (2015) p. 24. 
77
 See Armington/Odle (1982) pp. 15 f. On the other hand, establishment-level data may provide advantages with 
regard to the analysis of gross job creation, especially if M&A transactions are not accounted for properly. See 
Barnes/Haskel (2002) p. 5; Haltiwanger/Jarmin/Miranda (2013) p. 348. 
78
 See, for example, Evans (1987a) pp. 657 ff.; Evans (1987b) pp. 567 ff.; Gallagher/Daly/Thomason (1991) pp. 
269 ff.; Broersma/Gautier (1997) pp. 211 ff.; Voulgaris/Papadogonas/Agiomirgianakis (2005) pp. 289 ff. 
36 
 
Besides the data used by Birch (1981), follow-up studies also criticized his 
methodological approach.
79
 Birch’s basic idea is to divide the population of firms 
into several size classes and to measure the number of jobs created and destroyed by 
each size category over the sample period. The net gain in employment (“net job 
creation”) is his measure of interest. Based on this measures, he assesses the relative 
importance of small and large firms for job creation.
80
  
Figure 7 illustrates how this focus on net changes in employment can give a wrong 
image of small and large businesses’ role in job creation. In the example, small 
businesses only generate 20% of the new jobs but they account for 100% of net job 
creation. Merely considering the latter number would thus imply the impression of 
small businesses being the sole creators of new jobs. For the overall employment 
situation, however, it would be more harmful to lose the jobs provided by large 
enterprises. Hence, it is important to take net as well as gross numbers of job creation 
into account.
81
  
Figure 7: Net and gross job creation (example) 
 
Firm 1 
(small) 
Firm 2 
(large) 
Firm 3 
(large) 
Small 
firms 
Large 
firms 
All firms 
Employmentt=1 30 60 60 30 120 150 
Employmentt=2 35 40 80 35 120 155 
Net change 5 -20 +20 +5 0 +5 
Small-firm share of net job creation: 100%  (= 5 / 5) 
Small-firm share in gross job creation:  20%    (= 5 / (20 + 5))  
 
The main methodological criticism of Birch, however, refers to the so-called 
regression fallacy (also: regression to the mean). This is a statistical pitfall that 
occurs when businesses are misclassified as either small or large due to transitory, 
not serially correlated shocks in employment.
82
 A (borderline) large company, for 
example, can experience a temporary one-year decline in employment. If the 
classification of firms as either small or large is solely based on this year, the 
company falls in the small businesses category despite generally being a large 
enterprise. When the company returns to the normal number of employees in the 
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following year, the new jobs are reported to be created by a small firm. Similarly, 
jobs are recorded as being lost by a large enterprise when a small business 
experiences a positive transitory shock in the base year before returning to the 
normal level of employment in the following period. Ultimately, the regression 
fallacy thus always induces the growth rate of small enterprises to be overestimated 
while the large business rate is always depressed.
83
  
Birch’s analysis is especially prone to the regression fallacy because his size 
classification is solely based on the number of employees in the first sample year. 
Davis et al. (1996a, b) therefore propose the use of average size measurements that 
take multiple years into account.
84
 For a similar dataset, they replicate Birch’s 
findings using the base-year method while not observing any systematic relation 
between firm size and employment growth for their alternative measures. They 
interpret this as a proof of Birch’s findings to be driven by the regression fallacy.85 It 
needs to be pointed out, though, that their alternative measures also lead to 
misclassifications and introduce new bias. One bias is thus reduced at the cost of a 
new one. The question of which measure (or rather which bias) is more acceptable 
ultimately depends on the frequency of transitory shocks.  
Either way, the cumulative body of follow-up studies indicates that the general 
finding of a negative correlation of absolute firm size and employment growth still 
holds when accounting for the regression bias. Several studies follow the approach of 
Davis et al. (1996a, b) and still confirm small firms to create more jobs on average. 
The correlation is less distinct for average size than it is for the base-year 
classification in these studies, though.
86
 Davidsson et al. (1998), Fariñas and Moreno 
(2000) and Botazzi et al. (2001) also run explicit tests to determine the impact of the 
regression fallacy and only find it to play a minor role.
87
  
5) Firm size vs. firm age 
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In his seminal paper, Birch (1981) claims small enterprises to create more jobs on 
average than their larger counterparts. As shown above, this finding has been 
scrutinized in many follow-up analyses. Comparatively little attention, however, has 
been paid to his second main finding that firm age is also negatively correlated with 
net job creation. In fact, 80% of all new jobs in his sample are accounted for by 
establishments not older than four years
88
 and Birch clearly states that most small 
businesses are no creators of jobs. It is rather a small group of young, expanding 
start-ups that outgrow the small business category quickly.
89
 
Confirmation comes from Armington and Odle (1982), Kirchhoff and Phillips (1988) 
and Broersma and Gautier (1997) who find firm births to account for 30%, 50% and 
100%, respectively, of net job creation in their samples.
90
 Voulgaris et al. (2005) and 
Lotti (2007) report only the group of firms that are younger than 5 and 10 years, 
respectively, to have positive rates of net job creation.
91
 Further evidence comes 
from Dunne et al. (1988) and Headd and Kirchhoff (2009) who do not observe 
businesses to grow much at all after the start-up phase.
92
 Audretsch and Mahmood 
(1994) and Tang (2015) also believe most firms to settle in once they have reached 
the minimum efficient scale.
93
  Regression-based studies featuring firm size and firm 
age as explanatory variables find both measures to negatively affect expected 
employment growth. Interestingly, Harhoff et al. (1998) observe the relation to be 
more pronounced for size while Voulgaris et al. (2005), Davidsson et al. (1998) and 
Haltiwanger et al. (2013) rather see the newness of businesses driving employment 
growth.
94
  
Summing up, empirical evidence generally confirms Birch’s finding of absolute firm 
size being negatively correlated with rates of job creation and firm growth. The perception of 
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solely small businesses creating new jobs is wrong, though. The prevalence of this perception 
is in part due to the results of Birch’s studies that are driven by methodological deficiencies 
and problems relating to data quality. In addition, the ignorance of Birch’s second main 
finding is key in explaining the misconception of small businesses’ role in job creation: It is 
not small firms as a whole growing faster but only the so-called gazelles, the group of high-
growth firms that are usually both small and young.
95
 Recent evidence even suggests firm age 
to be the main determinant of expected growth whereas firm size has been found to have little 
predictive power when controlling for age. Exclusively using size criteria to target tax 
incentives therefore is an inefficient – if not ineffective – way of promoting growth and job 
creation.  
As only a small group of young and upcoming enterprises accounts for the bulk of 
net job creation, some countries try to target SME tax incentives more specifically at these 
firms. France, Malta and Portugal, for example, offer special reliefs for newly founded SMEs 
and their shareholders.
96
 Entry incentives, however, are also unlikely to have the intended 
effect on job creation because even among new firms the targeted high-growth firms only 
represent a minority. In fact, the entrepreneurship literature has identified two groups of 
entrepreneurs: On the one hand, there is the small group of progressive entrepreneurs with 
innovative ideas who enter the market to actively seize business opportunities, while on the 
other hand, there is the vast majority of defensive entrepreneurs who are mostly made up of 
passive followers, overoptimistic gamblers and escapees from unemployment. The latter 
group usually does not generate much growth and does not even aspire to do so.
97
 Hence, the 
targeting of high-growth firms creating new jobs is inadequate even when using a 
combination of size and age-related eligibility criteria.   
Furthermore, progressive entrepreneurs are unlikely to need tax incentives to start 
their businesses anyway. Intuitively, the marginal entrepreneur, i.e., the entrepreneur who 
starts a business only due to the availability of tax incentives, most likely is a defensive 
founder rather than a progressive entrepreneur. Somebody seeking to exploit an innovative 
idea or a novel business opportunity would probably engage in the venture irrespective of 
available reliefs and subsidies. The start-up decision of less competent and less ambitious 
entrepreneurs, in contrast, is more likely to be impacted by tax reliefs.
98
 Hence, start-up 
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incentives tend to encourage the “wrong” entrepreneurs to start a business while the “right” 
ones receive tax benefits although they would have invested anyway. And even if some of the 
“right” taxpayers were lured into self-employment, there is no apparent reason to explicitly 
restrict start-up benefits to small and micro businesses.
99
  
Tying eligibility for SME tax incentives to increased employment (or at least to the 
retention of existing jobs) is another approach to target high-growth businesses more 
accurately.
100
 Obviously, such incentives could induce firms to employ people they would not 
have hired in the absence of the relief. It is questionable, though, if job creation per se is an 
appropriate policy goal. A growing economy in which the allocation of resources is not 
impeded by market failure usually generates enough jobs on its own.
101
 Hence, policy-makers 
should rather focus on the provision of a neutral and investment-friendly business 
environment that keeps the obstacles to firm growth to a minimum.
102
 SME tax incentives, 
however, achieve the opposite. They discourage growth if eligibility is restricted by fixed 
turnover, asset or employment thresholds and – in the case of incentives tied to employment 
numbers – they distort the choice of input factors (capital vs. labor), which may hamper the 
overall competitiveness of a country’s economy.103 And even if the above arguments are 
neglected because employment is fostered for social rather than for economic reasons, the 
restriction of tax incentives to small enterprises again does not make sense unless jobs in large 
enterprises are considered to be inferior.
104
 
Altogether, job creation does not constitute a valid argument for SME tax incentives. 
If additional employment is sought, the problem should be addressed directly, e.g., through 
reduced labor costs. Size, however, is not an accurate indicator of a firm’s propensity to hire 
new employees. SME tax incentives are therefore neither efficient nor effective in generating 
new jobs. They benefit many businesses that are not intended to benefit and introduce more 
complexity and new distortions to the tax system, thereby impeding rather than fostering 
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economic growth. The design of many of the currently available regimes, i.e., reliefs in the 
form of output-based incentives for which eligibility is explicitly restricted by absolute 
thresholds on turnover, assets and employment, even reinforces these problems. 
4.1.3 Innovativeness 
The innovativeness of the small business sector is another argument regularly 
brought up to support SME tax incentives. Evidently, innovation is a major driver of 
economic growth. The introduction of new products and technologies is key to raising general 
productivity.
105
 It promotes market competition, fosters the development of new markets and 
triggers the destruction of existing ones.
106
 SME tax incentives could thus be warranted if they 
spark additional SME activity that results in additional innovations and the exploitation of 
innovations in the form of successful and sustainable businesses to the benefit of the economy 
as a whole.  
Similarly to R&D incentives, the innovation-based rationale for SME reliefs builds 
on the occurrence of market failure in the form of spillover effects. Such spillovers arise 
because the originator of an innovation often cannot exclude others from the benefits of the 
innovation, e.g., due to product imitation or the transfer of personnel.
107
 As a consequence, 
the economy as a whole benefits more than the innovator alone.
108
 When making the decision 
to invest and innovate, however, investors only take their personal returns into account. This 
leads to a suboptimal level of resources allocated to innovative activities and ultimately to 
social welfare losses.
109
 Whether SME tax incentives represent an effective countermeasure 
against this market failure depends on their ability to spur additional SME activity that 
generates more innovations and positive spillovers than the investments that would have been 
undertaken in the absence of the incentives. 
With regard to the relationship of firm size and innovativeness, there are two 
opposing views. While neo-classical theories suggest small firms to be particularly innovative 
as fierce competition and a lack of economies of scale force them to generate competitive 
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advantages through product differentiation, the Schumpeterian view assumes large enterprises 
to be more innovative because only they have the market power to fully reap the benefits 
emanating from innovations.
110
 According to the latter view, large firms are more suited to 
introduce innovative products to the market due to better management skills and better 
financial resources. They use previous research more efficiently and derive advantages from a 
superior division of labor.
111
 Moreover, their size allows them to better absorb the high share 
of fixed costs associated with innovative activities and to adequately diversify the related 
risks.
112
 Small businesses, on the other hand, exhibit easier and quicker decision-making due 
to leaner organizational structures. They can react faster to customer demands, which is an 
important advantage in recognizing and pursuing new ideas and business models. 
Furthermore, small firms and their employees may be more aware and more excited about 
minor innovations that are overlooked by large organizations.
113
  
Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether SMEs’ advantages in innovative 
activities outweigh their disadvantages and whether they are indeed more innovative than 
large enterprises. Existing evidence, however, does not give a clear answer to this question. 
While early empirical research by Horowitz (1962), Hamberg (1964) and Scherer (1965) 
rather suggests larger firms to be more innovative, Bound et al. (1984), Mowery (1983) and 
Cohen (1987) do not find a clear link between firm size and the propensity to spend on 
R&D.
114
 The results of these early studies need to be considered with caution, though, 
because they feature limited samples predominantly consisting of large enterprises. It is 
therefore questionable if the results allow valid conclusions about the SME sector. Moreover, 
the measurement of innovation is not trivial and results have been found to be highly 
dependent on the specific measures of innovation that are referred to.
115
 As a consequence, 
even the large body of more recent empirical literature does not come to a clear conclusion 
whether small or large enterprises are more innovative. Shefer and Frenkel (2005), Akcigit 
(2009), Park (2011) and Wolfe (2012), for example, observe small firms to spend more on 
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R&D whereas Hong et al. (2016) find the opposite.
116
 Results with regard to innovative 
outputs – measured as the number of new processes, products or services – are equally 
contradictory. While Pavitt et al. (1987), Kleinknecht et al. (1993), Cogan (1993), Santarelli 
and Piergiovanni (1996), Stock et al. (2002) and Hong et al. (2016) attest a negative link 
between firm size and the number of innovations, Damanpour (1992), Camisón-Zornoza et al. 
(2004) and Laforet (2008, 2009, 2013) report a positive rapport.
117
 Tsai (2005) and Tsai and 
Wang (2005), on the other hand, assume a U-shaped relation between firm size and R&D 
productivity.
118
 Studies not finding a clear relation between firm size and innovativeness 
include Acs and Audretsch (1988), Symeonidis (1996), Wakasugi and Koyata (1997), Tether 
(1998), Freel (2005), Hausman (2005), Lee and Sung (2005), Laforet and Tann (2006) and 
Baregheh et al. (2016).
119
 
Altogether, the diversity of empirical results suggests that there is no linear, 
monotonic relationship between firm size and innovativeness applying across all industries, 
size classes and countries. Innovation-related arguments do therefore not warrant the use of 
tax incentives basing eligibility solely on size criteria. And even if small firms were – on 
average – slightly more innovative than large enterprises, this does not mean that firm size is a 
good indicator of innovativeness because it is not the average investor (or investment) that 
matters but the marginal one. It is the investor in need of a tax incentive to actually make the 
investment who is relevant for the incentive’s effectiveness. Given the skewed distribution of 
firms with regard to innovation
120
 and the small number of actually innovative SMEs,
121
 the 
marginal SME investment can be assumed to not show the required positive attributes with 
respect to innovation and spillovers. 
                                                 
116
 See Shefer/Frenkel (2005) pp. 25 ff.; Akcigit (2009) pp. 1 ff.; Park (2011) pp. 1 ff.; Wolfe (2012) pp. 2 f.; 
Hong/Oxley/McCann/Le (2016) pp. 5379 ff. 
117
 See Pavitt/Robson/Townsend (1987) pp. 297 ff.; Kleinknecht/Reijen/Smits (1993) pp. 42 ff.; Cogan (1993) 
pp. 113 ff.; Santarelli/Piergiovanni (1996) pp. 689 ff.; Stock/Greis/Fischer (2002) pp. 537 ff.; Hong/ 
Oxley/McCann/Le (2016) pp. 5379 ff.; Damanpour (1992) pp. 375 ff.; Camisón-Zornoza/Lapiedra-
Alcami/Segarra-Ciprés/Boronat-Navarro (2004) pp. 331 ff.; Laforet (2008) pp. 753 ff.; Laforet (2009) pp. 188 
ff.; Laforet (2013) pp. 490 ff. 
118
 See Tsai (2005) pp. 795 ff.; Tsai/Wang (2005) pp. 966 ff. 
119
 See Acs/Audretsch (1988a) pp. 197 ff.; Symeonidis (1996) pp. 5 ff.; Wakasugi/Koyata (1997) pp. 383 ff.; 
Tether (1998) pp. 725 ff.; Freel (2005) pp. 123 ff.; Hausman (2005) pp. 773 ff.; Lee/Sung (2005) pp. 914 ff.; 
Laforet/Tann (2006) pp. 363 ff.; Baregheh/Rowley/Hemsworth (2016) pp. 768 ff. Inconclusive evidence also 
exists with regard to the correlation of firm size and the quality of innovations. See Akcigit (2009) pp. 1 ff.; 
Tether (1998) pp. 725 ff. 
120
 See Baumol (1990) pp. 893 ff.; Hurst/Pugsley (2011) pp. 92 ff. Schultz/Salomo/Talke (2013) p. 94.; 
121
 Hurst and Pugsley (2011), for example, only find 17.3% of American small businesses to generate any 
intellectual property within the first four years of their existence. Even more astonishingly, less than 20% of the 
business founders in their sample expect R&D to make up a considerable share of their expenses and only 34.9% 
of the entrepreneurs think that they a have a good business idea when starting their businesses. Piergiovanni and 
Santarelli (2006) confirm these trends as they estimate only 4.7% of new Italian businesses – which tend to be 
small – to be innovative. See Piergiovanni/Santarelli (2006) p. 268; Hurst/Pugsley (2011) p. 93. 
44 
 
As firm size is an inaccurate proxy for innovation, other eligibility should be referred 
to when targeting tax incentives at innovative investments and investors. In this respect, R&D 
activity is the obvious nexus. The link between R&D and innovativeness is much closer than 
the link between firm size and innovativeness.
122
 R&D tax incentives are therefore the 
superior instrument compared to SME-specific measures. Due to superior targeting, they are 
more effective and more efficient in generating innovations and positive spillovers.
123
  
Given the adequacy of tax incentives supporting R&D investments, the most 
interesting question with regard to small and medium-sized enterprises is whether to restrict 
eligibility for R&D tax incentives to SMEs. In other words, is there a valid, economically 
sound justification for excluding large enterprises from R&D incentives or offering more 
generous reliefs for SMEs? In the European Union, there are currently several countries 
providing R&D incentives exclusively for SMEs or R&D incentives that are more generous 
for SMEs.
124
  
There are indeed arguments in support of a more pronounced need for R&D tax 
incentives among SMEs than among large enterprises. First of all, small entities have been 
found to benefit less from direct subsidies and funding schemes for R&D projects than large 
businesses. Most likely, this is due to the regulatory burden associated with the application for 
such schemes.
125
 Tax incentives being especially generous for SMEs could correct for this 
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imbalance as they are less prone to selection bias than direct subsidies.
126
 Even more 
importantly, small businesses are on average subject to more severe financing constraints and 
may therefore require tax reliefs in early investment stages more urgently.
127
 This is 
especially relevant for R&D projects as they are often more risky and include fewer tangible 
assets that can be liquidated if the project fails.
128
 As a consequence, obtaining capital 
becomes even more difficult for SMEs engaging in R&D.
129
 For them, the respective projects 
often account for a large share of their overall business activity and can therefore hardly be 
compensated for by other successful projects in the event of failure. Large entities, in contrast, 
are better suited to diversify the related risks due to the large number of investment objects 
they are usually engaged in.
130
 Financing constraints are thus less likely to prevent them from 
investing in R&D. In line with these considerations, R&D investments have actually been 
found to be more responsive to tax incentives in SMEs than in large enterprises. Moreover, 
deadweight losses arising from R&D incentives are higher for large enterprises.
131
 And as the 
principle of efficiency requires the minimization of support for projects that would also be 
undertaken in the absence of tax incentives, restricting R&D tax incentives to SMEs may be 
warranted.  
The restriction of eligibility for R&D incentives to SMEs, however, also causes 
additional costs. Above all, restrictions complicate the tax code and induce additional 
compliance and administrative costs. Furthermore, the implicit taxation of growth is a 
problem arising from the limitation of eligibility to SMEs. If incentives are not available 
beyond certain size thresholds, taxpayers are discouraged from growing and exceeding the 
respective thresholds.
 132
 With regard to R&D projects (which tend to be high-risk, high return 
ventures), this may lead to the absurd situation of enterprises being better off if the projects 
are not too successful. In general, implicit taxes on growth are especially dangerous in sectors 
emphasizing R&D and innovation because innovation – as mentioned before – is closely 
related to growth. Conceptually, it would be inconsistent to provide incentives encouraging 
economic growth through innovation but also penalizing the firms that actually grow. Lastly, 
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incentives exclusively available for SMEs obviously deteriorate the investment neutrality of 
the tax system. Investments by SMEs are favored and therefore need to generate lower pre-tax 
rates of return to be undertaken. This can lead to a misallocation of human and physical 
capital which could be especially harmful in the knowledge-intense R&D sector where 
resources (e.g., qualified researchers) are scarce.
133
  
Summing up, R&D tax incentives are the more efficient and effective instrument to 
spur innovative activity compared to SME tax incentives. The above-average innovativeness 
of SMEs – which is not even free of doubt considering the current body of empirical work – 
does not support the implementation of generally applicable SME incentives.
134
 Targeting 
R&D tax incentives at SMEs, however, may have its merits as the efficiency of the incentives 
is likely to increase and the losses in tax revenue to decrease. The benefit of targeting SMEs 
need to be carefully weighed against the costs, though. Moreover, incentive designs need to 
avoid explicit size restrictions (i.e., eligibility thresholds on turnover or the number of 
employees). Instead, maximum absolute reliefs on input-based measures should be applied to 
target smaller entities. This practice is comparatively easy to implement as no size criteria 
have to be documented by taxpayers (nor controlled by tax administrations). Moreover, 
absolute caps on available reliefs prevent that firm growth is directly discouraged.
135
 At the 
same time, they provide policy-makers with an easy-to-handle instrument to control the 
revenue losses.
136
 
4.1.4 Financing Constraints 
The occurrence of market failure and related distortions can be a valid justification of 
tax incentives. The mere existence of market failure, however, does not suffice. Tax 
incentives also have to be effective in addressing the market failure and they should be the 
most efficient instrument to do so in order to represent a sensible policy instrument.
137
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Besides positive spillovers, asymmetric information is another market failure 
regularly associated with SMEs that may legitimize the usage of specifically targeted tax 
incentives. With regard to small businesses, harmful asymmetry primarily occurs between 
business insiders (i.e., owners and managers) and outside providers of capital.
138
 Naturally, an 
information gap between both parties exists for all kinds of businesses as insiders (almost) 
always have superior knowledge of their firms compared to external stakeholders.
139
 The 
information gap and related problems in the acquisition of financing are particularly 
pronounced in the SME sector, though.
140
 The reasons hereof are numerous. First of all, 
retrieving information on SMEs is more expensive for outsiders as they are usually not in the 
focus of capital market analysts and information is not as easily available.
141
 Their securities 
are usually less frequently traded than those of larger entities and the information conveyed 
by market pricing is likely to be less timely and relevant.
142
 The problem is further aggravated 
by the fact that many SMEs do not have to produce audited financial statements and that they 
are subject to fewer obligations to publicly disclose financial data. Obtaining information thus 
becomes more laborious.
143
 And even if SMEs provide financial statements and other data on 
their businesses, the quality is often insufficient due to inadequate business skills, lower key 
internal reporting systems, insufficient self-presentation and a lack of intrinsic motivation to 
disclose information.
144
 The overlap of ownership and management in many small businesses 
is another factor impacting on outsiders’ information deficits as it magnifies owners’ head 
start in knowledge and their leeway in sharing the information they possess. Moreover, the 
finances of firms and their owners are more likely to mingle in owner-managed SMEs than in 
larger entities. The picture for outside investors thereby becomes even more nebulous.
145
  
Theory suggests asymmetric information to induce adverse selection, in particular 
with regard to debt financing. As creditors are not able to adequately adjust interest rates to 
SMEs’ individual characteristics and risks, they are likely to charge uniform interest rates that 
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tend to be disproportionate relative to the idiosyncratic risks of many SMEs. As a 
consequence, only “bad risks” obtain loans whereas “good risks” refrain from accepting 
credits. The banks, in turn, further raise interest rates if only bad risks remain and the process 
of adverse credit selection is reinforced.
146
 Additionally, asymmetric information leads to 
inadequate monitoring of lenders and potential problems of moral hazard when lenders are 
enabled to take excessive risks. Even more good risks would thereby be turned into bad risks 
and interest rates inflate even further.
147
 In the end, lending to SMEs may become so 
unattractive that lenders are not willing to provide funds and credits rationing becomes a 
substantial obstacle for business growth that is almost impossible to overcome for individual 
enterprises. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the aforementioned problems indeed cause an 
insufficient provision of capital for at least some SMEs
148
 and that the financing gap affects 
the formation and the development these SMEs.
149
 The true extent of the financing gap and its 
effects on social welfare are not clear, though.
150
 Especially in industrialized countries, the 
financing gap is mostly limited to a rather small group of SMEs that tend to be young, 
innovative and characterized by above-average growth aspirations and the ensuing increased 
capital needs.
151
 The large majority of established businesses, in contrast, appear to have 
sufficient access to funds. Debt financing in particular is perceived to be rather unproblematic 
as banks have increasingly adjusted their business models to the requirements of SME lending 
and financial innovations have helped to adjust for SME particularities.
152
  
If tax incentives are intended to compensate for inadequate capital supply, their 
primary focus should therefore be on the group of innovative, high-growth and mostly young 
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SMEs. These businesses usually have the highest demand for capital
153
 but also feature some 
characteristics complicating the acquisition of funds.
154
 Debt financing and other traditional 
means of finance are usually of limited relevance for them due to the risks associated to their 
ventures. For outsiders, there is typically no or only little historic information to be evaluated 
and the business models as well as the management skills of owners and managers are 
unproven.
155
 Moreover, start-ups often incur losses in their first years and many investors 
prefer to only invest in more advanced stages of development.
156
 The lack of assets to pledge 
as collateral is another problem of newly founded SMEs that exacerbates obtaining capital.
157
 
The problem is particularly severe for innovative start-ups centered around R&D activities. 
They usually focus on the generation of intangibles that cannot or only hardly be liquidated if 
the venture fails. For investors, in particular creditors, the riskiness thereby increases 
significantly. As a consequence, they often refrain from providing capital and many 
innovative ventures have to rely on self-financing and outside risk capital financing more than 
other SMEs.
158
  
Given this misallocation of capital, the question at hand is whether SME tax 
incentives do adequately address the problem. Interestingly, the group of SMEs most affected 
by financing constraints appears to be the same dynamic group that also accounts for 
disproportionally high rates of innovation and job creation. So there is a certain kind of SME 
which generates the positive spillovers sought by policy-makers and at the same time suffers 
the most from underinvestment due to asymmetric information. As already discussed, these 
firms only represent a very small fraction of the SME sector, though, and providing relief to 
enterprises of a certain size therefore constitutes as very inefficient way of fostering 
investments in the innovative, high-growth SMEs. There are simply too many other small and 
medium-sized entities not falling into this category and a more accurate targeting with the 
help of additional eligibility criteria – as currently implemented for numerous input-based 
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schemes – is highly problematic as well. The additional criteria are not very accurate 
indicators either, enhance the complexity of the schemes and introduce further distortions to 
the neutrality of the tax code.  
In addition to being inefficient, the majority of currently available SME tax 
incentives also bear the risk of being ineffective in providing relief to the targeted group of 
young and innovative high-growth enterprises. Above all, special tax rates for SMEs, the most 
commonly used and most impactful form of SME tax incentives, are inept as they only take 
effect when investments generate positive returns, i.e., after the actual investment has been 
made and the information asymmetry causing financing constraints has been cut back 
significantly. Input-based tax incentives, in contrast, could provide substantial support to 
businesses confronted with an insufficient supply of capital. If designed appropriately, i.e., if 
refunds are granted, they are effective in the early stages of investments when returns are 
often low or even negative. Moreover, tying the relief to the size of investments ensures a 
better targeting of enterprises with growth aspirations.
159
 In practice, however, refunds are 
rarely granted and even carry forwards are regularly limited. Moreover, the reliefs actually 
provided by input-based regimes are rather small compared to the savings incurred on special 
tax rates. It is thus questionable, in how far they really incentivize additional investments 
showing the intended favorable attributes and in how far they provide unnecessary relief to 
SME investments that would have been undertaken anyway and in large parts are not affected 
by financing constraints.
160
 
Besides special tax rates and input-based incentives on the firm level, shareholder-
level reliefs are another instrument that aims at providing eligible businesses with additional 
funds. They grant preferential tax treatment of dividends and capital gains from SME 
investments. Hence, such investments require a lower pre-tax rate of return to meet the 
expected after-tax rate of return.
161
 Investor-level incentives thereby seek to induce more 
external equity to be invested in the SME sector. Given that young enterprises often need to 
resort to risk capital from outside equity holders, shareholder-level reliefs could indeed be an 
effective instrument to close the financing gap of SMEs. On the other hand, investor-level 
incentives for SMEs could have adverse effects on capital allocation instead of improving it if 
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the additional capital invested in the SME sector is withdrawn from more efficient alternative 
investments in large enterprises.
162
 Given that shareholder reliefs for private investors 
generally face the same problems related to targeting the right SME as firm-level measures, 
this kind of unintended capital reallocation is not unlikely. Shareholder-level incentives, 
however, provide the possibility of restricting the respective measures to venture capital funds 
and venture capital companies. The targeting of high-risk, high-growth firms is thereby 
relocated to the fund, which helps the accuracy as well as the collection costs incurred by tax 
administrations.
163
 The effectiveness of incentives for venture capital funds and companies, 
however, is only given if comparable entities (i.e., investment funds and investment 
companies) are not exempt from taxation anyway.
164
  
Existing evidence also casts doubt on the effectiveness as well as the efficiency of 
shareholder-level incentives as research predominantly finds lower capital gains taxes to have 
positive albeit modest effects on the level of high-tech and early-stage venture investments. 
The amount of additional capital provided to SMEs could therefore be disproportionally small 
compared to the costs that are induced by market distortions and forgone tax revenues.
 165
 In 
addition, the supply of capital could not even be the main reason for financial constraints. 
Instead, the problem may stem from the demand side as business owners refrain from taking 
up capital in fear of diluted ownership and control or the restrictions emanating from 
covenants.
166
 Moreover, owners of SMEs and their managers may forfeit opportunities for 
financing due to their unawareness of potential sources of funds.
167
 Obviously, tax incentives 
do not at all address these demand-side issues nor do they eliminate the actual sources of 
SME-specific asymmetric information relating to financial reporting, the quality of business 
planning, financial management and governance systems.  
As a last argument against the use of tax incentives in the prevention of 
underinvestment in SMEs, empirical work has – at least up to now – not clearly identified the 
extent to which financial constraints of SMEs are really caused by asymmetric information 
(i.e., market failure). SMEs’ problems in acquiring funds could actually be the result of a 
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functioning market mechanism simply identifying alternative investments to be superior.
168
 In 
fact, capital markets have been found to function quite well even in the presence of imperfect 
information while the investment readiness of start-ups has been asserted to be inadequate in 
many cases.
169
 So the government’s ability to generate a more efficient equilibrium than the 
market by redistributing capital resources to SMEs is doubtful. Accordingly, research 
generally recommends to refrain from direct policy intervention to close the financing gap.
170
  
Summing up, the problem of asymmetric information aggravates the acquisition of 
capital for SMEs more than for large enterprises, which puts them at a competitive 
disadvantage and is likely to induce suboptimal levels of welfare. The extent of the problem is 
not clear, though.
171
 In developed financial markets, evidence suggests the financing gap of 
SMEs to primarily occur for equity financing of innovative and young SMEs with a high 
potential for growth. These enterprises require the most funds but often cannot sufficiently 
resort to traditional instruments of financing due to the risk structure of their ventures. Using 
firm-level incentives like special tax rates, tax allowances or tax credits is subject to the same 
problems in targeting the right group of businesses that are already described in the previous 
sections. On the shareholder level, preferential taxation of dividends and capital gains from all 
kinds of SME investments seriously deteriorates the investment neutrality of the tax code. 
Most likely, this results in major distortions of capital allocation that would outweigh the 
benefits of reducing SMEs’ financing gap. A restriction to venture capital investments would 
more accurately target the SMEs producing positive externalities but – depending on the 
group of eligible investors – either the effectiveness or the practicality of this approach 
appears questionable. Financing constraints as a consequence of asymmetric information 
therefore do not constitute a strong argument for SME tax incentives either – especially in the 
way they are currently designed in the majority of countries.  
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4.1.5 Socioeconomic Role of the SME Sector 
Besides the efficiency-driven rationale, there is also the view that socioeconomic 
considerations legitimize SME support. Following this line of thought, SMEs’ role in 
expanding the middle class, in giving individuals the opportunity for economic advancement 
and in providing jobs for people who would find it difficult to obtain employment elsewhere 
makes them worthy of government assistance.
172
 U.S. sources describe businesses run by 
women, minorities and immigrants as being of particular importance in their communities 
because they do not only create job opportunities for the less educated but also help in 
building social networks and informal capital markets. These businesses are a possible entry 
into the labor market for the less educated and supply social benefits not obtainable for them 
otherwise.
173
 Moreover, small businesses are claimed to secure a diversity in locally available 
services and products that cannot be provided by the large players and chains and are 
therefore highly valued by the respective communities.
174
 Altogether, SME tax incentives 
may thus be justified by wider social issues.   
The social benefits of SME activities, of course, are difficult to quantify. While 
empirical studies indeed find SMEs to provide a disproportionally large share of jobs to 
underqualified individuals, their impact on the diversity of available products and services is 
hardly measurable. Even if the prominent, socioeconomic role of small businesses is taken for 
granted, though, it is hard to make the case for tax incentives. If customers value the supply of 
certain products and services, for example, they will pay for them accordingly. There is no 
need for support through the tax system. With regard to employment and social advancement, 
it seems illogical to link support to firm size – at least if being the only eligibility criterion. If 
the hiring of certain employees is intended, then support should be awarded for hiring, not for 
being a small enterprise. In the end it boils down to the same line of argumentation already 
pursued in connection with the general role of the SME sector for the economy: Just because 
SMEs are important, they do not need to be provided with tax advantages. Just because they 
hire more underqualified people, they do not necessarily hire even more underqualified people 
when being subject to preferential tax rates. So if socioeconomic goals are the rationale 
behind SME tax incentives, support schemes should rather address these goals directly and 
not take firm size as a proxy for other firm characteristics. And under most circumstances, 
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non-tax measures are probably the more effective, the more efficient and the more sustainable 
way of achieving socioeconomic goals.
175
 
4.2 Structural Disadvantages of SMEs Emanating from the Tax System 
4.2.1 Incomplete Loss Offset 
As the commonly used non-tax arguments appear questionable as a justification of 
SME tax incentives, an adequate reasoning for providing such incentives may be rooted in the 
tax system itself. If the tax system discriminates against small and medium-sized firms, it 
creates inefficiencies in the allocation of resources and a level of investment in SMEs that is 
not optimal with regard to overall social welfare. Following this line of argumentation, tax 
incentives could serve as a compensation aiming at a minimization of the distortions induced 
by the tax system and at reducing the level of underinvestment in SMEs. In order to assess the 
validity of this argument, it needs to be examined if structural tax-induced disadvantages for 
SMEs really exist and if tax incentives are the appropriate measure to address them. The 
latter, of course, hinges on the effectiveness and efficiency of SME tax incentives, i.e., their 
ability to provide relief to those businesses negatively affected by structural discrimination of 
the tax system and to do so at reasonable costs. 
Asymmetric treatment of profits and losses is a basic feature of modern income 
taxation. Taxpayers generally have to pay taxes on positive income – either corporate or 
personal income tax – whereas they do not receive any payments if they incur losses. If the 
government only participates in positive returns, taxation discriminates against investment 
projects bearing a greater risk of incurring losses. Income taxation may thus discourage risk-
taking.
176
 The problem is at least partly alleviated as businesses and their owners can offset 
losses against other positive income – either from other sources of income (e.g., employment 
income or capital income) or against income from past and future years.
177
 Not in all 
situations, however, taxpayers have positive income to be offset, which becomes even more 
likely as loss offsets are restricted. Hence, limitations to intra and inter-periodic loss offsets 
increase the danger of risk-taking being discouraged by income taxation. In practice, this may 
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show on two levels: Either investors abstain from equity investments in risky ventures or the 
businesses themselves take fewer risks.
178
 
The first question at hand is whether restrictions to loss offsets affect SMEs more 
severely than large enterprises. This would generally be the case if SMEs were more likely to 
incur losses. The AMADEUS data used to generate the model companies in Section 3 indeed 
indicates the return on equity to continuously increase in firm size. Moreover, SMEs are 
active in a smaller number of markets with a smaller number of products and services. Their 
business risks are less diversified and their incomes more volatile.
179
 Hence, SMEs should 
indeed be more affected by limited loss carry forwards and loss offsets than their larger 
counterparts.
180
 Even more than an “average SME”, start-ups and young, high-risk ventures 
are prone to incur negative income as significant losses upfront are a usual occurrence for 
them.
181
 Upcoming start-ups are also particularly affected by loss trafficking rules as a buyout 
as well as the participation of venture capitalists and business angels potentially triggers the 
extinction of loss carry forwards.
182
 Moreover, time limits on carry forwards of four or five 
years as implemented in numerous countries
183
 may severely restrict start-ups’ ability to 
deduct initial losses later on.
184
 
Although SMEs indeed appear to suffer more from limited loss offsets, it is 
questionable if that really distorts investment decisions, i.e., leads to underinvestment in the 
SME sector. First of all, tax planning may at least alleviate the effects of the limitations, 
especially for start-ups who usually expect to incur upfront losses and should adjust 
accordingly.
185
 Secondly, investors have not been found to pay much attention to loss offset 
regulations in their investment decisions.
186
 But even if they did, the SME tax incentives 
analyzed in Section 3 are not the right measure to compensate for limited loss offsets because 
the link between firm size and the propensity to be affected by restricted loss offsets is only 
weak. The targeting of special tax rates or tax credits for SMEs would thus be poor if a 
compensation for limited loss offsets was intended. Moreover, the design of currently 
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available SME incentives suggests that such a compensation is not the goal as special tax rates 
and non-refundable input-based incentives only benefit taxpayers with positive income.  
If the issue of incomplete loss offsets is perceived to be a major problem for the SME 
sector, policy-makers should thus address the issue directly and reduce the respective 
restrictions – ideally for all kinds of companies. Alternatively, more generous provisions 
could be offered exclusively to new enterprises in order to prevent excessive losses in tax 
revenues. This would introduce another distortion to the tax system but at least firm age 
would be a more accurate indicator than firm size to target businesses that are likely to be 
actually affected by limited loss offsets. Moreover, it is an easy-to-track indicator which is 
less prone to misuse and accounting policies than firm size.  
As already discussed, the focus of many policy-makers is on innovative high-risk, 
high-growth start-ups which generate positive externalities to the benefit of the economy as a 
whole. With regard to these enterprises, two restrictions to loss offsets and carry forwards 
should receive special attention. Above all, loss trafficking provisions represent an 
impediment as venture capital investors and business angels regularly acquire qualified 
shareholdings in high-growth start-ups. If loss trafficking rules are too restrictive, i.e., if they 
already kick in for minor ownership changes, the initial losses incurred by these businesses 
run the risk of being annihilated for tax purposes.
187
 This, in turn, might discourage or at least 
slow down the obtainment of outside capital by start-ups. Moreover, loss trafficking rules 
potentially depress the selling price upon exit for the founders of start-ups, thus making 
investments in start-ups less attractive. Secondly, start-ups may suffer from too restrictive 
time limits for carry forwards. If it takes them several years to generate net profits, four or 
five-year carry forwards may not suffice to fully offset the initial losses, especially if 
combined with limits on annual offsets (e.g., in Hungary and Poland).
188
   
Summing up, incomplete loss offsets on carry forwards may indeed affect small and 
medium-sized enterprises more severely than large enterprises.
189
 Special tax rates, tax 
credits, allowances or depreciation schemes for SMEs, however, are not the appropriate 
countermeasures. Instead, it would be more effective and efficient to directly address the 
problem by granting more generous loss carry forwards and offsets. In particular, legislators 
should avoid loss trafficking rules that discourage investments in high-growth start-ups. 
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4.2.2 Debt Bias 
Most income tax systems treat equity and debt finance differently. While interest 
payments on debt are usually deductible from taxable income, dividend payments are not (or 
only to a limited extent).
190
 As a consequence, interest payments lower taxable business 
income and are exclusively taxed in the hands of the recipient of the interest whereas 
dividends are subject to double taxation on the corporate and on the shareholder level. For 
transparently taxed entities, the problem of double taxation does not exist because there is 
only one level of taxation. Disadvantages for equity financing, however, may arise if business 
and capital income are subject to different tax rates (progressive vs. proportional).  
The discrimination against equity financing constitutes a structural disadvantage for 
SMEs if they have more problems to obtain debt financing than large entities and if they have 
more difficulties to effectively deduct interest payments from the tax base due to a lack of 
positive taxable income. In general, large firms may indeed be better positioned to obtain debt 
financing as they often represent better risks for creditors. They possess more assets that can 
serve as collateral and offer better risk diversification as a result of a broader range of 
products and services being sold at the market. The lack of risk diversification also makes 
small businesses more prone to losses and thus to the danger of not being able to effectively 
deduct interest expenses. Moreover, lending to small firms could be less profitable in view of 
the fixed costs related to giving loans and the problems in obtaining information about 
lenders.
191
    
As outlined in Section 4.1.4, however, SMEs as a whole do not necessarily have 
problems in obtaining debt capital. Banks have increasingly adapted to the challenges of 
lending to small businesses and the financing gap has at least been narrowed for debt 
financing. In addition, the challenges of lending to small businesses do not necessarily have to 
prevent debt financing altogether. Instead, they may merely increase the interest rates 
imposed on affected entities.
192
 The deductibility of interest payments would then rather 
benefit SMEs than it would hurt them. Hence, it appears that SMEs do not generally suffer 
from the debt bias in income taxation. It is rather a certain group of SMEs not being able to 
obtain debt financing and not being able to deduct interest payments due to a lack of positive 
taxable income. This group primarily includes start-ups and gazelles. Their success is often 
based on new ideas and technologies that are unsuitable to serve as collateral and they lack 
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proven track records of their business models and abilities, which aggravates the obtainment 
of loans.
193
  
Given that the majority of SMEs have sufficient access to debt financing as well as 
positive income to deduct interest payments from, it does not make sense to provide general 
tax incentives to SMEs as a compensation for the debt bias, e.g., in the form of special tax 
rates, special depreciation schemes or tax credits on certain kinds of investments. In fact, such 
incentives rather tend to benefit those businesses without negative income and without a 
shortage in available debt financing. The debt bias therefore does not constitute a justification 
of these kinds of incentives. Measures effectively addressing the debt bias need to embrace 
the problems arising from it and target affected firms more accurately.  
A few incentives aim more specifically at alleviating financing-related issues. In 
Belgium, for example, an additional 0.5% of notional interest can be deducted from taxable 
income by small enterprises and in Portugal 5% of initial capital contributions and capital 
increases can be deducted by SMEs. Obviously, both measures do not improve the access to 
debt financing but they make equity financing more attractive with regard to taxation and 
could indeed reduce the debt bias. It is questionable, though, in how far they really support the 
taxpayers being most affected, i.e., loss-making firms. In the absence of refunds, these 
enterprises do not benefit from additional deductions, especially if carry forwards are not 
allowed. In Hungary, the tax credit of 60% on interest payments even has an adverse effect as 
it extends the debt bias rather than reducing it. The taxation of debt financing becomes even 
more advantageous and therefore constitutes an even bigger disadvantage for taxpayers 
suffering from the debt bias.
194
  
Shareholder-level incentives are another group of regimes that may positively affect 
SMEs heavily relying on equity financing. They limit the double taxation of proceeds derived 
from equity investments and thereby reduce the debt bias. Once again, however, the group of 
SMEs having the most problems in obtaining debt financing and in effectively deducting 
interest payments due to incurred losses may not benefit – at least as long as they still make 
losses. During this time, firms are unlikely to pay dividends and their shareholders may not be 
able to realize capital gains. Reduced shareholder taxation therefore does not provide 
immediate relief and only kicks in as the respective SMEs generate positive returns. At this 
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time, affected businesses could probably obtain debt financing anyway and the debt bias 
would no longer put them at a competitive disadvantage. 
Altogether, the debt bias does not constitute an adequate argument for providing 
SME tax incentives in their current form, especially if the incentives do not directly relate to 
the taxation of equity financing (either at the firm level or at the shareholder level). There is 
simply no clear link between firm size and the inability to acquire loans. If the discrimination 
against equity financing is indeed perceived to be a problem, policy-makers should rather 
directly tackle the problem instead of trying to alleviate one distortion (equity vs. debt) by 
introducing another (SME vs. large). The debt bias could, for example, be addressed by 
generally reduced shareholder taxation or by aligning the treatment of payments on debt and 
equity on the firm level.
 195
 
4.2.3 Double Taxation of Corporate Profits 
In most EU countries, corporate income is taxed on the corporate level as soon as 
profits are incurred and on the shareholder level when profits are distributed or capital gains 
are realized upon the disposal of participations.
196
 In practice, the double taxation of corporate 
profits negatively affects the success of the SME sector in several ways. First, it may prevent 
business creation. If the overall level of taxation and the hurdle after-tax rate of return of 
newly founded businesses becomes too high, dependent employment and alternative capital 
market investments could be more attractive and prevent businesses from being started.
197
 
Employment income and alternative capital market investments, however, are also subject to 
taxes that are not necessarily lower.
198
 In fact, most of the tax systems in the EU and other 
developed countries do not feature full double taxation of corporate profits. Mostly, 
shareholder relief systems or imputation systems reduce tax wedges between the overall tax 
rate on corporate profits and the top PIT rate to a minimum or even create an advantage for 
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corporate profits (see Table 9).
199
 In view of these relief mechanisms, it appears highly 
questionable if businesses not being started due to corporate double taxation should be 
founded in the first place. Most likely, a true entrepreneur would not be deterred from starting 
a business by a minor tax wedge, especially as the non-corporate form of business not being 
subject to double taxation is also available. 
Besides the discouragement of business start-ups, double taxation may also slow 
down firms’ growth as it prevents incorporation.200 In fact, the choice of legal form has been 
found to be impacted by tax considerations, most notably differences in nominal tax rates.
201
 
The welfare losses induced by the distortion of legal form choice are unclear, though. If 
investment decisions were distorted by the choice of legal form and the acquisition of funds 
was prevented, double taxation could indeed prevent firms from growing.
202
 As mentioned 
above, the size of the tax wedges in most EU countries is not very big, though. Hence, it 
appears unlikely that enterprises with substantial growth aspirations would 1) really abstain 
from incorporation because of a minimal tax rate advantage and 2) have their growth 
aspirations halted by being non-corporate. And even if that was the case, an improved 
alignment of (generally applicable) corporate and non-corporate income tax rates would be 
the better response to the problem than the SME tax incentives discussed in Sections 2 and 3.  
Lastly, double taxation could prevent SMEs’ success because shareholder taxation 
increases the cost of equity capital. The increase is likely to be more pronounced for SMEs 
than for large enterprises as the shareholder clienteles of both groups differ. Large 
corporations usually have access to international financial markets where shareholder taxes 
are neglected.
203
 In contrast to that, SMEs are more reliant on domestic, small-scale investors 
for whom shareholder taxation plays a significant role. As a result, SMEs incur higher cost of 
capital that – even if exclusively stemming from taxation – constitute a competitive 
disadvantage and could cause SMEs to be pushed out of the market.
204
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Table 9: Tax wedge for corporate and non-corporate business income in the EU (2015) 
Country PIT rate (in %) CIT rate (in %) ∆ (in %-points) 
Austria 50.00 43.75 6.25 
Belgium 53.50 50.49 3,01 
Bulgaria 15.00 14.50 0.50 
Croatia 47.20 29.60 17,60 
Cyprus 38.50 12.50 26.00 
Czech Rep. 16.05 31.15 –15.10 
Denmark 50.00 55.36 –5.36 
Estonia 20.00 20.00 0.00 
Finland 50.25 42.44 7.81 
France 49.00 64.38 –15.38 
Germany 47.79 48.59 –0.80 
Greece 33.00 33.40 –0.40 
Hungary 31.96 31.96 0.00 
Ireland 40.00 57.13 –17.13 
Italy 48.52 46.35 2.17 
Latvia 23.00 23.50 –0.50 
Lithuania 15.00 27.75 –12.75 
Luxembourg 44.10 43.38 0.72 
Malta 35.00 35.00 0.00 
Netherlands 52.00 43.75 8.25 
Poland 32.00 34.39 –2.39 
Portugal 56.50 49.24 7.26 
Romania 16.00 29.44 –13.44 
Slovakia 25.00 22.00 3.00 
Slovenia 50.00 37.75 12.25 
Spain 45.00 44.92 0.08 
Sweden 54.86 45.40 9.46 
UK 45.00 44.45 0.55 
Mean 38.72 37.95 0.77 
Note: Data was retrieved from ibfd.org 
 
However, SME tax incentives on the firm level again appear to be an inadequate 
remedy. Compensating for one distortion by adding another is unlikely to create better overall 
neutrality, especially if the taxpayers affected by the initial distortion are not targeted 
accurately. With regard to targeting, addressing the shareholder level directly is the superior 
approach. Shareholder-level incentives, though, introduce distortions and discriminate against 
non-qualifying investments in large enterprises as well. In particular, special investment 
allowances as in France and Ireland do not provide a level playing field but rather revert a 
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likely SME discrimination into a large business discrimination.
205
 In addition, the commonly 
used explicit size criteria come along with the same problems as on the firm level: more 
complexity in the tax system and a potential discouragement of growth.
206
  
Even for investor-level incentives, the adequacy of tax incentives in compensating 
SMEs for corporate double taxation therefore appears questionable. Instead, a general 
reduction of taxes on dividends and capital gains emerges as the superior approach. It would 
reduce the disadvantages incurred by SMEs due to double taxation while avoiding the 
problems of explicit size restrictions. In practice, of course, the loss of tax revenues 
(compared to measures restricted to SMEs) is a major concern.
207
 The concern could be 
alleviated by limiting reduced taxation to significant shareholdings, i.e., shareholdings 
accounting for a certain percentage of all outstanding shares of the respective company. Such 
a restriction would practically exclude shareholders of large enterprises while also achieving 
an improved focus on the shareholders who cannot avoid dividend and capital gains taxation 
because they make a living on the proceeds from their participations (mostly owner-managers 
of small firms). A differentiated treatment according to the holding quota is already 
implemented in several countries, which proves the practicability. In Germany, for example, a 
restriction of preferential treatment is easily achievable by increasing the part of exempt 
dividends and capital gains in the Teileinkünfteverfahren while holding everything else equal. 
4.2.4 Tax Planning Opportunities for Multinational Enterprises 
Large enterprises usually run multinational operations whereas SMEs mostly operate 
exclusively on the domestic market.
208
 Cross-border operations, of course, come along with 
tax advantages and usually offer opportunities for tax planning. The overall tax liability can 
be reduced significantly as income is shifted to low-tax jurisdictions, e.g., through transfer 
pricing, hybrid structures taking advantage of legal mismatches and tax haven finance 
affiliates.
209
 The exact amount of savings from such activities, of course, varies across 
countries and companies. Overall, anecdotal as well as empirical evidence indicate substantial 
reductions of tax payments, though, and the lack of opportunities for cross-border profit 
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shifting could put SMEs at a structural competitive disadvantage that would not arise in the 
absence of taxation.
210
 Possibly, this warrants the use of SME tax incentives as a consolation.  
Whether effective tax rates really decrease in firm size, however, is questionable. 
Empirical evidence on the subject has been ambiguous so far.
211
 Moreover, smaller entities 
also have opportunities for tax planning that do not play a role for most large enterprises. 
Small businesses, for example, can often choose their legal form in a tax-optimal way.
212
 The 
limited number of shareholders of most micro and small enterprises also enables controlling 
owners to optimize profit distributions according to their personal needs and preferences. In 
addition, profits can be extracted with the help of contracts between the company and the 
owners (e.g., employment contracts and shareholder loans). These contracts oftentimes serve 
the purpose of saving taxes and do not necessarily reflect the real economic value of the 
services provided to the firm.
213
 Besides tax avoidance, small business owners also engage in 
tax evasion more than any other group of taxpayers. Especially self-employment is used as a 
vehicle for tax evasion.
214
  In the UK, for example, SMEs account for about half of the overall 
tax gap and the amount of evaded taxes relative to the overall amount of the estimated tax 
liability is nearly twice as high as for large enterprises (3.1% compared to 1.8%).
215
 
Altogether it is thus not clear, if and how much SMEs are really disadvantaged with 
regard to tax planning (and tax evasion) opportunities. Even if they were, this would not 
represent an adequate justification of SME tax incentives as they are currently implemented, 
though. As previously discussed, it is highly unlikely that compensating for one tax-induced 
distortion by introducing another distortion in the tax system leads to a higher degree of 
overall efficiency – especially if the extent and the dynamics of the initial distortion are not 
exactly known. Moreover, imposing lower tax burdens on more mobile capital may simply be 
efficient. So there may not even be a need for compensation. And lastly, a look at actual SME 
tax incentives shows that micro enterprises benefit by far the most whereas small and even 
more so medium-sized entities are often not affected by the regimes or only to a limited 
degree. It is predominantly micro enterprises, however, who can engage in the 
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abovementioned tax planning and tax evasion strategies existing for narrowly held companies. 
Most of the currently available tax incentives would thus be badly targeted if they were 
intended to compensate for an imbalance in tax planning opportunities. 
4.2.5 Compliance Costs 
Paying taxes does not only represent a burden for businesses due to the actual tax 
payments but also because determining the tax liability as well as paying the taxes cause 
considerable compliance costs. Previous studies have estimated compliance costs to amount 
on taverage to up to 21% of turnover
216
 and 150% of taxable income for the very smallest 
businesses.
217
 The majority of studies, however, report significantly lower compliance 
burdens between 0.2% and 15% of revenues.
218
 Compliance costs are incurred for acquiring 
external expertise (e.g., tax advisers), for acquiring required materials and for hiring 
employees who take care of tax-related obligations.
219
 Importantly, a substantial share of the 
compliance burden is made up of fixed and quasi-fixed costs. Hence, large enterprises benefit 
from economies of scale and learning effects stemming from the volume and the frequency of 
their operations and related tax obligations.
220
 As a consequence, the compliance burden 
(relative to turnover or total assets) decreases in firm size and micro and small enterprises are 
subject to a disproportionally high compliance burden.
221
 So the tax system indeed puts SMEs 
at a competitive disadvantage that would not exist in the absence of taxation.  
But does this discrimination justify the use of SME tax incentives? In contrast to the 
abovementioned structural disadvantages, enhanced compliance costs are really driven by 
firm size (or rather the lack hereof). The amount of sales of an enterprise actually determines 
how well fixed costs can be forwarded to customers through prices so that firm size is not 
only a more or less accurate proxy of the firm characteristic which truly causes the 
disadvantage but the actual reason of the disadvantage.
222
 Tax incentives based on firm size 
are thus well targeted at the businesses being affected.  
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Among the different forms of relief, administrative simplifications should be the 
primary choice to address disproportionate compliance burdens. Requiring simplified tax 
accounts, less frequents tax returns and fewer tax payments – as it is common practice in most 
EU Member States – should actually decrease enterprises’ compliance costs. Administrative 
reliefs for micro and small businesses are thus effective and efficient instruments in 
alleviating the compliance-related distortion introduced by the tax system. In addition, 
simplified procedures also relieve the tax administration and are likely to increase net tax 
revenues. The use of administrative simplifications for very small businesses therefore 
appears well-grounded and is likely to contribute to the overall efficiency of the tax system.  
Caution needs to be exercised with regard to the generosity and the exact eligibility 
thresholds, though. Preferential treatment for small businesses naturally partitions taxpayers 
and violates the neutrality of the tax system.
223
 The relief provided needs to be carefully 
weighed against the size-related disadvantage under the ordinary compliance obligations. 
Otherwise a discrimination against micro and small businesses easily turns into a 
discrimination against larger entities – either because eligibility thresholds are chosen too 
high or because the relief provided is too beneficial. In particular, regimes may be overly 
generous if they strongly deviate from standard procedures. If income is determined 
presumptively, for example, or if special regimes replace several taxes, the determination and 
collection of taxes is not only simplified but actual tax payments are significantly altered.
224
 
Taxpayers are then put at a substantial competitive advantage compared to ineligible 
competitors and may be strongly incentivized to not forfeit access to the special regimes by 
remaining small (or by reporting to be small).
225
 In addition, simplifications should be 
harmonized with non-tax regulations. Eligibility thresholds for simplified tax accounting, for 
example, need to consider financial accounting regulations. A simplified regime would be 
misplaced if local accounting standards required comprehensive double-entry and accruals-
based book-keeping from the respective businesses anyway.  
5. Conclusion 
SMEs account for the bulk of economic activity in the European Union and they are 
essential to Europe’s economic development and prosperity. As a consequence, the need for 
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specific SME support, most notably in the form of tax incentives, is a popular credo among 
European policy-makers. Tax incentives for specific groups of taxpayers should be treated 
with caution, though. Above all, the tax system needs to be as fair, as simple and as neutral as 
possible. Distortions in the allocation of resources need to be held to a minimum. Naturally, 
discriminatory treatment of small and large firms is contradictory to these guiding principles 
and there must be valid reasons when privileging either group. If such reasons are given, the 
adequacy of tax incentives depends on their ability to properly address and alleviate the 
targeted problems as well as on the costs associated with their implementation. In order to 
ensure their efficiency and avoid unintended adverse effects, they must be designed in a 
simple, transparent and neutral way. 
With regard to currently available regimes, SME tax incentives are common practice 
in the Member States of the European Union. Most notably, reduced income tax rates are 
regularly offered to micro and small businesses as well as to their owners. In addition, input-
based incentives such as special depreciation schemes, tax allowances and tax credits can be 
found in numerous tax codes. The latter are frequently limited to rather specific areas of 
application, e.g., to certain underprivileged regions or to certain kinds of investments. Given 
these restrictions in the scope of application, the vast majority of regimes in the European 
Union does not have a significant impact on the tax burden of most SMEs. Comparing the 
three classes of SMEs, micro companies receive by far the most generous benefits, whereas 
small and – even more so – medium-sized entities are rarely subject to substantial tax cuts. 
Besides reductions in tax payments, the very smallest enterprises also benefit from 
administrative reliefs throughout the European Union. The simplifications range from less 
frequent tax payments and returns over simplified accounting requirements up to special 
regimes building on alternative tax bases (e.g., turnover) or even lump-sum payments. 
Given the multitude of available SME incentives, the question of their justification 
arises. In general, the market mechanism should be assumed to induce the best available 
allocation of resources unless frictions prevent the well-functioning of the market. If, 
however, market failure does indeed occur and results in underinvestment in the SME sector, 
policy-intervention could be warranted. With regard to small businesses, positive externalities 
in the form of job creation and innovation as well as asymmetric information between 
business insiders and outsiders are the most commonly cited market failures. The latter 
induces an insufficient provision of capital as investors are unwilling to invest when they 
cannot properly assess the associated risks. 
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Existing evidence does generally not confirm that the SME sector as a whole is 
affected by the aforementioned market failures. Instead, it is only a very small group of young 
and dynamic firms who feature an above-average propensity to generate jobs and innovation 
and who are subject to increased problems of obtaining sufficient financing due to their 
heightened capital needs and the uncertainty associated to their business models. The majority 
of SMEs, however, are not (or not so much) affected by market frictions. Tax incentives 
relying on size as the main eligibility criterion are thus not targeted adequately. In addition, 
most of the currently available regimes tend to provide exactly those businesses with the most 
generous reliefs that are the least affected by market failure, i.e., the well-established and 
highly profitable enterprises. Start-ups and upcoming high-growth, high-risk firms, by 
contrast, can often not take full advantage as they regularly do not have the positive income 
required to benefit from preferential tax rates and input-based, non-refundable tax credits and 
allowances.   
Disadvantages of smaller entities emanating from the tax system constitute another 
line of argumentation in favor of providing SME tax incentives. Most prominently, SMEs are 
assumed to be discriminated against because their compliance burden is disproportionally 
high. Given that compliance costs are largely made up of fixed and quasi-fixed costs, whose 
impact decreases in firm size, there is indeed a case to be made for SME incentives. Firm size 
actually is the characteristic causing the problem and it should thus be the characteristic to be 
referred to when targeting compensatory relief. Naturally, the relief itself should relate to the 
underlying friction, which implies the provision of administrative reliefs rather than other 
instruments aiming at the actual tax liability (e.g., special tax rates).  
In addition, SMEs are assumed to be disadvantaged by the tax system because they 
do not have the tax planning opportunities of large entities, because they are more affected by 
the double taxation of corporate profits and restricted loss offsets and because they are more 
reliant on equity financing that is traditionally disadvantaged in modern income tax systems. 
These alleged tax-related discriminations, however, do not justify the use of SME incentives. 
Evidently, owners of small businesses evade more taxes than any other group of taxpayers by 
mingling private and business affairs. Moreover, they have substantial leeway to organize 
operations in tax-minimizing ways as well, e.g., by choosing their legal form adequately, by 
timing profit distributions according to their preferences or by setting up contract relations 
with their businesses. Moreover, the double taxation of corporate profits, the discrimination of 
equity and the restriction of loss offsets do not necessarily affect small businesses more than 
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large entities; and even if they did, the obvious approach would be to address the issues 
directly instead of trying to alleviate one distortion by introducing a new one. 
Altogether, the use of SME tax incentives is mostly inappropriate. Considering 
currently available regimes, the majority of incentives are ineffective in addressing the 
problems of the SME sector. The provisions are regularly not well designed and cause 
unnecessary complexity in the tax code as well as additional distortions to investment and 
financing decisions. European policy-makers should thus shift their focus from providing 
specific and mostly ineffective SME tax incentives to the removal of tax-related obstacles to 
the growth of businesses. 
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Appendix 
 
Annex 1: Country Reports 
In the following, available SME tax incentives and special regimes in the 28 countries of the 
European Union and selected other countries are described. Moreover, the country reports 
inform about other – generally applicable – provisions that might benefit or discriminate 
against SMEs. The focus of the summaries is on corporate income taxation. Transparently 
taxed enterprises, however, are subject to the majority of incentives, too (except for special 
CIT rates).
226
  
The summaries also include special SME tax incentives for sole proprietors, partnerships and 
the shareholders of SMEs. Moreover, provisions targeted at newly founded enterprises are 
accounted for because most of them are either micro, small or medium-sized enterprises when 
starting their operations. Lastly, size-related reliefs in value-added taxation are considered. 
Although the final consumer is the subject of the value-added tax, reliefs do effectively 
benefit enterprises – in terms of compliance costs as well as actual tax payments. The terms 
micro, small and medium-sized enterprises are used in accordance with the standards given by 
the European Commission
227
 if not stated otherwise. 
 
Austria 
On the firm level, Austria does not offer special tax incentives for SMEs. There is only an 
adjusted minimum tax for newly founded companies of € 1,092 that only benefits low-income 
companies. On the shareholder level, Austria grants full exemption to income from 
participations in unlisted European SMEs (i.e., dividends, capital gains and interest payments) 
for so-called intermediary investors. Intermediary investors must be corporate entities 
financed with equity capital. For individual investors, dividends from such intermediary 
investors are exempt from income taxation up to € 25,000. 
                                                 
226
 If eligibility thresholds are reported in local currencies other than €, comparable euro amounts are given in 
brackets. Exchange rates as of December 31, 2015 were referred to for the conversion.  
227
 The European Commission defines micro, small and medium-sized enterprises as businesses not exceeding 
certain thresholds for the number of employees (20/50/250), turnover (€ 2 million/€ 10 million/€ 50 million) and 
total assets (€ 2 million/€ 10 million/€ 43 million). See Section 2.1 and European Commission (2003) p. 39. 
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Enterprises are exempt from the value-added tax (VAT) if their turnover is lower than 
€ 35,000. Moreover, enterprises with less than € 100,000 of turnover in the preceding year 
only have to file VAT returns and make VAT payments on a quarterly basis (instead of 
monthly). Suppliers with a turnover of less than € 110,000 may pay VAT on a cash basis. 
 
Belgium 
Belgium has numerous incentives for SMEs in place. For tax purposes, an enterprise must 
meet the following criteria to be considered an SME: 
 not more than 50 employees (and not more than 100 employees even if the other 
criteria are fulfilled); 
 turnover does not exceed € 7 million; 
 balance sheet total does not exceed € 5 million 
 profits do not exceed € 322,500. 
Belgium offers several investment allowances. The general investment deduction for SMEs 
amounts to 10.5% of the depreciation taken on assets. The rate has varied between 10.5% and 
12.5% since 2009.
228 
The incentive is restricted to companies with fewer than 20 employees. 
Unused amounts can be used in subsequent years with a maximum carry-forward of 
€ 946,800 (or 25% if the unused part exceeds € 3,787,210). Additionally, an allowance of 
20.5% is granted to SMEs for investments in safety measures either in the year of the 
investment or the following year. Concerning carry-forwards the same rules apply as for the 
above deductions. A notional interest deduction is available for all Belgian companies. It 
amounts to 4% of qualifying equity.
229
 SMEs, however, are allowed to deduct an additional 
0.5%. Since 2012, carry-forwards are no longer possible.  
With regard to depreciation, SMEs may – irrespective of the exact date of acquisition – 
deduct 100% of the ordinary annual depreciation for an asset in the year of acquisition.
230
 
Moreover, all costs related to the acquisition of depreciable assets can be immediately 
                                                 
228 The exact rates in this period are as follows: 10.5% from 2009 to 2011, 12.5% in 2012 and 11.5% in 2011.  
229 The exact rates for large companies from 2009 to 2013 are as follows: 4.307% in 2009, 4.473% in 2010, 3.8% in 2011, 3.425% in 2012 and 3% in 2013. The respective 
rates for SME are 0.5% higher.
 
230
 Until 2010, the regime was more generous. SMEs could incur depreciations on all assets that were twice as 
high as the normal rate in the first three years of usage. 
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depreciated. Newly founded companies can also immediately depreciate all costs of 
establishment. 
SMEs may shift income into a tax-exempt reserve of at most € 37,500 or 50% of retained 
earnings. The maximum size of the reserve can be further reduced by the following 
circumstances: 
 occurrence of capital gains on shares that are eligible for participation exemption; 
 occurrence of exempt capital gains on cars used for business purposes; 
 occurrence of gains on debt claims against managers, shareholders and their 
spouses or children;  
 paid-up capital is decreased.  
The income entering the reserve needs to be re-invested within three years. The reserve must 
not be used in combination with the notional interest deduction on equity.  
SMEs in Belgium also benefit from progressive corporate income tax rates (rates are given 
excluding the surcharge of 3%):  
 24.25% on income ≤ € 25,000; 
 31% on income between € 25,000 and € 90,000; 
 34.5% on income between € 90,000 and € 322,500; 
 33% on all income beyond that. 
Certain types of companies are not allowed to apply the reduced rates (financial companies, 
collective investment companies, companies owned by other companies by 50% or more, 
companies whose distributions exceed 13% of paid-in capital, members of groups with a 
coordination center and companies not paying at least € 36,000 to a director or active partner). 
The size of the tax credit on R&D investments – if utilized – is adjusted to the progressive 
schedule.  
Further reliefs for SMEs include exemptions from the special tax on capital gains (0.412%) 
and the so-called “Fairness Tax”. The latter is levied at 5.15% (including austerity surcharge) 
upon distributions that are made in spite of losses or in the absence of taxable income due to 
other tax incentives. Moreover, 80% of SMEs’ income derived from self-developed patents 
are tax exempt. Large firms only benefit from this exemption if the underlying patents were 
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acquired. With regard to administrative regulations, SMEs do only have to make yearly tax 
payments (instead of quarterly).  
On the shareholder level, dividend distributions from SMEs with respect to shares issued after 
July 1st 2013, are subject to reduced withholding taxes if they are made at least three years 
after issuance (20% in the third year and 15% in the fourth and subsequent years instead of 
25%). For this purpose, the following conditions need to be met:  
 The shares must be held continuously and in full ownership by the same 
shareholder for three or four years. 
 The shares must be issued in exchange for cash contributions.  
 The statutory minimum amount of capital must be paid up. 
Capital gains of SMEs from their subsidiaries are completely exempt from capital gains 
taxation if the subsidiaries meet certain qualitative criteria. 
Lastly, there is an advance payment system in place for the taxation of liquidation proceeds 
from SMEs. Eligible SMEs may create a "liquidation reserve" from after-tax profits which 
must be maintained on a separate equity owner's account. The liquidation reserve immediately 
is subject to a separate non-deductible tax of 10%. In return, no dividend withholding tax is 
due upon liquidation. If the liquidation reserve is distributed as a dividend within 5 years, 
though, a dividend withholding tax of 15% is due (5% if distributed after more than 5 years). 
Newly founded enterprises may immediately depreciate all costs of establishment and costs 
related to the creation of the enterprise. 
With regard to the VAT, SMEs are exempt if their turnover does not exceed € 15,000. 
 
Bulgaria 
Bulgaria does not have special tax incentives for SMEs. Small companies are subject to 
administrative reliefs, though. Enterprises whose net sales in the previous year were below 
BGR 300,000 (≈ € 150,000) do not have to make advance tax payments and those with net 
sales below BGR 3,000,000 (≈ € 1,500,000) only have to make quarterly advance payments 
(instead of monthly). In addition to that, simplified accounting standards apply for SMEs. 
VAT registration is only required for enterprises with more than € 25,565 of turnover. 
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Croatia 
Croatia provides comprehensive investment incentives for new undertakings. Income from 
new investments (also by existing enterprises) can be subject to corporate income tax rates 
that are reduced by up to 100% for 10 years. The exact amount of the reduction depends on 
the size of the investment and on the number of newly created jobs related to the investment: 
 100% reduction if investment of at least € 3 million and related to 15 new 
employees; 
 75% reduction if investment of at least € 1 million and related to 10 new 
employees; 
 50% reduction if investment of less than € 1 million and related to 5 new 
employees. 
For micro companies with up to 10 employees, a special regime exists that grants a 50% relief 
(resulting in a tax rate of 10% compared to the normal 20%) if the investment amounts to at 
least € 50,000 and creates 3 new jobs. Before the Law on Investment Promotion (2012), 
Croatia offered a similar incentive schedule without a special schedule for micro companies 
and with higher thresholds for eligibility: 
 100% reduction if investment of at least € 8 million and related to 75 new 
employees (50 for R&D activities); 
 80% reduction if investment of at least € 4 million and related to 50 new 
employees (25 for R&D activities); 
 65% reduction if investment of at least € 1.5 million and related to 30 new 
employees (15 for R&D activities); 
 50% reduction if investment of € 300,000 (€ 100,000 for R&D activities) to € 1 
million and related to 10 (5) new employees. 
In addition, extensive reliefs were available for companies in economically weak regions. 
These regional incentives have been abolished. Croatia also provides a special allowance for 
eligible costs for general education and training (60%) and special education and training 
(25%) for employees. The percentages increase for medium-sized to 70% and 35%, for small 
and micro enterprises to 80% and 45%, respectively.  
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VAT registration is only required if the turnover exceeds HRK 230,000 (≈ € 30,000). 
Quarterly VAT payments (instead of monthly) can be made if the turnover is below 
HRK 800,000 (≈ € 100,000). 
 
Cyprus 
There are no tax incentives for small and medium-sized enterprises in Cyprus.  
 
Czech Republic 
The Czech Republic provides comprehensive investment incentives for new undertakings. 
Income from new investments (also by existing enterprises) can be subject to full exemption 
from the corporate income tax for 10 years. The exemption applies if the following conditions 
are met: 
 investment of at least CZK 100 million (≈ € 3,7 million) in the manufacturing 
sector; 
 investment of at least CZK 10 million (≈ € 370,000) and creation of at least 40 
new jobs in so-called technological centers; 
 creation of at least 40 new jobs in strategic service centers. 
Businesses are exempt from the VAT if their turnover is below CZK 1 million (≈ € 37,000). 
 
Denmark 
There are no tax incentives specifically targeted at SMEs in Denmark. With regard to 
administrative obligations, there is a relief from transfer pricing documentation for small 
companies with not more than 250 employees, a maximum turnover of DKK 250 million 
(≈ € 33 million) and a maximum balance sheet total of DKK 125 million (≈ € 17 million). The 
relief only applies if no transactions with other entities outside the EEA are made. For VAT 
purposes, no registration is required if turnover is below DKK 50,000 (≈ € 7,000). Half-yearly 
payments (instead of monthly) are allowed if taxable revenues are below DKK 5 million 
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(≈ € 670,000). Quarterly payments suffice if revenues do not exceed DKK 50 million 
(≈ € 7,000). 
Estonia 
Estonia provides no special tax incentives for corporate SMEs. This is due to the Estonian tax 
system that does not tax corporate income as such but only corporate distributions. 
Consequently, there are no reliefs of corporate income at all. 
Registration for VAT is only required if turnover exceeds € 16,000. 
Finland 
Finland does not provide tax incentives specifically targeted at SMEs. There is a regime of 
accelerated depreciation for fixed assets being used in production activities (200% of the 
usual depreciation rate on machinery, equipment and industrial buildings). The regime used to 
be restricted to SMEs until 2013 but is now available for all enterprises. Moreover, the super 
deduction of 100% of salary costs incurred for R&D projects is capped at € 400,000. SME 
should therefore benefit more than large enterprises. 
Businesses with less than € 8,500 of turnover are exempt from VAT. If turnover is below 
€ 25,000, only yearly VAT payments need to be made, if it is below € 50,000, only quarterly 
payments are required (instead of monthly). Moreover, SMEs are subject to reduced 
documentation requirements with regard to transfer prices. 
 
France 
France offers a multitude of tax incentives specifically designed for SMEs. The provisions 
include tax credits, special tax rates and various exemptions from income tax. Enterprises are 
generally considered SMEs if they comply with the SME criteria by the European 
Commission. 
A special tax rate of 15% is available for SMEs with less than € 7,630,000 of turnover. The 
SME must be held directly or indirectly by individuals or other SMEs fulfilling the 
aforementioned condition. The special corporate income tax rate applies to income up to 
€ 38,120 (instead of the usual rate of 33.33%). The surcharge of 3.33% is dispensed for all 
SMEs meeting the turnover criterion, whereas all other enterprises incur the surcharge on 
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income tax payments beyond the threshold of € 763,000. Since 2012, another surcharge of 
10.7% (5% until 2012) is in place for all companies with an income of more than € 250 
million, which, by definition, does not apply to SMEs.  
Furthermore, micro enterprises may use simplified rules to determine taxable income if two of 
the following three criteria are met: 
 turnover ≤ € 534,000; 
 balance sheet total ≤ € 267,000; 
 number of employees ≤ 10. 
Micro enterprises with less than € 82,200 (sale of goods) or € 32,900 (services) of income, 
respectively, may even opt for lump-sum expense deductions from turnover to determine their 
taxable income (71% for sales activities; 50% for service activities; 34% for professional 
services). 
France also offers several tax credits for SMEs. A credit of 20% is granted on expenditures 
related to innovative activities up to € 400,000. Another credit is available for SMEs with at 
least 20 employees. The credit equals the difference of the income tax payable multiplied with 
a rate reflecting the size of the increase in employment and the corporate income tax paid 
effectively in the preceding year (→ income tax payable * employment rate – income tax pay-
ablet-1). The employment rate ranges from 0 to 100% with 100% reflecting an increase of 15% 
or more in personnel expenses compared to the preceding year. The credit only applies if the 
number of employees compared to each of the previous two years increased by at least 15%. 
Until 2014, another one-off corporate tax credit was granted to SMEs for expenses related to 
the hiring of an employee to develop export activities outside the EU. The credit amounted to 
50% of qualifying expenses and was limited to € 40,000 over a two-year period. Lastly, there 
is a special tax credit for SMEs on the island of Corsica. The credit amounts to 20% and is 
granted on the following investments:  
 depreciable assets that qualify for declining-balance method depreciation; 
 the installation or arrangement of commercial premises; 
 software necessary for the use of the aforementioned assets or premises; 
 renovation of hotels. 
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In order to be applicable, enterprises’ turnover must not exceed € 40 million, the number of 
employees must not exceed 250 and at least 75% of the shares need to be held by individuals 
or other SMEs. Unused credits can be carried forward for 9 years. A partial refund is available 
after 5 years (35%; 50% after 9 years). New firms are granted an immediate refund.   
A full exemption from the business tax (CAVE) applies to SMEs if their turnover is below 
€ 152,500. Due to allowances, businesses with a turnover below € 500,000 are effectively 
exempt as well. Moreover, the allowance creates a progressive tax rate structure for the 
business tax: 
 turnover between € 0 and € 500,000: 0%; 
 turnover between € 500,000 and € 3 million: 0% to 0.5%; 
 turnover between € 3 million and € 10 million: 0.5% to 1.4%; 
 turnover between € 10 million and € 50 million: 1.4% to 1.5%. 
In addition, newly founded innovative SMEs are subject to an exemption from corporate 
income tax in the first two years of operations (100% in the first year, 50% of income derived 
in the second year of their innovative activities). Eligible SMEs must not be older than eight 
years and pursue R&D activities that account for at least 15% of the total expenses incurred. 
The incentive also includes exemption from the local business tax and social security 
contributions. Until 2011 SMEs were even granted five years of relief (three years with an 
exemption of 100% and two years with 50%). Newly created companies may also benefit 
from tax exemptions in certain regions (“redevelopment areas”) for the first five years of 
operations. The exemption decreases gradually from 100% to 75%/50%/25% in the last three 
years of the five-year period. The maximum relief that can be obtained from this incentive 
amounts to € 200,000. The same limit applies to the exemption of income from SMEs that 
were created to take over companies in hardship. The regime is only available in certain 
regions and only in the first two years of operation of these newly founded SMEs. Another 
five-year exemption (100%) is offered to newly created companies in tax-free urban zones. 
Enterprises need to have at least one employee in order to be eligible. The maximum 
exemption equals € 100,000 per year and further tax incentives can be used under this regime. 
Another exemption from income taxes exists for SMEs with regard to capital gains from the 
sale of a complete branch of activity excluding gains on immovable property. The exemption 
amounts to 100% if the value of the branch does not exceed € 300,000 and to 50% if it is 
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between € 300,000 and € 500,000. At least 75% of the disposing SME must be held directly 
or indirectly by individuals or other SMEs.  
 
 
Further preferential treatments for SMEs include the following: 
 SMEs are eligible for an immediate refund of the R&D tax credit that is generally 
applicable for enterprises of all size classes. The R&D tax credit at 30% is also 
capped as only expenses up to € 100 million are eligible. Beyond the threshold the 
credit is reduced to 5%, which can only affect large enterprises. 
 SMEs are subject to beneficial provisions concerning the immediate recognition 
of losses from foreign branches. The offsetting enterprise must not have more 
than 2,000 employees, be subject to corporate income tax and be owned (75%) by 
individuals or other enterprises fulfilling the above two conditions. Moreover, the 
source state must impose income taxes that are comparable to the French taxes 
and have an administrative assistance clause in the tax treaty with France. The 
maximum cash benefit from this regime must not exceed € 500,000.  
Shareholders of SMEs benefit from various other reliefs:  
 Retiring SME owners are eligible for an allowance of € 500,000 on the sale of 
their shares in the SME. Capital gains of directors of SMEs who sell their shares 
upon retirement are also exempt if certain requirements concerning the holding 
period are met. 
 Capital gains from the disposal of shares in SMEs are (partly) exempt: 50% if the 
holding period has been between 1 and 4 years, 65% if from 4 to 8 years and 85% 
for holdings over 8 years. This relief only applies if the SME had not existed for 
more than 10 years at the time of acquisition, is subject to CIT and situated in an 
EEA country. Retiring owners of SMEs do not have to fulfill these conditions.  
 18% of amounts invested in qualifying SMEs can be deducted from the personal 
income tax base up to an amount of € 50,000 (for small companies) or € 20,000 
(for medium-sized companies). 
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 50% of investments in qualifying SMEs are deductible for wealth tax purposes up 
to an amount of € 45,000. 
 Capital contributions to innovative SMEs can be depreciated over 5 years under 
certain conditions. 
 Venture capital firms benefit from an exemption of their income from securities 
and shareholdings. Certain criteria with regard to the legal form and the assets of 
venture capital firms apply. 
For purposes of the VAT, enterprises are exempt if their turnover does not exceed € 80,000 
(supply of goods/accommodation/food) or € 32,000 (supply of other services). A simplified 
regime with quarterly provisional payments and a year-end final settlement is available for 
enterprises with less than € 763,000 (supply of goods/accommodation/food) or € 230,000 
(supply of other services) of turnover. 
 
Germany 
Germany has two tax incentives in place that target specifically small companies. For both 
reliefs, the following criteria must be met in order to be eligible: 
 Net assets must be smaller than € 235,000 if the company applies the net worth 
method to determine the taxable income and smaller than € 100,000 if the 
company applies the net income method. (The thresholds were reduced from 
€ 335,000 and € 200,000 respectively in 2011.)  
 The relevant assets must remain in a domestic permanent establishment of the 
company for at least one year. 
The benefits connected to fulfilling these criteria are twofold: First, an additional depreciation 
of 20% of the acquisition or manufacturing costs of new movable assets can be incurred in the 
year of acquisition or manufacturing and the following four years (20% at most in all five 
years together). The additional depreciation reduces subsequent depreciations accordingly. 
Second, an investment reserve of up to 40% of future acquisition or production costs of 
depreciable assets can be recognized. Income entering the reserve is tax-free upon recognition 
but is taxed as the respective assets start to be depreciated. The investment reserve is limited 
to € 200,000. The acquisition or the manufacturing of the asset for which the deduction is 
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claimed must be made within three years and it must be used in a domestic permanent 
establishment (almost) exclusively for business purposes.  
For non-corporate entities, business income up to € 24,500 is exempt from the trade tax.  
If the annual turnover does not exceed € 500,000 and the profit stays below € 50,000, 
simplified tax accounting in the form of modified cash accounting may also be used by non-
corporate entities. 
If turnover did not exceed € 17,500 in the previous fiscal year and does not exceed € 50,000 
in the current year, enterprises are exempt from the VAT. If the annual value-added tax 
payable does not exceed € 7,500, quarterly payments can be made (instead of monthly). 
 
Greece 
Greece does not provide any tax incentives specifically designed for SMEs. There is, 
however, a scheme that allows establishing tax-free reserves. The reserve amounts to 15–45% 
of the amount invested in qualifying undertakings (which includes investments that contribute 
to improving business, technological development, business competitiveness and regional 
cohesion). The eligible amount depends on the location of the investment and the size of the 
company (smaller enterprises receive higher reliefs of 25–45% instead of 15–40%). SMEs 
should therefore receive larger exemptions. The tax-free income must neither be distributed 
nor capitalized. Up to one third of the exemption is due in the first year of operations of the 
investment and up to two thirds in the following year. The balance is settled within a 
maximum of eight years.  
For small firms with a turnover of up to € 1.5 million the use of single-entry accounts is 
allowed; however, this entails an increased tax rate of 33% instead of the usual 26% on all 
income over € 50,000 for partnerships. Corporate entities are usually not eligible for this 
special scheme.  
A disadvantage for SMEs occurs with respect to Greece’s treatment of so-called strategic 
investments. These are investments of at least € 15 million or investments creating at least 
150 new jobs. SMEs naturally will not (or only hardly) reach such investment levels.  
100 
 
Enterprises only need to register for VAT if their turnover exceeds € 5,000 (provision of 
services) or € 10,000 (sale of goods), respectively. If enterprises use single-entry books, they 
may also opt for quarterly VAT returns (instead of monthly). 
 
Hungary 
Hungary offers substantial tax incentives that primarily benefit SMEs. SMEs are generally 
defined according to the definition by the European Commission. 
Most importantly, a special tax rate of 10% applies to the first HUF 500 million 
(≈ € 1.6 million). Beyond the threshold, income is taxed at 19%. Moreover, small businesses 
are exempt from the innovation tax (0.3% of the tax base of the local business tax) and may 
be exempt from the local business tax (depending on municipalities). 
With regard to input-based tax incentives, there are several tax allowances for SMEs. First, 
100% of investment expenses for certain assets can be deducted from the tax base if the SME 
is solely owned by individuals. The maximum deduction is HUF 30 million (≈ € 100,000). 
SMEs with less than 20 employees can also benefit from an additional allowance of 200% of 
wage costs that are incurred for employees who are at least 50% disabled. The deductible 
wage costs per employee cannot exceed the statutory minimum wage. Lastly, micro 
enterprises with less than five employees and without an outstanding tax liability at the end of 
the year are subject to an allowance based on the increase in personnel. They are entitled to a 
deduction equal to the product of the increase in the average annual number of employees 
compared to the previous year and 12 times the statutory minimum wage. 
There is also a tax credit for new investment projects that is available for businesses of all size 
classes but requires lower minimum investments to be eligible for SMEs: 
 Large enterprises: minimum investment is HUF 3 billion (≈ € 10 million), 150 
new jobs must be created and wage costs need to be increased by at least 600 
times the statutory minimum wage. 
 Medium-sized enterprises: minimum investment is HUF 500 million (≈ € 1.6 
million), 50 new jobs must be created and wage costs need to be increased by at 
least 100 times the statutory minimum wage. 
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 Small enterprises: minimum investment is HUF 500 million (≈ € 1.6 million), 20 
new jobs must be created and wage costs need to be increased by at least 50 times 
the statutory minimum wage. 
The tax credit equals 100% of the investment value but must not exceed 80% of the tax 
liabilities. It is granted in 10 equal instalments.  
Another tax credit is offered for SMEs that invest at least HUF 500 million (≈ € 1.6 million) 
and take out a loan from a financial institution to acquire or produce required tangible assets. 
The credit equals 60% of the interest paid on the loan with a maximum eligible interest of 
HUF 6 million (≈ € 20,000). Enterprises from the transport or the agricultural sectors are not 
eligible.  
For SMEs in disadvantaged regions, immediate depreciation of acquisition costs of 
machinery, equipment and vehicles (excluding cars) is also available. 
In addition to these incentives, small businesses in Hungary may also opt for three alternative 
regimes. The so-called simplified entrepreneurial tax is available for small businesses that are 
no public companies and whose turnover does not exceed HUF 30 million (≈ € 100,000). 
Under this regime, taxpayers are taxed at 37% on turnover increased by VAT. If turnover 
unexpectedly exceeds HUF 30 million during the fiscal year, an increased tax rate of 50% 
applies for the excess. The simplified entrepreneurial tax replaces corporate and personal 
income taxes, the value-added tax and the company car tax. The regime must not be applied if 
the taxpayer sells waste products falling under the reverse charge regime for VAT purposes or 
if certain holding requirements are not met. 
Another regime that may be opted for instead of the ordinary corporate income tax is the 
small company tax. In order to be eligible companies need to fulfill the following criteria: 
 average number of employees ≤ 25; 
 expected annual turnover ≤ HUF 500 million (≈ € 1.6 million); 
 expected balance sheet total ≤ HUF 500 million (≈ € 1.6 million); 
 balance of enforceable tax debt ≤ HUF 1 million (≈ € 3,000) 
The small company tax replaces the corporate income tax, the social security tax and training 
contributions for the taxpayer. The tax is levied at 16% on accrual profits but it must not be 
smaller than the personnel costs incurred.  
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Lastly, the itemized tax of small businesses can be chosen by businesses with a turnover of 
less than HUF 6 million. Under this regime, businesses pay HUF 50,000 (≈ € 160) per full-
time employee and HUF 25,000 (≈ € 80) for each employee not being classified as full-time. 
These tax payments replace the corporate income tax, the social security tax, the health care 
charge and the vocational training contribution. If the threshold of HUF 6 million (≈ € 20,000) 
is exceeded, a tax of 40% on the excess turnover is charged.  
With regard to administrative obligations, small enterprises are subject to less restrictive 
regulations on transfer pricing and related documentation. Businesses with a turnover of less 
than HUF 6 million are exempt from the VAT. If the net VAT payable is below 
HUF 1 million (≈ € 33 million), only quarterly returns need to be filed instead of monthly. If 
net turnover does not exceed HUF 250,000, (≈ € 800) only annual returns are required. Cash 
accounting for VAT purposes is allowed up to HUF 125 million (≈ € 400,000). 
 
Ireland 
With regard to the corporate income tax, Ireland does not provide tax incentives specifically 
for SMEs. However, they may benefit from an exemption of taxable income up to € 40,000 
that phases out between € 40,000 and € 60,000. The exemption is restricted to newly founded 
companies in the first three years of operation, though, and must not exceed the PRSI 
contributions made (max. € 5,000 per employee). 
SMEs also benefit from less restrictive transfer pricing regulations and – if their tax liability 
does not exceed € 200,000 – less restrictive provisions for preliminary tax payments. No 
prepayments are required from new businesses that do not expect a tax liability of more than 
€ 200,000 in their first year of operations. 
For personal income tax purposes, individuals can deduct up to € 150,000 of the acquisition 
costs of shares in qualifying unquoted trading SMEs from their taxable income (excess 
investments can be carried forward). The share in the company must not be higher than 30% 
unless the capital of the company does not exceed € 500,000. Holding restrictions and other 
anti-avoidance rules are in place. The company must either be incorporated and resident in 
Ireland or be incorporated in an EEA country and resident (a) in Ireland or (b) in another EEA 
country and carry on business through a branch or agency in Ireland. In addition, the company 
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must carry on qualifying trade. The maximum capital the company may raise amounts to € 15 
million and € 5 million within any 12-month period. An even more generous deduction is 
granted to formerly employed people who invest in a start-up. They can claim a tax refund on 
income from the last six years (the maximum tax refund is € 100,000). 
For VAT purposes, businesses are exempt if their turnover does not exceed € 37,500. 
Moreover, small businesses do only have to file returns and make VAT payments every 6 
months (instead of every 2 months) if their VAT payments do not exceed € 3,000 and only 
every 4 months if payments are below € 14,400. 
Italy 
Italy does not provide generally applicable incentives for SMEs with regard to the corporate 
income tax. SMEs, however, can use simplified rules for determining the tax base of the 
business tax (IRAP). The simplified rules include standardized lump-sum deductions for 
expenses incurred.  
Moreover, there is a tax credit for R&D expenses in place that is likely to benefit SMEs more 
than large companies as it is capped at € 5 million. Eligible enterprises need to incur at least 
€ 30,000. In 2014, two different R&D tax credits were in place. The first one only applied to 
enterprises with less than € 500 million of turnover. It granted a relief equal to 50% of R&D 
expenses as far as the expenses surpassed the average of the previous three years. The other 
credit amounted to 35% of the wage costs that were attributable to newly hired employees in 
R&D who were given permanent contracts. The cap for this credit was € 200,000. 
Companies in the fields of energy production and supply were not subject to the increased 
corporate tax rate of 34% (instead of 27.5%) if they had a turnover below € 3 million and 
taxable income below € 300,000. The surtax for companies in the areas of energy production 
and supply (6.5%) has been abolished in 2015, though. 
Innovative start-up companies are exempt from stamp duties and registration fees, if the 
following criteria are fulfilled:  
 business not older than 48 months; 
 not a result of a merger/acquisition;  
 turnover ≤ € 5 million; 
 no profit distributions;  
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 sole purpose of innovative high-technology products and services. 
Additionally, at least one out of the following conditions are met: 
 R&D expenses amount to at least 15% of revenues or costs; 
 one third of all employees are highly qualified; 
 the respective company is holder or licensee of patent right connected to its 
activity. 
Newly founded companies – in contrast to established ones – may also fully deduct expenses 
incurred for studies, research, advertising and entertainment as well as the costs of formation 
in the first year, in which they incur gross receipts. 
Shareholders of innovative SMEs and start-ups can deduct 20% of their respective 
investments from taxable income. The maximum deduction amounts to € 1.8 million. 
Furthermore, the shareholding has to satisfy, i.a., the following criteria: 
 equity share not larger than € 2.5 million; 
 shares must be held for at least 2 consecutive years; 
 SME must not be older than 7 years, not have gross production of more than € 5 
million and it must be active in the field of highly technological and innovative 
products. 
Investors of venture capital funds are also exempt with regard to their proceeds from the fund 
if the fund only invests in non-listed, Italian small companies (turnover ≤ € 50 million) that 
are not exempt from corporate income tax, have not been incorporated for more than 36 
months and are controlled by individual shareholders. 
For purposes of the value-added tax, enterprises that do not have more than € 50,000 of 
turnover can file quarterly returns (instead of monthly). There is no registration threshold. 
Each business needs to register for the value-added tax. 
 
Latvia 
Latvia provides micro enterprises with the option to tax turnover instead of the ordinary 
corporate income tax. Companies are eligible if their turnover does not exceed € 100,000 and 
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if they do not employ more than 5 employees who must not earn more than € 720 per month. 
Shareholders have to be exclusively individuals. Under the regime the following tax rates 
apply: 
 9% on turnover from € 0 to € 7,000; 
 12% on turnover from € 7,001 to € 100,000; 
 20% on turnover beyond € 100,000. 
In the three first years the regime is applied, the lowest rate of 9% is granted for all revenues 
up to € 100,000. The turnover tax replaces the corporate income tax (15%) and the social 
security contributions that need to be paid by the employer. Penalty taxes apply if either the 
wage threshold is exceeded (20% on excess wages) or more than five employees are hired 
(2% tax rate increase per employee).  
In Latvia’s special economic zones, a tax credit is available for new investments. For small 
and micro companies, the credit equals 55% of the investment value, whereas it is limited to 
45% for medium-sized enterprises and to 35% for large ones. For each size class, the credit 
must not exceed 80% of the tax liability. The definition of the size classes corresponds to the 
definition by the European Commission. With regard to the standard tax credit, however, 
SMEs are by trend disadvantaged because only investments of at least € 10 million are 
eligible. The credit grants a relief of 25% of the investment value up to € 50 million and 15% 
on expenditure beyond the threshold. 
For VAT purposes, enterprises are exempt if their turnover does not exceed € 50,000. 
Businesses beyond the threshold have to file monthly returns. If supplies are below 
€ 14,228.72, six-monthly returns are sufficient. Cash accounting for the value-added tax is 
allowed up to € 100,000. For the corporate income tax, annual tax returns need to be filed 
sooner by SMEs (4 months after the end of the fiscal year) than by large enterprises (7 
months). 
 
Lithuania 
Lithuania has extensive tax incentives for micro companies. Foremost, enterprises enjoy a 
reduced corporate income tax rate of 5% (instead of 15%) if they meet the following criteria: 
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 number of employees ≤ 10; 
 taxable income ≤ LTL 1 million (≈ € 300,000); 
 corporation must not be owned by more than 50% by an owner/a family/a group 
of persons who also own(s) a sole proprietorship or other companies by more than 
50%.  
Companies meeting these criteria whose income does not exceed € 150,000 are also entitled 
to free depreciation of fixed assets (excluding buildings). When benefitting from the reduced 
tax rate, no maximum for the use of loss carry-forwards applies (70% of the current year’s 
income for large entities).  
Additionally, newly founded businesses and companies with taxable income of less than 
€ 30,000 in the last three years of operation are allowed to determine their income based on 
cash accounting. Large enterprises, on the other hand, tend to be favored in special economic 
zones, where several tax advantages only apply to investments of at least € 1 million. 
With regard to the value-added tax, enterprises are exempt if their turnover does not exceed 
€ 45,000. Registration is also mandatory, if goods from other EU countries are acquired for at 
least € 14,000. 
 
Luxembourg 
Luxembourg does not provide any tax incentives that refer specifically to SMEs as defined by 
the European Commission. However, small companies in particular should benefit from the 
reduced corporate income tax rate of 20% (instead of 21%) that applies to companies with an 
income below € 15,000 as well as from the progressive schedule of the minimum tax. (The 
amount of minimum tax payable depends on the balance sheet total.) Moreover, income up to 
€ 17,500 is not subject to the municipal business tax. The generally applicable tax credit (7% 
or 8% on qualifying tangible and depreciable assets) may also favor SMEs as it is capped at 
€ 150,000. Beyond the threshold, only 2% of the qualifying expenditure is creditable. Further 
advantages for SMEs include higher non-tax grants for R&D projects. 
25% of the income by certain new businesses fostering the growth of the economy may be 
exempt from corporate income taxation. 
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There are also incentives for venture capital investments. Special venture capital vehicles 
(SICAR) are exempt from corporate income tax and qualifying investments up to € 5 million 
or 30% of taxable income, respectively, can be deducted from the tax base by investors. The 
latter relief only applies if the capital finances enterprises that introduce new technologies or 
fabrications.    
For VAT purposes, enterprises do only have to register if their turnover does exceed € 25,000 
or intra-community acquisitions exceed € 10,000. Returns need to be filed annually if the 
turnover is below € 112,000 and quarterly if it is below € 620,000 (instead of monthly). VAT 
can be paid on a cash basis (receipts method) if the turnover of the taxpayer is below 
€ 500,000.  
 
Malta 
Malta provides SMEs with increased tax credits for new investments or major extensions of 
existing operations in a multitude of manufacturing and service industries. Eligible activities 
include: 
 production, manufacturing and processing of goods, materials, commodities, 
equipment, plant and machinery; 
 activities related to information technology,  
 call centers 
 R&D and innovation of products and processes as well as activities related eco-
innovation, water treatment, environmental solutions and biotechnology; 
 tertiary education, filming and cultural restoration as well as the provision of 
large-scale cultural, creative and trade facilities 
 private healthcare services. 
Creditable costs include expenditures in tangible or intangible assets incurred by such 
undertakings in the preceding year or wage costs for jobs directly created by the initial 
investment. Taxpayers may deduct 35% (micro and small undertakings) or 25% of eligible 
costs from their tax liabilities (instead of 15% for large enterprises). Cash grants are available 
instead of the tax credit if the makes a substantial contribution to the economic development 
of Malta. SMEs are defined according to the definition of the European Commission. 
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An extra credit is available for research projects. The size of the credit is measured as a 
percentage of eligible personnel costs, current costs, overhead, costs for contract research (not 
more than 25% of total eligible costs), costs for registering intellectual property (IP), 
depreciation of land and buildings and capital expenditures for fixed assets other than land 
and buildings. Eligible percentages are as follows: 
 small and micro enterprises: 70% for industrial research projects (80% for 
collaborative projects with research and knowledge-dissemination organizations); 
45% for experimental research projects (60% for collaborative projects); 
 medium-sized enterprises: 60% for industrial research projects (75% for 
collaborative projects); 35% for experimental research projects (50% for 
collaborative projects); 
 large enterprises: 50% for industrial research projects (65% for collaborative 
projects); 25% for experimental research projects (40% for collaborative projects). 
Projects must be finished within three years in order to be eligible. Unused credits can be 
carried forward indefinitely. 
Another tax credit exists for small enterprises. The credit amounts to 45% (65% in the region 
of Gozo) of wage costs for new employees, refurbishing costs and costs incurred for 
machinery, equipment and technology. The maximum credit amounts to € 30,000 (€ 50,000 
for start-ups). Eligible businesses must have at least one and less than 30 full-time employees, 
a turnover of less than € 10 million and be registered for the value-added tax and not be part 
of a group. 
Enterprises are exempt from VAT if their turnover does not exceed € 35,000 (supply of 
goods), € 24,000 (supply of service with low value added) or € 14,000 (other activities), 
respectively. Professional service providers and retailers with less than € 2 million of turnover 
may account for VAT on a cash basis. 
 
Netherlands 
The Netherlands do not provide any incentives that are exclusively restricted to small and 
medium-sized enterprises. Some provisions, however, particularly benefit SMEs due to 
maximum absolute thresholds limiting eligible income or expenses. First, there is a 
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progressive corporate income tax schedule in place that taxes income up to € 200,000 at 20% 
and the excess at 25%.  
Second, the general investment deduction for small-scale investments in certain assets is only 
applicable if the total annual qualifying costs are between € 2,300 and € 309,693. Moreover, 
the deductible percentage decreases as eligible costs increase. The following sliding scale 
applies:  
 28% if the total of qualifying investments is between € 2,300 and € 55,745; 
 € 15,609 if the total of qualifying investments is between € 55,745 and € 103,231;  
 € 15,609 less 7.56% of the invested amount exceeding € 103,231 if the total of 
qualifying investments is between € 103,231 and € 309,693; 
 0% if the total of qualifying investments exceeds € 309,693. 
The thresholds and deductible amounts are adjusted for inflation annually. 
A regime of free depreciation was introduced in 2015. It applies to certain assets that are in 
the interest of the furtherance of economic development with a maximum investment value of 
€ 25 million. Beyond the threshold EU admission is necessary. For R&D activities, a wage 
tax reduction of 35% for involved employees is available up to € 250,000 per employee (50% 
for start-ups). Beyond the threshold, only 14% of eligible wage costs can be deducted. The 
maximum deduction amounts to € 14 million. Another deduction applies to individual 
entrepreneurs conducting R&D. They are entitled to a lump-sum allowance of € 12,310 or 
€ 18,467 for the first five years of his entrepreneurial activity. Net losses arising from this 
deduction can be carried back for three years or carried forward for nine years. 
For VAT purposes, businesses may make quarterly payments if the amount payable per 
quarter does not exceed € 7,000 (instead of monthly). Yearly payments are allowed if 
quarterly amounts are below € 2,000. Natural persons whose VAT liability does not exceed 
€ 1,883 are fully exempt from VAT. 
 
Poland 
Poland provides several tax incentives for SMEs. First, small and medium-sized enterprises 
may receive a tax credit of up to 75% of investment costs for investing in new technologies. 
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The credit must not exceed 70% of the sales value of the products produced with the new 
technology. Lower percentages may apply depending on the size of the company and the 
project location. The technology needs to be new and sufficiently innovative (must not have 
been used for more than five years globally). The maximum credit is PLN 4 million 
(≈ € 950,000) and the project must not involve investments of more than € 50 million. SMEs 
are defined according to the definition by the European Commission. 
Second, SMEs receive tax benefits if they invest in so-called special economic zones. For 
investments of at least € 100,000, enterprises benefit from investment allowances on either the 
investment costs (costs for land and buildings only enter the calculation base with 5% and 
40%, respectively) or the personnel costs of newly hired employees over two years. While 
large enterprises can only apply an allowance of 30% to 50% (depending on the zone), 
medium-sized enterprises are entitled to an additional 10% and small enterprises to an 
additional 20%. In order to be eligible for the allowance, activities must be carried on for at 
least 3 years without changing ownership and new jobs must be created and kept for this 
period. 
A special regime of depreciation is also in place in Poland. Under the regime, enterprises with 
a turnover (incl. VAT) of less than € 1.2 million are allowed to immediately depreciate the 
costs of certain fixed assets up to an amount of € 50,000. The same exception applies to start-
ups. The latter may also get a waiver for the income tax due in the first or second year of 
operations (depending on the exact date of initiation) if they are small or micro companies. 
The tax, however, must be repaid in the subsequent five years in equal instalments.  
For the VAT purposes, small taxpayers with less than € 1.2 million of turnover (incl. VAT) 
can opt for quarterly tax payments instead of monthly payments. Moreover, cash-basis 
accounting is available for these enterprises. Eligible taxpayers can also opt for quarterly 
advance income tax payments instead of monthly.  
 
Portugal 
Portugal offers various kinds of tax incentives targeted at SMEs. Starting with the corporate 
income tax rate, the first € 15,000 of income of SMEs (according to the definition of the 
European Commission) are taxed at a reduced rate of 17% (instead of 23%). Moreover, SMEs 
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benefit from the progressive structure of the state surtax that is levied at the following rates 
(for all enterprises irrespective of their size): 
 0% on income up to € 1.5 million; 
 3% on income between € 1.5 million and € 7.5 million; 
 5% on income between € 7.5 million and € 35 million; 
 7% on income beyond € 35 million. 
Tax credits are also available for SMEs in Portugal. First, there is a credit of 10% on retained 
earnings. The credited amount needs to be reinvested in eligible assets within two years. 
Another credit is granted for R&D expenditures (capital expenditure excluding land and 
buildings, costs for personnel and contract research and other operating costs). While the 
creditable amount is generally calculated as 32.5% of eligible costs, new SMEs can claim 
47.5%.
231
 In addition, they may include 100% of personnel costs instead of only 90% as is 
usual. Unused credits can be carried forward for six years.  
The third credit refers to investments that are designed to internationalize the Portuguese 
economy. The credit is available to all enterprises for non-EU member states but is restricted 
to SMEs for investments within the EU. The minimum investment is € 250,000 and the credit 
amounts to 10-20% of the investment. It must neither exceed 25% of the tax liability nor 
€ 997,595.79. There is also an exemption of dividends from non-resident subsidiaries that is 
restricted to non-EU countries for large companies whereas SMEs can benefit in both the EU 
and non-member states. In order to be eligible, the holding must be at least 10% one year 
prior to the dividend, the investment must have led to a newly created non-resident company 
or an acquisition of such and the investment must have amounted to at least € 250.000. 
Another investment tax credit applies to all enterprises but is especially beneficial to SMEs as 
smaller investment amounts are promoted more generously in relative terms. The credit 
reduces the income tax payable by 25% of investments in fixed assets up to € 5 million. 
Beyond this threshold only 10% are deductible and the credit must not exceed 50% of the tax 
liability. For start-ups, the credit may amount to 100% of the tax liability in the first three 
years of operations. The incentive only applies in certain sectors such as tourism and mining 
and requires an investment period of at least five years. The credit can be carried forward for 
4 years. The incentive also includes exemptions from the property tax, the property transfer 
                                                 
231
 In addition, an incremental tax credit (50%) is available for all businesses on all eligible R&D expenditures as 
far as they exceed the average spending of the previous two fiscal years. 
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tax and stamp duties on acquired land. On the other hand, SMEs may be disadvantaged with 
regard to contractual tax incentives for so-called strategic investment that are only granted if 
certain minimum investments are made (€ 3 million). The related tax credit of 10% to 25% is 
also accompanied by exemptions from property tax, the property transfer tax and stamp 
duties. 
A deduction of 5% from taxable income applies to SMEs on all capital contributions in cash 
by shareholders upon incorporation or subsequent capital increases. Eligible SMEs must be 
owned by individuals or qualifying venture capital investors. Shareholders on the other hand 
are exempt from taxation with 50% of their capital gains from the sale of participations in 
unlisted small and micro companies. 
For micro companies – either incorporated or not incorporated – Portugal also offers a very 
simplified accounting regime to determine taxable income. It applied to micro enterprises that 
fulfill the following criteria: 
 no. of employees ≤ 5; 
 turnover ≤ € 500,000; 
 balance sheet total ≤ € 500,000; 
 income ≤ € 200,000. 
If these criteria are met, small businesses may determine taxable income as follows: 
 4% of sales and services rendered for hotel, food and beverage activities; 
 75% of income derived from the official schedule of activities approved by order 
of the Minister of Finance 
 10% of remaining income arising from services and business-related subsidies 
 95% of income from the sale or temporary use of rights of intellectual or 
industrial property and other investment income 
 100% of acquisition value of charge increases in wealth 
Another simplified accounting system is in place for enterprises that fulfill the following 
criteria: 
 no. of employees ≤ 50 
 turnover ≤ € 3 million 
 balance sheet total ≤ € 1,5 million 
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Further administrative reliefs for micro enterprises exist with regard to the value-added tax. 
While individual entrepreneurs with a turnover of less than € 9,976 are completely exempt, 
enterprises with less than € 650,000 do only need to file quarterly returns (instead of 
monthly). Micro enterprises are also subject to reduced periods of safekeeping for supporting 
documents. 
Romania 
Romania provides a mandatory special tax regime for micro companies under which 
corporate income tax has to be paid at 3% on turnover. The regime applies to fully privately 
owned enterprises with income below € 65,000 except for enterprises deriving income in the 
banking, gambling, consultancy or management sector. Before being repealed in 2010 and re-
introduced in 2011, the regime used to be applied on a voluntary basis.  
If businesses do not have more than € 65,000 of turnover, they are also exempt from the 
value-added tax.  
 
Slovak Republic 
The Slovak Republic does not have any specific tax provisions for small and medium-sized 
enterprises except for size-adjusted eligibility criteria for R&D investment incentives. Small 
enterprises may even be disadvantaged with regard to some investment incentives as these 
require minimum investments of up to € 3 million. 
For new companies, start-up expenses are deductible when incurred. 
For VAT purposes, small businesses are exempt if their turnover is below € 49,790.   
 
Slovenia 
Slovenia does not provide tax incentives specifically designed for SMEs. They are, however, 
subject to less restrictive holding requirements (3 instead of 5 years) for assets that qualify for 
the investment deduction in the region of Pomurje. The deduction amounts to 70% of incurred 
costs of eligible equipment and intangibles with a maximum allowance of € 30,000. There is 
also a general investment allowance of 40% of expenditures on intangibles and equipment in 
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place, the maximum threshold of € 30,000 for this allowance has been abolished, though. 
Consequently, there is no advantage for SMEs compared to large enterprises. 
Venture capital companies are generally tax exempt with their investments. 
Administratively, there are some minor reliefs for SMEs reduced penalties in case of 
insufficient or delayed tax payments or shortened audit periods. Moreover, businesses are 
exempt from the value-added tax if their turnover does not exceed € 50,000. 
 
Spain 
Spain is a country with multiple kinds of tax incentives for SMEs. Accelerated depreciation is 
offered as well as allowances, tax credits and special tax rates. In order to be considered an 
SME, firms generally need to have a turnover below € 10 million (€ 8 million until 2010).  
There are two schemes of accelerated depreciation. The first one allows depreciation at 200% 
of the normal rates. The regime includes all newly acquired tangible fixed and intangible 
assets. Alternatively, free depreciation is available for SMEs if they increase the annual 
average of personnel in the 24 months following the first use of the asset. The maximum 
amount to be freely depreciated equals the product of € 120,000 and the percentage increase 
in personnel. Assets with acquisition costs below € 601.01 maybe freely depreciated up to a 
threshold of € 12,020.24 in any case. In 2013 and 2014, there were further schemes that 
allowed SMEs to depreciate all tangible fixed assets if they were purchased with proceeds 
stemming from capital gains. Moreover, ordinary depreciation rates for tangible fixed assets, 
intangibles and immovable property were not temporarily reduced by 30% as was the case for 
large enterprises.  
SMEs with less than 50 employees also qualify for two tax credits that are granted for the 
hiring of new employees with indefinite full-time employment contracts. The first one 
amounts to € 3,000 for each new employee under the age of 30. The other tax credit is 
provided for the hiring of employees who have received unemployment payments for at least 
three months at the time of hiring. The latter one yields 50% of the outstanding 
unemployment payments for one year for the enterprise as well as 25% of the outstanding 
payments for the employee. The R&D and innovation tax credits may also favor SMEs as 
they are capped at € 3 million and € 1 million, respectively. 
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Besides tax credits and accelerated depreciation schemes, special corporate income tax rates 
apply for SMEs which meet the following criteria: 
 net revenue ≤ € 5 million; 
 no. of employees ≤ 25; 
 level of employment needs to be retained or increased relative to 2009. 
If the criteria are met, a special corporate income tax rate of 20% applies for the first 
€ 300,000 of income. All income beyond the threshold is taxed at 25%. SMEs that do not 
meet the above criteria incur a reduced tax rate of 25% on the first € 300,000 of income 
instead of being subject to the standard CIT rate of 28%. The normal rate, however, will be 
further decreased to 25% in 2016 (coming from 30% in 2014) thus making the special rate 
irrelevant. Another rate exists for newly founded companies (not only SMEs) that are not part 
of a group. In their first two years with positive income, they are subject to a CIT rate of only 
15% on their first € 300,000 of income and 20% on income beyond the threshold. The newly 
founded company must not be held by shareholders having performed similar activities before 
in order to be eligible. 
Further SME tax rates apply in several regions of Spain. In Alava, Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa, a 
special rate of 24% applies to SMEs (instead of the usual 28% in Basque Country). In 
Navarre, a rate of 23% (19%) instead of 25% applies for SMEs that employ at least one 
person and have an annual turnover below € 9 million (€ 1 million). A slight disadvantage for 
SMEs is the regressive structure of the surcharge for members of the Chamber of Commerce. 
While 0.75% is charged on income up to € 60,101, the rate decreases gradually to only 0.01% 
on income beyond € 24 million. The surcharge is tax deductible though. 
Besides the abovementioned provisions, Spain offers the following tax incentives for SMEs: 
 exemption from the local business tax (IAE) if turnover is below € 1 million; 
 special deduction of up to 10% of taxable income; deduction must enter a special 
reserve that is used in the following 5 years to balance out tax losses (otherwise 
taxation at the end of the 5-year period); 
 option to establish a special provision for bad debt not qualifying for the general 
provision. The maximum provision amounts to 1% of the existing balance of debt 
at the end of the tax period;  
116 
 
 exemption of 99% of gains from venture capital investments in non-financial 
SMEs operating in the field of technological innovation by qualifying venture 
capital companies and funds; exemption includes gains from the sale of shares and 
other participations that have been held for at least one and not more than 15 
years. (An extension to 20 years may be granted.) 
With regard to administrative facilitations, Spain offers relaxed transfer pricing requirements 
for all SMEs with intercompany transactions below € 100,000. For VAT purposes, a special 
regime of cash accounting can be applied if an enterprise’s turnover does not exceed 
€ 2 million. If turnover is below € 35,000, only annual VAT returns need to be filed. 
 
Sweden 
Sweden does not provide any tax incentives directly targeted at SMEs. Individual investors, 
however, can claim a deduction of 50% of the acquisition costs they incur when acquiring 
shares of small companies at the formation or subsequent share issuances. The shares must be 
held for at least five years. The deduction can be made from capital income. The maximum 
deduction amounts to SEK 650,000 (≈ € 100.000). The maximum total investment per 
company is SEK 20 million (≈ € 3 million) per year. Furthermore the company must fulfill the 
following criteria (on a group level): 
 payment of annual salaries of at least SEK 300,000 (≈ € 45,000); 
 fewer than 50 employees or active partners;  
 net turnover ≤ SEK 80 million (≈ € 12 million); 
 balance sheet total ≤ SEK 80 million (≈ € 12 million).  
For VAT purposes, businesses can use cash-based accounting if their turnover does not 
exceed SEK 3 million (≈ € 450,000). Returns have to be file monthly unless the turnover does 
not exceed SEK 40 million (≈ € 6 million). Then quarterly returns are sufficient. Enterprises 
with a turnover of less than SEK 1 million (≈ € 150,000) can opt for yearly returns. No 
registration threshold exists. 
 
United Kingdom 
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The United Kingdom provides an investment allowance for R&D activities that is especially 
beneficial for SMEs. Under the regime, all enterprises are allowed to deduct an additional 
30% of their R&D expenses from taxable income (only revenue expenditure, no capital 
expenditure). SMEs, however, are entitled to an additional 100%, resulting in a total 
allowance of 130%. In order to be eligible, the following criteria need to be met: 
 number of employees ≤ 500; 
 turnover ≤ € 100 million; 
 balance sheet total ≤ € 86 million. 
Loss-making SMEs may surrender their R&D losses in return for a tax credit equal 14.5% of 
the underlying loss. The credit is refunded immediately. The relief from the SME-specific 
regime must not exceed £ 7.5 million (≈ € 9 million). If an SME incurs eligible expenditures 
beyond the threshold, however, the scheme for large enterprises applies. 
Further provisions that may benefit SMEs include the following: 
 There is an annual investment allowance of 100% on the first £ 500,000 
(≈ € 650,000) of expenditure on plant and machinery in place. Alternatively, a 
first-year allowance for certain assets can be claimed. Both incentives are 
generally applicable and not restricted to SMEs. 
 There is no cap on deductible external finance expenses if an SME is part of a 
taxable group.  
 Special corporate income tax rates apply for companies engaged in the production 
of oil and gas: income up to £ 300,000 (≈ € 400,000) is taxed at a rate of 19% 
instead of 30%; marginal relief is available for income up to £ 1.5 million 
(≈ € 2 million). 
 SMEs are subject to simplified provisions for the valuation of intellectual 
property. 
With regard to the value-added tax, enterprises are exempt if their annual turnover does not 
exceed £ 81,000 (≈ € 100,000). A simplified VAT scheme applies for enterprises with a 
turnover below £ 150,000 (≈ € 200,000) and cash-based accounting for VAT is allowed up to 
£ 1.35 million (≈ € 1.8 million). 
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Annex 2: Empirical Studies on the Relation of Firm Size and Job Creation 
Table A1: Empirical studies on the relationship of firm size, firm growth and job creation 
Author(s) Year Publication Data Estimation design Main findings 
Amirkhalkhali/Mukhopadhyay 1993 Eastern Economic Journal  large U.S. firms  
 all sectors 
 1965–1987 
 regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
Armington/Odle 1982 The Brookings Review  U.S. establishments 
(private sector) 
 all sectors 
 1978-1980 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 negative relationship between 
establishment size and rate of net 
job creation 
Audretsch/Elston 2006 Entrepreneurship, 
Growth, and Innovation 
(textbook) 
 all publicly traded 
German firms 
 all sectors 
 1970–1984 
 regression  positive relationship between firm 
size and  firm growth (employment) 
Audretsch/Klomp/Santarelli/Thurik 2004 Review of Industrial 
Organization 
 Dutch firms  
 hospitality sector 
 1987–1991 
 regression  
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 no clear relationship between firm 
size and  firm growth (employment) 
Audretsch/Santarelli/Vivarelli 1999 International Journal of 
Industrial Economics 
 Italian start-ups  
 manufacturing 
 1987–1993 
 regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and  firm growth (employment) 
among surviving start-ups 
Baldwin/Picot 1995 Small Business 
Economics 
 Canadian firms 
 manufacturing 
 1970–1990 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 negative relationship between plant 
size and rate of net job creation  
 negative net job creation among 
large plants 
Barnes/Haskel 2002 Working paper  UK firms 
 manufacturing 
 1980–1991 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 negative relationship between 
establishment size and rate of net/ 
job creation  
 negative net job creation among 
establishments with 20+ employees 
119 
 
Author(s) Year Publication Data Estimation design Main findings 
Becchetti/Trovato 2002 Small Business 
Economics 
 Italian firms (10+ 
employees) 
 manufacturing 
 1989–1997 
 regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
among firms with less than 100 
employees 
 no clear relationship between firm 
size and  firm growth (employment) 
among firms with 100+ employees 
Birch 1981 The Public Interest  U.S. establishments  
 all sectors 
 1969–1976 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 negative relationship between firm 
size and rate of net job creation  
 new businesses account for majority 
of job creation 
Birch 1987 Job Creation in America 
(textbook) 
 U.S. establishments  
 all sectors 
 1969–1985 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes / age 
classes 
 negative relationship between 
establishment size and rate of net 
job creation (except for very large 
establishments) 
 negative net job creation among 
establishments with 100+ 
employees 
Bottazzi/Dosi/Lippi/Pammolli/Riccaboni 2001 International Journal of 
Industrial Organization 
 large international 
firms  
 pharmaceutical sector 
 1987–1997 
 comparison of 
size distribution 
functions  
 no clear relationship between firm 
size and  firm growth (employment) 
Broersma/Gautier 1997 Small Business 
Economics 
 all Dutch firms (10+ 
employees) 
 manufacturing 
 1978–1991 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 negative relationship between firm 
size and rate of net/gross job 
creation 
 negative net job creation among 
firms with 50+ employees 
 only new businesses account for 
positive net job creation 
Buckley/Dunning 1984 Kyklos  large international 
firms  
 industrial firms 
 1972–1977 
 regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (sales) 
Cefis/Ciccarelli/Orsenigo 2007 Structural Change and  Italian firms  Bayesian  no clear relationship between firm 
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Author(s) Year Publication Data Estimation design Main findings 
Economic Dynamics 
 
 pharmaceutical 
industry 
 1987–1998 
hierarchical 
model estimation 
size and  firm growth (employment) 
Chen/Lu  2003 Applied Economics 
Letters 
 publicly traded 
Taiwanese firms 
 all sectors 
 1988–1999 
 regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (fixed assets) 
only in some sectors 
Davidsson/Lindmark/Olofsson 1998 Small Business 
Economics 
 all Swedish plants  
 all sectors 
 1989-1994 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
 negative relationship between firm 
age and firm growth (employment) 
Davis/Haltiwanger/Schuh 1996 Small Business 
Economics 
 U.S. plants 
 manufacturing 
 1972–1988 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 no clear relationship between plant 
size and net job creation (contrary 
results driven by methodological 
problems) 
Davis/Haltiwanger/ Schuh 1996 Job Creation and 
Destruction (textbook) 
 U.S. plants 
 manufacturing 
 1972–1988 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 no clear relationship between plant 
size and net job creation 
 only new plants (5 years) account 
for net job creation 
 positive net job creation by large 
plants  
de Wit/de Kok 2014 Small Business 
Economics 
 population of EU-27 
businesses 
 all sectors 
 2002–2012 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 negative relationship between firm 
size and rate of net job creation 
(decreases in firm size at 
diminishing rate) 
de Kok/Vroonhof/Verhoeven/ 
Timmermans/Kwaak/Snijders/ Westhof 
2011 Project report  all EU firms 
 all sectors 
 2002–2010 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 negative relationship between firm 
size and rate of net job creation 
Del Monte/Papagni 2003 Research Policy  Italian firms  
 manufacturing 
 1989–1997 
 regression  no clear relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (sales)  
Droucopoulos  1982 Journal of Economic  large international  regression   no clear relationship between firm 
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Author(s) Year Publication Data Estimation design Main findings 
Studies 
 
firms 
 all sectors 
 1957–1977 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
size and firm growth (sales) 
Dunne/Hughes 1994 Journal of Industrial 
Economics 
 large UK firms  
 all sectors 
 1975–1985 
 regression  
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 negative relationship between firm 
size and rate of net job creation 
(decreases in firm size at 
diminishing rate) 
 negative relationship between firm 
age and  firm growth (employment) 
Dunne/Roberts/Samuelson 1989 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 
 all U.S. start-ups 
 1967–1977 
 manufacturing 
 regression  
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size and age 
classes 
 negative relationship between plant 
size and plant growth (employment) 
 negative relationship between plant 
age and plant growth (employment) 
European Commission 2015 Annual Report on 
European SMEs 
 all firms in EU 
 2008–2012 
 all sectors 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 no clear relationship between firm 
size and  firm growth (employment) 
Evans 1987 Journal of Industrial 
Economics 
 U.S. firms 
 manufacturing 
 1976–1982 
 regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (rate of 
employment growth decreases in 
firm size at diminishing rate ) 
Evans 1987 Journal of Political 
Economy 
 U.S. firms  
 manufacturing 
 1976–1982 
 regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (rate of 
employment growth decreases in 
firm size at diminishing rate) 
 negative relationship between firm 
age and firm growth  
Fariñas/Moreno 2000 Review of Industrial 
Organization 
 Spanish firms 
 manufacturing 
 1990–1995 
 regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
 negative relationship between firm 
age and  firm growth (employment) 
Gallagher/Daly/Thomason 1991 Small Business 
Economics 
 UK firms 
 all sectors 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
 negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
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Author(s) Year Publication Data Estimation design Main findings 
 1985–1987 size classes   negative net job creation by large 
firms (1000+ employees) 
Haltiwanger/Jarmin/Miranda 2013 The Review of Economics 
and Statistics 
 all U.S. establishments 
 all sectors 
 1992–2005 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes / age 
classes 
 no clear relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
if controlled for firm age 
 only new businesses with  positive 
net job creation  
Hall, B. H.  
 
1987 Journal of Industrial 
Economics 
 publicy traded U.S. 
firms 
 manufacturing 
 1972–1983 
 regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
Harhoff/Stahl/Woywode 1998 Journal of Industrial 
Economics 
 German firms 
 all sectors 
 1989–1994 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size / age classes 
 regression 
 negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
 negative relationship between firm 
age and  firm growth (employment) 
Hart 1962 Economica  U.S. and UK firms 
 manufacturing 
 1931–1960 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 no clear relationship between firm 
size and  firm growth (employment) 
Headd 2010 Working paper  U.S. establishments 
 all sectors 
 1998–2006 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
Headd/Kirchhoff 2009 Journal of Small Business 
Management 
 all single-
establishment firms 
(1+ employees) 
 all sectors 
 1992–2002 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes / age 
classes 
 negative relationship between firm 
age and firm growth (employment) 
 most firms do not grow much after 
start up  
Heshmati 2001 Small Business 
Economics 
 all small firms  
 all sectors 
 1993–1998 
 regression  no clear relationship between firm 
size and firm growth: negative for 
employment, positive for sales 
growth negatively related to size 
Hohti 2000 Small Business  all Finnish 
establishments (5+ 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
 no clear relationships between 
establishment size and 
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Author(s) Year Publication Data Estimation design Main findings 
Economics employees) 
 manufacturing 
 1980–1994 
size classes establishment growth (employment) 
Hymer/Pashigan 1962 Journal of Political 
Economy 
 largest U.S. firms 
 manufacturing 
 1946–1955 
 regression  no clear relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
Kirchhoff/Phillips 1988 Journal of Business 
Venturing 
 U.S. firms 
 manufacturing 
 1976–1984 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 negative relationship between firm 
size and rate of net job creation 
 new firms account for majority of 
net job creation 
Kumar 1985 Journal of Industrial 
Economics 
 quoted UK firms 
 all sectors 
 1960–1976 
 regression  slightly negative relationship 
between firm size and rate of net 
job creation 
Liu/Tsou/Hammitt 
 
1999 Economics Letters  Taiwanese firms  
 manufacturing  
 1990–1994 
 regression  negative relationship between plant 
size and plant growth (employment) 
 negative relationship between plant 
age and plant growth (employment) 
Lotti 2007 Industrial and Corporate 
Change 
 Italian firms  
 manufacturing and 
service 
 1993–1998 
 regression 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes / age 
classes 
 negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (rate of 
employment growth decreases in 
firm size at diminishing rate) 
 negative relationship between firm 
age and firm growth  (employment) 
Lotti/Santarelli/Vivarello 2003 Journal of Evolutionary 
Economics 
 all new firms (1+ 
employees) 
 manufacturing 
 1987–1993 
 regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
only for new and small firms 
Mansfield 1962 The American Economic 
Review 
 large U.S. firms 
 manufacturing sector 
 1916–1959 
 regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
among  surviving firms 
Mata/Portugal 1994 Journal of Industrial 
Economics 
 all Portuguese start-ups 
(5+ employees) 
 comparison of 
numbers of firms 
 negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
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Author(s) Year Publication Data Estimation design Main findings 
 manufacturing 
 1981–1988 
in size classes 
Mata/Portugal/Guimaraes 1995 International Journal of 
Industrial Organization 
 all Portuguese plants 
 manufacturing 
 1981–1990 
 regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
Mohnen/Nasev 2008 Betriebswirtschaftliche 
Forschung und Praxis 
 German SMEs  
 all sectors 
 2001–2003 
 regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
 negative relationship between firm 
age and firm growth (employment) 
only among new firms 
Neumark/Wall/Zhang 2011 The Review of Economics 
and Statistics 
 all U.S. establishments 
 all sectors 
 1992–2004 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
 only small firms (max. 20 
employees) with positive net job 
creation 
Samuels 1965 Review of Economic 
Studies 
 U.S. firms 
 all sectors 
 1950–1960 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 positive relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
among  surviving firms 
Santarelli/Vivarelli 2002 Industrial and Corporate 
Change 
 Italian start-ups 
 electrical/electronic 
engineering 
 1987–1993 
 regression 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes   
 negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment); 
less pronounced among established 
firms 
 negative relationship between firm 
age and firm growth (employment) 
Singh/Whittington 
 
1975 Review of Economic 
Studies 
 all quoted UK firms 
 all sectors 
 1948–1960 
 regression 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 positive relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
among  surviving firms 
Tang 2015 Empirical Economics  all Swedish companies 
 energy sector 
 1997–2011 
 regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
but only for young firms 
Variyam/Kraybill 1992 Economics Letters  SMEs in Georgia  regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
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Author(s) Year Publication Data Estimation design Main findings 
  all sectors 
 1986–1991 
 negative relationship between firm 
age and firm growth (employment)  
Voulgaris/Papadogonas/Agiomirigianakis 2005 Review of Development 
Economics 
 all Greek firms 
 manufacturing 
 1995–1999 
 regression 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes / age 
classes 
 negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
 negative relationship between firm 
age and firm growth (employment)  
 only young firms (5 years) with 
positive net job creation  
 
